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I. INTRODUCTION 
Recently the Internal Revenue Service (the "Service") was 
strafed1 by the congressional leadership and the airline industry, 
both sharply criticizing it for requiring an airline to capitalize its 
costs of cyclical major inspections and complete overhauls of 
aircraft engines.2 As a result of Federal Aviation Administration 
(FAA) safety mandates, the airline incurred maintenance costs of 
$90,000 to $122,000 for each of its aircraft engines approximately 
every four years.3 With these inspections and proper routine 
maintenance, such aircraft engines have estimated average 
aggregate service lives of more than twenty-two years.4 The Service 
issued a Technical Advice Memorandum (T.A.M.) requiring the 
capitalization of the costs under the rationale that the expenditures 
produced substantial improvements by increasing the values and 
According to Webster's Seventh New Collegiate Dictionary, "strafe", meaning to rake 
ground troops with machine gun fire from low-flying aircraft, comes from Gott strafe England 
(God punish England), a World War I (German) propaganda slogan. We do not mean to imply 
that these interests act like or have the popular attributes then or now of Huns, much less 
Nazis. There appears in the recent political anti-income tax rhetoric, however, in Professor 
Lee's populist eyes trained by an educated understanding of German culture in the early 
Twentieth Century, at least a faint similarity of conviction as to the righteousness of the 
cause and perhaps an undertone of long-resented subordination in the case of some of the 
congressional leadership interested in this tax issue, probably more justified than in the case 
of the World War I German folk. The Nazis were considerably less self-righteous but 
infinitely more vengeful and above all opportunistic, unprincipled, and treacherous. We 
cheapen the lessons of history to apply World War II terms to the prevalent American 
political factions. 
See T.A.M. 96-18-004 (Jan. 23, 1996). The airline also performed "hot section 
inspections" of the air intake systems of its aircraft on a one to two year cycle at% to% the 
cost of a major engine inspection and overhaul. See id. The auditing agent did not challenge 
the airline's immediate deduction of these costs. See id. 
See id. Actually every six to seven thousand flight hours (turning more on number of 
landings than anything else) triggered an inspection. This article like the Technical Advice 
Memorandum uses the rough equivalent of four years. See id. The purpose for such 
inspections and resultant overhauls was to ensure aircraft reliability and passenger 
safety-"airworthiness." See id. We thank the many who have educated us as to the 
mechanics of replacing and reconditioning aircraft engines as part of such safety inspections 
and the applicable tax accounting methods for rotable parts. In particular the aid of Eric 
Smith, a second-year law student at the College of William and Mary, Ken Kempson, and 
Professor Gene Seago was invaluable. 
See id. 
164 Virginia Tax Review [Vol. 17:161 
useful lives of the engines.5 The airline could recover the so 
capitalized costs through depreciation over an eight-year period.6 
The airline industry feared that this conclusion would raise the 
after-tax costs of inspections because the standard industry practice 
deducted them currently. The airlines collectively spend about nine 
billion dollars each year on inspections and maintenance with one-
third attributable to major engine inspections.7 The airline 
industry asserts that a change from the practice of deducting these 
costs to capitalizing them would increase the industry's tax cost by 
one billion dollars over eight years.8 Such an increase would 
significantly raise the industry's cost of complying with the FAA 
required inspections. 
House Ways and Means Committee Chairman Bill Archer, R-
Tex., wrote former Commissioner Margaret Milner Richardson 
requesting reversal of the T.A.M.'s treatment of these safety 
efforts.9 He argued that these costs were deductible incidental 
repairs and that the Service was using ambiguous interpretations 
of the Supreme Court's. decision in INDOPCO, Inc. v. 
5 Id. 
' See I.R.C. § 168(e)(3)(C)(ii) (providing a seven-year recovery period for the general 
residual class of items of personal property into which aircraft fall). The recovery period for 
aircraft would be used instead ofthe period for an engine specifically because section 168 does 
not permit taxpayers to depreciate structures on a component-by-component basis. See I.R.C. 
§ 168(i)(6). Depreciation deductions for property with a seven-year recovery period would be 
taken over eight tax years due to the half-year convention that treats all property acquired 
during the year as being placed in service on the mid-point of that tax year. See I.R.C. § 
168(d). Depreciation not taken during the first half of the first tax year is taken in the eighth 
year. 
7 See Matthew L. Wald, An I.R.S. Ruling Ruffles Airline Industry Feathers, N.Y. Times, 
Oct. 5, 1996, at 1-38. 
See id. (citing Air Transport Association Lawyer Richard A. Janis) (reporting that the 
one billion dollars consists of interest on additional payments due for past years plus the 
higher tax cost of depreciating the expenditure over longer periods rather than deducting the 
total all at once); accord David Field, IRS Rule Change Upsets Airlines: Repair Deduction a 
Safety "Pena.lty," USA Today, Oct. 8, 1996, at B6; A New Tax Burden on Crucial Airline Safety 
Check-ups Draws Fire, Wall St. J., Sept. 25, 1996, at Al. 
Letter from Rep. Bill Archer, R-Tex., Chairman of House Ways and Means Committee, 
to Margaret Milner Richardson, Commissioner of the Internal Revenue Service (Sept. 19, 
1996) [hereinafter Archer Letter], reprinted in Archer Letter to Commissioner About FAA-
Inspection Costs, 96 Tax Notes Today 198-43 (Oct. 9, 1996) (LEXIS, FEDTAX lib., TNT file, 
elec. cit. 96 TNT 198-43). 
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Commissioner10 to expand the capitalization doctrine.11 
importantly, however, 
More 
[a]t a time when we should be doing everything possible to 
improve aviation safety, I am concerned that the Internal 
Revenue Service position represents a new tax burden on critical 
airline safety inspections and repairs. Moreover, funds 
potentially available for additional safety efforts could instead be 
claimed by the Internal Revenue Service. I believe this Internal 
Revenue Service position is inconsistent with the views recently 
expressed by Vice President Gore as a result of his commission's 
review of airline safety issues and with President Clinton's even 
more recent call for increased spending on airline safety.12 
10 503 U.S. 79 (1992). In INDOPCO, the Court addressed "whether certain professional 
expenses incurred by a target corporation in the course of a friendly takeover are deductible 
by that corporation as 'ordinary and necessary' business expenses." Id. at 80. The Court 
capitalized the expenses on the grounds ofthe long-term benefits that accrued to the target 
from the acquisition. See id. at 88-90. 
11 Archer Letter, supra note 9. 
12 Archer Letter, supra note 9. The reference to "funds ... claimed by the Internal Revenue 
Service" echoes the Republican rhetoric of the debate over whom does income belong to-the 
government or the taxpayer. See, e.g., Michael Wines, House Votes to Cut Taxes by $189 
Billion Over 5 Years as Part of G.O.P. "Contract," N.Y. Times, Apr. 6, 1995, at A1, B10 
(quoting House Ways and Means Committee Chairman Bill Archer, R-Tex.) ("I have a simple 
message for the Democrats: it's not your money; it's the taxpayers' money."); cf. 142 Cong. 
Rec. H5338 (daily ed. May 21, 1996) (Remarks of Rep. Bill Archer) ("Congress treated the 
public's money as if were Congress' own."). What Chairman Archer appears to really oppose 
is progressivity. Representing one of the half-dozen most affluent congressional districts, see 
David E. Rosenbaum, With a Passion {or Tax Cuts, and in Power, N.Y. Times, Apr. 4, 1995, 
at A1, he naturally wants to take care of high income individuals. A signature Archer 
metaphor is providing "fuel for the engine that pulls the train of economic growth," Wines, 
supra. In other words, "affluent taxpayers must receive tax breaks because they are mainly 
the ones who invest money and create jobs for others." Rosenbaum, supra. Chairman 
Archer's more recent signature phrase involves tearing the Code out by its roots. See Archer 
Announces Hearing on Replacing Federal Income Tax and Its Impact on Small Business, 
reprinted in W&M Schedules Hearing on Effect of Tax Reform on Small Business, 96 Tax 
Notes Today 65-19 (Apr. 2, 1996) (LEXIS, FEDTAX lib., TNT file, elec. cit. 96 TNT 65-19). 
The two goals seem related: tearing the progressive income tax out by its roots would provide 
fuel for the engine. We presume that Chairman Archer is sincere in his belief that cutting 
taxes at the top will trickle down through general increase in productivity and standard of 
living (or at least its maintenance). We read the record as showing to the contrary that the 
trickle down experiments of the 1978 and 1981 tax cuts failed in that respect-any trickle 
down was from the top 1% to the top 5% or so of families. See John W. Lee, Current 
Congressional Capital Gains Contentions, 15 Va. Tax Rev. 1, 53-55 (1995) [hereinafter 
Capital Gains Contentions]. Certainly Bill Clinton, then-governor of Arkansas, played the 
populist rhetoric of failed trickle down economics with much skill and success in his 1992 
Presidential Campaign. See John W. Lee, President Clinton's Capital Gains Proposals, 59 
Tax Notes 1399, 1400 (June 7, 1993). That is why Lee defended President Clinton's then-
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Chairman Archer's letter broached the idea that the deductibility 
of the inspection costs was supported by the FAA safety policy 
rather than by federal tax policy. Thirty-one bipartisan members 
of the House Ways and Means Committee drafted a second letter to 
Treasury Secretary Robert Rubin concurring with Chairman 
Archer's conclusions.13 They asserted: "Clearly the IRS is 
overstepping its authority in attempting to impose this tax penalty 
on air safety."14 
IRS Chief Counsel Stuart Brown, on behalf of Commissioner 
Richardson, replied to Chairman Archer.15 Brown insisted that the 
Service has consistently issued rulings "holding that INDOPCO 
does not change the fundamental legal principles" of 
capitalization. 16 Accordingly, Brown concluded that the T.A.M. 
properly characterized the costs as capital expenditures for the 
populist reputation against a right wing knock-off of the scurrilous, populist "Mellon Ditty" 
from the 1920's. John W. Lee, "Death and Taxes" and Hypocrisy, 60 Tax Notes 1393 (Sept. 
6, 1993). 
13 Letter from Mac Collins et al., Representative, U.S. House of Representatives, to Robert 
E. Rubin, Secretary of the Treasury (Sept. 26, 1996), reprinted in Reps' Letter to Rubin on 
IRS's New Capitalization Position, 96 Tax Notes Today 196-51 (Oct. 7, 1996) (LEXIS, 
FEDTAX lib., TNT file, elec. cit. 96 TNT 196-51). 
14 Id. 
15 Letter from Stuart L. Brown, Chief Counsel, Internal Revenue Service, to Bill Archer, 
Representative, U.S. House of Representatives (Oct. 1, 1996) [hereinafter Brown Letter], 
reprinted in IRS Chief Counsel's Response to Archer on FAA-Inspection Costs, 96 Tax Notes 
Today 198-44 (Oct. 9, 1996) (LEXIS, FEDTAX lib., TNT file, elec. cit. 96 TNT 196-51). 
16 I d.; "c{ T.A.M. 96-41-004 (June 25, 1996)(citing various rulings asserting that INDOPCO 
confirmed, without changing, capitalization principles); Letter from Thomas J. Smith, 
Internal Revenue Service, to William F. Clinger, Chairman of the House Committee on 
Government Reform and Oversight, U.S. House of Representatives (Aug. 8, 1996), reprinted 
in IRS Response to Clinger on FAA-Inspection Costs, 96 Tax Notes Today 200-13 (Oct. 11, 
1996) (LEXIS, FEDTAX lib., TNT file, elec. cit. 96 TNT 200-13). In fact, INDOPCO did not 
change the fundamental legal principles governing capitalization; however, most people had 
not understood those principles but had instead been applying the erroneous "no separate 
asset" test to deduct many future benefit expenses. See John W. Lee, Doping Out the 
Capitalization Rules After INDOPCO, 57 Tax Notes 669, 669 (Nov. 2, 1992) [hereinafter 
Capitalization Rules] (quoting Ecclesiastes' observation that what appears to be new actually 
occurred before). Brown himself acknowledged that the Service discovered while setting 
"standards in the aftermath of INDOPCO [that] 'we ... don't know what the pre-INDOPCO 
standard was."' Brown Lists Factors That Could be Used to See if Cleanup Costs Must be 
Capitalized, Daily Tax Rep. (BNA), Mar. 10, 1993, at G-11 (quoting Associate Chief Counsel 
Stuart Brown). This confusion is amply manifested in the twists and turns of the Service's 
approach to capitalization rules. See John Lee et al., Restating Capitalization Standards and 
Rules: The Case for Rough Justice Regulations (Part One), 23 Ohio N.U. L. Rev. 631 (1997) 
and (Part Two), 23 Ohio N.U. L. Rev. (forthcoming) [hereinafter Rough Justice] (outlining the 
various approaches in the Service's rulings). 
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improvement of property instead of adopting Archer's 
characterization as incidental repairs.17 In particular, "[t]he major 
inspections involve the replacement or reconditioning of a large 
portion of the engine's component parts; upon completion of these 
procedures, the engine's value was materially increased and its 
service life was substantially prolonged."18 Finally, Brown assured 
Archer that the Service shared Congress' concem for airline safety; 
however, Brown asserted that the T.A.M. merely applied current 
tax law to an airline19 without addressing any safety issues.20 
Chairman Archer expressed disappointment with Brown's 
response,21 complaining that IRS disapproval of the airline 
industry's long-standing practice of deducting the costs not only 
failed to provide any rationale for its new interpretation of 
capitalization standards but even failed to acknowledge that this 
was a new interpretation.22 Moreover, Archer asserted that the 
Service's position contradicted the Clinton Administration's support 
·for airline safety by imposing a "new tax burden" on the airlines.23 
17 Brown Letter, supra note 15. 
18 Brown Letter, supra note 15. 
19 Brown Letter, supra note 15. Brown insisted that a T.A.M. is taxpayer specific-it is 
based on one taxpayer's specific factual circumstances and cannot be cited as precedent by 
other taxpayers. I d. Others assert "[t]hat's not the real world" because agents will rely on 
the reasoning of the T.A.M. to support its conclusions when auditing other airlines. Tom 
Herman, Airlines Decry IRS Move as Threat to Safety, Broader Than Apparent, Wall St. J., 
Oct. 10, 1996, at B4 (quoting former IRS Commissioner Donald Alexander); accord Letter 
from Bill Archer, Chairman of House Ways and Means Committee, to Margaret Milner 
Richardson, Commissioner ofthe Intemal Revenue Service (Oct. 8, 1996) (noting that agents 
already were using the T.A.M. in audits of other airlines) [hereinafter Archer Reply], 
reprinted in Archer Letter to Commissioner About IRS Refusal to Change Inspection Cost 
Policy, 96 Tax Notes Today 198-45 (Oct. 9, 1996) (LEXIS, FEDTAX lib., TNT file, elec. cit. 96 
TNT 198-45). As discussed below, the fact that the IRS National Office of Appeals put aircraft 
engine inspection costs on the "significant issues" list in 1992, List of Significant Issues in the 
Internal Revenue Service Industry Specialization Program, Accompanied by Explanation by 
John Monaco, Executive Director, IRS Coordinated E=mination Programs, reprinted in Daily 
Tax Rep. (BNA), Dec. 23, 1992, at L-29, is far more relevant than the holding of the T.A.M. 
"' Brown Letter, supra note 15. 
21 Archer Reply, supra note 19. 
22 Archer Reply, supra note 19. 
23 Archer Reply, supra note 19. Archer has vowed that income taxes will not be raised 
during his tenure. See Unofficial Transcript of June 8 W&M Hearing on Tax Reform, 96 Tax 
Notes Today 116-54 (June 15, 1995) (LEXIS, FEDTAX lib., TNT file, elec. cit. 95 TNT 116-54) 
("Well, I would contemplate that as long as I'm chairman ofthis committee that none ofthese 
plans will raise taxes."). He may mean that taxes will not be raised by the IRS as well as by 
new Congressional enactments. 
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Simultaneously, the House Budget Committee Report expressed 
dissatisfaction with the Service's refusal to take into account FAA 
safety policies.24 Such late 1996 Congressional disapproval ofthe 
Service's position forewarns of potential Congressional interference 
aimed at preserving the government's policy on air safety. It 
appears unlikely at this time that Congress will address this issue 
with substantive legislation due to the pay-go rules that would 
require it to find a revenue raiser to offset the Joint Committee on 
Taxation computed hypothetical revenue loss created by 
subtracting, pursuant to statutory authorization, these costs 
immediately (as they currently do in the real tax world)25 from a 
hypothetical baseline in which these costs are properly capitalized 
and amortized. This absurdity suggests that the pay-go rules 
should be modified to allow enactment of simplification rules 
codifying a widespread but conceptually incorrect practice without 
creating a hypothetical revenue loss. 
24 H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 104-863, at 1149 (1996) 142 Cong. Rec. H11644, H12009 (daily ed. 
Sept. 28, 1996) ("[T]he conferees urge the IRS to reverse its recent position on [the] tax 
treatment of aircraft inspection and safety costs."). 
25 The "pay-go" procedures of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990, as extended 
by the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, require estimated revenue decreases 
under federal tax legislation to be offset by increases in revenues or decreases in spending to 
produce no net increase in the estimated federal deficit. See Michael J. Graetz, Paint-by-
Numbers Tax Lawmaking, 95 Colum. L. Rev. 609, 611-12 (1995); Barbara Kirchheimer, 
Reconciliation Perspective: A Look Back to See Where We're Headed, 59 Tax Notes 158 (Apr. 
12, 1993); Capital Gains Contentions, supra note 12, at 57; Alexander Polinsky, What is the 
Deficit Trust Fund?, 60 Tax Notes 1295, 1296 (Sept. 6, 1993). Revenue decreases usually 
come from "tax expenditures," defined as "reductions in individual and corporate income tax 
liabilities that result from special tax provisions or regulations that provide tax benefits to 
particular taxpayers. These special tax provisions can take the form of exclusions, credits, 
deductions, preferential tax rates, or deferrals oftax liability." Joint Committee on Taxation, 
Estimates of Federal Tax Expenditures for Fiscal Years 1997-2001 2 (Nov. 26, 1996), reprinted 
in JCT Releases Five-Year Forecast of Tax Expenditure Costs, 96 Tax Notes Today 231-6 
(Nov. 27, 1996) (LEXIS, FEDTAX lib., TNT file, elec. cit. 96 TNT 231-6). "Special income tax 
provisions are referred to as tax expenditures because they are considered to be analogous 
to direct outlay programs, and the two can be considered as alternative means of 
accomplishing similar budget policy objectives. Tax expenditures are most similar to those 
direct spending programs that have no spending limits, and that are available as 
entitlements to those who meet the statutory criteria established for the programs." !d. For 
an enlightening sampling of the literature, see Paul L. Caron et al., Federal Income Tax 
Anthology 296-312 (1997). Under the pay-go rules, the ideal rule of capitalization/ 
depreciation as to cyclical safety aircraft engine overhauls is included in the base line so that 
a new statute allowing expensing would be counted as a revenue loser. In actuality, this 
provision would not increase the deficit because the taxpayers already were expensing the 
costs and not paying tax on the hypothetically correct income. 
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Rather than adopting such a sensible bookkeeping reform, 
congressional tax leadership appears more likely to resort to 
procedural legislation, generically known as "limitation riders" 
even when appearing in Committee bills rather than in a floor 
amendment, that would bar the Service from requiring the 
capitalization of overhaul costs until the Service takes account of 
FAA safety policies. 26 Although the limitation riders might entail 
an explicit ban on the Service's enforcement of capitalization 
standards in this area, the placement of a statement of disapproval 
of the Service's position in the 1997 appropriations bill hints that 
Congress might simply refuse to finance the Service's enforcement 
activities.27 (Professor Lee understands, primarily from 
conversations with former Treasury Deputy Tax Legislative 
Counsel and Chief ofthe Joint Committee Staff (and, in between, 
Professor of Law at the Universities ofVirginia and Pennsylvania) 
Harry Gutman, that given the current institutional "culture" of 
Congress refusal to fund is less viable than a ban on enforcement 
of a particular tax policy.) Curiously, the motivation for this 
congressional micromanagement of tax regulation . ostensibly 
derives from safety concems and not the Service's administration 
of the tax laws. (The no new tax increase notion appears the driving 
force for some.) 
In particular, the congressional leadership states that it seeks to 
achieve a policy coordinated between the Service and those 
26 See, e.g., Archie Parnell, Congressional Interference in Agency Enforcement: The IRS 
Experience, 89 Yale L.J. 1360, 1370-75, 1371 n.77, 1372 n.85 (1980) (cataloging instances 
during 1975-80 when Congress prohibited the IRS from executing certain aspects of the tax 
law in the areas of (a) salary reduction plans, (b) oil production-sharing contracts, (c) 
employee tips paid by credit card, (d) publishers' prepublication costs, (e) travel expenses, (0 
private non-qualified deferred compensation plans, (g) fringe benefits, (h) employee and 
independent contractor classifications, (i) losses of tax-exempt status for racially 
discriminating schools, and (j) contributions to tax-exempt religious schools for educational 
purposes). At the Virginia Tax Study Group's [hereinafter VTSG] Spring 1997 Symposium 
the father of the VTSG as well of so much else in the Code, Emeritus Professor Edwin Cohen 
(former Under Secretary of Treasury who most notably designed and presented the Tax 
Reform Act of 1969 to the tax writing Committees and co-authored the 1954 American Law 
Institute Corporate Tax Proposals and whose hands-on experience with income taxes begins 
with the Revenue Act of 1936) noted that the "limitation rider" which he had fashioned for 
the publishers was in a regular tax act (section 2119 of the Tax Reform Act of 1976) and 
remained in effect for a decade as to publishers (until section 263A of the 1986 Code was 
enacted). See infra note 88. 
27 See supra note 24. 
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agencies concerned with safety.28 This raises the question of when 
and how the Service should consider non-tax policies affected by the 
tax laws. Ultimately, this issue turns more on tax politics than on 
tax policies. If the Service simply reversed the cyclical aircraft 
engine maintenance T.A.M. with a tersely worded ruling-as it did 
with the soil remediation T.A.M.,29 every other industry faced with 
a new post-INDOPCO ruling would tend to challenge it politically.30 
Conversely, if the Service did not consider FAA policy and/or hold 
public hearings to consider cyclical safety overhauls, then Congress 
might use limitation riders to suspend the application of the 
T.A.M.'s reasoning. Either way, the Service might well find its 
whole post-INDOPCO strategy of incrementalism, described 
immediately below, much more trouble than it ever could have been 
worth. 
This article elaborates on the open letter written by Professor 
John Lee to Commissioner Richardson in partial support of the 
cyclical aircraft engine safety inspection T.A.M.'s conclusions31 and 
offers negotiated rule making as a defusing technique to address 
the above problems. The article recommends that the Service 
abandon its apparent strategy of establishing capitalization rules 
incrementally through audit, litigation, and occasional rulings. As 
described more fully in Rough Justice, Political Science Professor 
Charles Lindblom, aptly dubbing that approach "Muddling 
Through,"32 recommends it where an administrative agency is 
28 See H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 104-863, supra note 24, at 1149 ("The conferees are also 
concerned that this policy change, which affects the entire airline industry and critical airline 
safety policies, was implemented without apparent input from and coordination with other 
interested parties such as the Department of Transportation and the FAA."). 
29 See Rev. Rul. 94-38, 1994-1 C.B. 35 (reversing T.A.M. 93-15-004 (Dec. 17, 1992)); infra 
notes 225-29 and accompanying text. 
3° Cf Art Pine, Congress Stirs Up IRS Enforcement, Wash. Post, Dec. 22, 1978, at E1 
(describing congressional action inspired by constituents upset by an IRS ruling). 
31 See Letter from John Lee, Professor, William and Mary Law School, to Margaret Milner 
Richardson, Commissioner of the Internal Revenue Service (Sept. 30, 1996) [hereinafter Lee 
Letter) (agreeing with the need to capitalize the overhaul costs but suggesting a four-year 
recovery period for the capitalized costs as a freestanding depreciable intangible, much like 
a financial accounting "deferred charge"), reprinted in Professor Says IRS Shouldn't Change 
Position on Capitalizing Costs of Airplane Engine Overhauls, 96 Tax Notes Today 204-11 (Oct. 
18, 1996) (LEXIS, FEDTAX lib., TNT file, elec. cit. 96 TNT 204-11). 
32 Charles E. Lindblom, The Science of "Muddling Through," 19 Pub. Admin. Rev. 79 
(1959). 
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unsure of the best rules or, as appears to be the instant case, where 
there are conflicts inside the agency.33 Such intra-agency conflicts 
appear to exist in the Service between (a) the higher levels of Chief 
Counsel, and (b) the National Office of Appeals as reported by the 
tax press34 and, according to comments at the Virginia Tax Study 
Group by Glenn Carrington and Ken Kempson, regional chief 
counsel as well who are eager to establish the boundaries of 
capitalization/expensing through litigation. We strongly 
recommend in Rough Justice and again here that the Service utilize 
instead the medium of more global structured discretionary justice 
regulations as conceptualized by University of Chicago Law School 
Administrative Law Professor Kenneth Culp Davis in his landmark 
Discretionary Justice, a Preliminary lnquiry.35 Such regulations 
should set forth (a) the clear reflection of income standard for 
capitalization versus expensing, (b) rough justice rules for 
implementing such standard, and (c) directions for applying those 
rules under fully articulated balancing tests. Going beyond the 
advice in the open letter,36 this article advocates that the Service 
formulate such structured discretionary rough justice regulations 
through negotiated rulemaking with other agencies appropriately 
represented during the discussions of certain topics affecting non-
33 See Rough Justice, supra note 16. 
34 See Minutes of Tax Executives Institute-Internal Revenue Service Liaison Meeting 
November 19, 1996, [hereinafter TEl-IRS Liaison Minutes] (Remarks of Chief Counsel Stuart 
Brown) reprinted in TEl Releases Minutes of IRS, Treasury Liaison Meetings 97 Tax Notes 
Today 20-46 (Jan. 30, 1997) (LEXIS, FEDTAX lib., TNT file, elec. cit. 97 TNT 20-46). 
35 Kenneth Culp Davis, Discretionary Justice, A Preliminary Inquiry 103 (LSU Press 1969); 
cf. John W. Lee, The Art of Regulation Drafting: Structured Discretionary Justice Under 
section 355, 44 Tax Notes 1029, 1032 (Aug. 28, 1989). 
36 See Lee Letter, supra note 31. This initial reaction to avoid deciding tax treatment on 
non-tax policy grounds at least put Professor Lee in good company-i.e., the Treasury and 
Service officials responsible for reviewing the soil remediation T.A.M. See Andrew J. 
Roemer, Service Ponders Environmental Cleanup Costs; Carrington Uncertain of Outcome, 
93 Tax Notes Today 102-10 (May 12, 1993) (LEXIS, FEDTAX lib., TNT file, elec. cit. 93 TNT 
102-10) ("The denial of deductibility was not based on environmental policy, and the current 
review of the treatment of environmental costs will not consider environmental policy .... 
'Environmental impact is an issue for legislators and policymakers. My job is to only 
interpret the law .... "') (quoting Associate Chief Counsel Glenn Carrington); cf Treasury 
Official Sees Environmental Clean-up Guidance This Year as Warranted, Daily Tax Rep. 
(BNA), May 10, 1993, at G-14 (considering environmental guidance that promotes both public 
policy and tax policy goals). The reaction of members of the VTSG at the Spring 1997 
Symposium was much the same. 
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tax policies.37 This approach should seek to replicate the best of the 
prior collegial tax reform experiences. Following these 
recommendations, the Service could take major steps toward 
simplifying the capitalization rules and reducing the tax law's 
interference in business decisions. 
Part II advances a rough justice concept that seeks fair results 
through easy-to-apply rules. These rules create a minimal 
distortion of income when compared with their capitalization-cum-
depreciation counterpart. This part explains the rationales behind 
rough justice, puts forth four rough justice exceptions to 
capitalization, and advocates promulgating structured 
discretionary justice regulations incorporating these exceptions. 
Part Ill applies these rough justice exceptions in the context of the 
aircraft maintenance T.A.M. Finally, part IV presents 
considerations of public policy important to interpretation of the tax 
laws. This part first demonstrates that the Service previously has 
considered the impact on non-tax policies in several areas when 
interpreting the Code. Then this part advances a two-prong test 
that looks to a congressional or judicial identification of a policy 
overlap and requires a severe frustration of the non-tax policy 
before the Service considers the non-tax policy. This part concludes 
that in the case of the airline maintenance T.A.M., the Service 
should use a negotiated rulemaking strategy to take into account 
the safety policies of the FAA. 
37 See generally Administrative Conference of the United States, Negotiated Rulemaking 
Source Book (1990); Daniel J. Fiorino, Dimensions of Negotiated Rule-making: Practical 
Constraints and Theoretical Implications, in Conflict Resolution and Public Policy 141 
(Miriam K. Mills ed., 1990); Philip J. Harter, Negotiating Regulations: A Cure for Malaise, 
71 Geo. L.J. 1 (1982); Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Administrative Alternative Dispute Resolution: 
The Development of Negotiated Rulemaking and Other Processes, 14 Pepp. L. Rev. 863 (1987); 
Lawrence Susskind & Gerard McMahon, The Theory and Practice of Negotiated Rulemaking, 
3 Yale J. on Reg. 133 (1985). 
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II. "ROUGH JUSTICE" OR "MORE-TROUBLE-THAN-IT'S-WORTH 
EXCEPTIONS"38 TO CAPITALIZATION OF FUTURE BENEFIT 
EXPENDITURES 
Sections 16239 and 26340 intend to more accurately calculate net 
income41 by generally matching42 expenses with revenue in the 
taxable period in which the expenses actually generate that 
revenue.43 Justice Blackmun advanced this conceptually sound 
idea recently in INDOPCO, Inc. v. Commissioner44 and two decades 
38 NCNB Corp. v. United States, 651 F.2d 942, 953 (4th Cir. 1981) [hereinafter NCNB I), 
rev'd en bane, 684 F.2d 285 (4th Cir. 1982), overruled, 503 U.S. 79 (1992); see NCNB I, 651 
F.2d at 961 (noting "situations involving considerations of pragmatism and uncertainty"). 
39 I.R.C. § 162(a) ("There shall be allowed as a deduction all the ordinary and necessary 
expenses paid or incurred during the taxable year in carrying on any trade or business .... "). 
40 I.R.C. § 263(a) (denying deductions for most capital expenditures). 
41 Taxing net annual income is a fundamental policy of the Code. See 50 Cong. Rec. 3849 
(1913) (remarks of Sen. Williams). Today the keystone is section 446's mandate that a 
taxpayer's method of income tax accounting must clearly reflect income. See I.R.C. § 446(b). 
A taxpayer's practice of expensing or capitalizing an expenditure is a method of accounting. 
See Rev. Rul. 95-74, 1995-2 C.B. 36; Rev. Rul. 95-32, 1995-1 C.B. 8; G.C.M. 39,328 (Jan. 23, 
1985) ("A material item is defined as any item which involves the proper time for the 
inclusion ofthe item in income or the taking of a deduction. Clearly, the taxes, interest and 
loan fees at issue constitute material items since the decision whether to capitalize or 
expense such items involves the appropriate time for taking a deduction.") (citation omitted). 
42 That match is by no means exact. Rather capitalized costs are "added" to the basis of 
an asset, see I.R.C. § 1016, and then depreciated over the estimated useful life or recovery 
period at varying rates of depreciation. See I.R.C. §§ 167, 168. Capital recovery often occurs 
over a much shorter period than the actual useful economic life. Only by pure chance would 
the depreciation deductions actually match the resulting income. 
43 See generally Alan Gunn, Matching of Costs and Revenues as a Goal of Tax Accounting, 
4 Va. Tax Rev. 1 (1984); cf H.R. Rep. No. i04-586, at 140 (1996) (referring to sections 167(g) 
and 263A for which "in theory, the income forecast method is an appropriate method for 
matching the capitalized cost of certain property with the income produced by such 
property"); George Mundstock, Taxation of Business Intangible Capital, 135 U. Penn. L. Rev. 
1179, 1184 n.15 (1987) ("A currentfad in tax policy is ... the financial accounting notion of 
'matching."'). 
« 503 U.S. 79 (1992). In espousing the matching notion, Justice Blackmun stated that: 
[t]he primary effect of characterizing a payment as either a business expense or a capital 
expenditure concerns the timing of the taxpayer's cost recovery: While business 
expenses are currently deductible, a capital expenditure usually is amortized and 
depreciated over the life of the relevant asset, or, where no specific asset or useful life 
can be ascertained, is deducted upon dissolution of the enterprise. Through provisions 
such as these, the Code endeavors to match expenses with the revenues of the taxable 
period to which they are properly attributable, thereby resulting in a more accurate 
calculation of net income for tax purposes. 
I d. at 83-84 (citations omitted). 
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earlier in Commissioner v. Idaho Power Co.45 to explain that when 
an expenditure offers benefits in future periods, the expenditure 
should be capitalized instead of expensed to accurately reflect net 
income. 
Why should the doctrinal and tax policy analysis not stop with 
future benefit? Arguably, the cyclical overhauls yield substantial 
future benefit for a four-year period and therefore should be 
capitalized and amortized over that period. (Of course depreciation 
over an eight-year period of an expenditure repeated every four 
years distorts the taxpayer's income. Judge Sterrett provided the 
answer in Wolfsen Land & Cattle Co. v. Commissioner,46 which 
Glenn Carrington introduced into the Chief Counsel's quiver of 
capitalization precedent and doctrine.)47 Treasury, as well as some 
academics, advocates capitalization and depreciation for all multi-
period costs.48 Otherwise, as a Tax Notes Today article put it, 
airlines receive tax advantages and preferences over other forms of 
transportation that must capitalize their overhaul and 
reconditioning costs.49 The short answer to the above question is 
45 418 U.S. 1 (1974). Focusing on the purpose of depreciation in tax accounting, the Court 
stressed that depreciation serves to allocate the cost of an asset to the various periods that 
benefit from the asset use. See id. at 10-11. 
When the asset is used to further the taxpayer's day-to-day business operations, the 
periods of benefit usually correlate with the production of income. Thus, to the extent 
that equipment used in such operations, a current depreciation deduction is an 
appropriate offset to gross income currently produced. It is clear, however, that different 
principles are implicated when the consumption of the asset takes place in the 
construction of other assets that, in the future, will produce income themselves. In this 
latter situation, the cost represented by depreciation does not correlate with production 
of current income. 
Id. at 11. 
•• 72 T.C. 1 (1979). 
47 For the Carrington-Lee-Wolfsen Land & Cattle story, see Miscellaneous Revenue Issues: 
Hearings before the Subcomm. on Select Revenue Measures of the House Comm. on Ways and 
Means (Part 2), 103d Cong., 1689, 1702 (1993) [hereinafter 1993 Hearings) (Prepared 
Statement of Professor Lee). · 
48 See 2 U.S. Dep't Treasury, Tax Reform for Fairness, Simplicity and Economic Growth-
General Explanation 202-11 (1984). 
49 John Godfrey, Bipartisan Group Says Reverse IRS Decision on Plane Inspections, 96 Tax 
Notes Today 196-3 (Oct. 7, 1996). See, e.g., LaSalle Trucking Co. v. Commissioner, 22 T.C.M. 
(CCH) 1375 (1963) (capitalizing the costs to overhaul truck engines); Rev. Rul. 88-57, 1988-2 
C.B. 36 (capitalizing substantial costs for cyclical overhauls of freight-train cars). Some 
commentators distinguish Revenue Ruling 88-57 from the aircraft engine overhauls because 
the railway car overhauls take place at the otherwise end of their service life. See William 
L. Raby & Burgess J.W. Raby, Capitalizing the Costs of Aircraft Engine Overhauls, 71 Tax 
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that courts, Congress, and the Service always have tempered the 
absolute rule that future benefit requires capitalization with a host 
of exceptions.50 The story of these exceptions, which essentially 
make the rule, provides the rationales and tax policies supporting 
the judicial and administrative results. 
The Supreme Court implicitly has recognized the role of these 
exceptions. In Commissioner v. Lincoln Savings & Loan 
Association51-properly read for the general proposition that 
expenditures should be capitalized when incurred to enhance or 
create an asset producing substantial future benefit52-Justice 
Blackmun warned that "the presence of an ensu:lng benefit that 
may have some future aspect is not controlling; many expenses 
concededly deductible have prospective effect beyond the taxable 
year."53 Similarly in INDOPCO, Justice Blackmun acknowledged 
that the mere presence of an incidental future benefit may not 
warrant capitalization. 54 After sanctioning the use of exc~ptions, 
however, the Court left to others the task of explaining and 
cataloging the exceptions. 
Notes 1221, 1222 (May 27, 1996). 
50 See NCNB I, 651 F.2d .at 953 (noting that these exceptions allow a taxpayer "currently 
to recognize some expenses even though theoretically nicety would suggest capitalization and 
subsequent recognition. They may be called the 'more-trouble-than-it's-worth exceptions.'"). 
61 403 u.s. 345 (1971). 
62 See Black Hills Corp. v. Commissioner, 73 F.3d 799, 805-06 (8th Cir. 1996); Rev. Proc. 
90-63, 1990-2 C.B. 664, 665; Rev. Rul. 89-23, 1989-1 C.B. 85; G.C.M. 39,606 (Feb. 27, 1987); 
T.A.M. 96-41-004 (June 25, 1996); T.A.M. 96-38-002 (June 3, 1996); T.A.M. 90-24-003 (Mar. 
2, 1990). 
53 Lincoln Savings, 403 U.S. at 354. This statement served as the peg for the development 
of the separate asset doctrine. See John W. Lee & Nina R. Murphy, Capital Expenditures: 
A Result in Search of a Rationale, 15 U. Rich. L. Rev. 473, 475-84 (1981) (discussing the 
development of the separate asset doctrine). Several commentators showed that the separate 
asset doctrine was unsound and was not mandated by Lincoln Savings. See, e.g., Alan Gunn, 
The Requirement that a Capital Expenditure Create or Enhance an Asset, 15 B.C. Indus. & 
Com. L. Rev. 443 (1974); Lee & Murphy, supra, at 481-84. By and large, the doctrine 
developed in reaction to IRS overreaching in requiring capitalization without allowing any 
or only inadequate depreciation. See NCNB I, 651 F.2d at 959; John W. Lee, Start-up Costs, 
Section 195, and Clear Reflection of Income: A Tale of Talismans, Tacked-on Tax Reform, and 
a Touch of Basics, 6 Va. Tax Rev. 1, 51-56 (1986) [hereinafter Start-up Costs and Clear 
Reflection of Income]. 
54 See INDOPCO, 503 U.S. at 87. 
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A: The Rationales Underlying the Exceptions 
Several rationales explain why exceptions generally temper the 
otherwise absolute rule of capitalizing all costs producing future 
benefit. These rationales consider costs that produce incidental 
future benefits, a balancing of the benefits and burdens of 
capitalization, and the role of administrative convenience in 
applying the tax laws. 
1. Incidental Future Benefit 
The potential capitalization of all costs that generate future 
benefit presents an overly expansive rule never intended for income 
tax accounting.55 The Supreme Court recognized this limitation in 
INDOPCO by stating that incidental future benefits may not 
require capitalization.56 Tax Court Judge Tannenwald explored 
this incidental future benefit limitation in Sun Microsystems, Inc. 
v. Commissioner. 57 In Sun Microsystems, the taxpayer, a new high-
tech company, argued that the issuance of stock warrants to a new 
major customer-with the exercise rights contingent upon the 
volume of future purchases-constituted sales discounts, whereas 
the Government argued that under INDOPCO's "new look" the 
warrants should be capitalized as an investment made to develop 
65 See 1 B. Bittker, Federal Taxation of Income, Estates and Gifts 'II 20.4.1, at 20-67 (1st 
ed. 1981). Professor Bittker explained: 
[I]f the IRS seriously endeavored to disallow every cost contributing to the profits of 
future periods, it would be necessary to divide almost every salary and advertising 
expense between its immediate impact on the customer and its contribution to the 
company's long-lived goodwill. Recognizing this fact of business life, the Supreme Court 
has said that "the presence of an ensuing benefit that may have some future aspect is 
not controlling; many expenses concededly deductible have prospective effect beyond the 
taxable year." 
Id. (quoting Lincoln Savings, 403 U.S. at 354); cf Encylopaedia Britannica, Inc. v. 
Commissioner, 685 F.2d 212, 217 (7th Cir. 1982) (same reasoning and example); John W. Lee, 
A Blend o{Old Wines in a New Wineskin: Section 183 and Beyond, 29 Tax L. Rev. 347, 462 
(1974) ("[An] increase in earning power or benefit to future years is not alone sufficient [for 
capitalization], otherwise all ordinary and necessary business expenditures resulting in 
greater profit would have to be capitalized, which is not the law."). 
66 See INDOPCO, 503 U.S. at 87 ("[T]he mere presence of an incidental future 
benefit-'some future aspect'-may not warrant capitalization."). 
67 66 T.C.M. (CCH) 997 (1993). 
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a long-term relationship with a customer.58 Judge Tannenwald 
responded: 
We find it unnecessary to refine this claimed "new look" for the 
purpose of our decision herein. . . . [T]he Supreme Court 
recognized that, while realization of future benefits is important 
in determining existence of a capital expenditure, "the mere 
presence of an incidental future benefit-'some future 
aspect'-may not warrant capitalization." INDOPCO .... "[T]he 
anticipated long-term benefits to [the taxpayer] from the 
relationship with [tl).e customer] were 'softer' and were 
speculative, compared to the immediate benefits to [the taxpayer] 
of the anticipated sales of computer workstations to [the 
customer] under the Purchase Agreement." 
We conclude that the instant situation falls within the 
"incidental future benefit" category reflected in INDOPCO . ... 
Indeed, the long-term benefits herein appear to be no different 
than those present in stock options given to. employees which 
were held not to impair their compensatory character even before 
the enactment of the statutory framework that now exists.59 
Judge Tannenwald thus ruled that costs predominately 
benefiting the current period justify an immediate deduction when 
the remaining future benefit is incidental. Also he catalogued as 
coming within the currently deductible/incidental future benefit 
category authorities permitting current deduction of author's 
prepublication costs, job seeking fees, and advertising costs.60 
•• ld. at 1002. 
" Id. at 1005 (citations omitted). 
60 I d. We conclude that the instant situation falls within the "incidental future benefit" 
category reflected iniNDOPCO. Cf Snyder v. United States, 674 F.2d 1359, 1365 (lOth Cir. 
1982) (author's expenses in connection with a book to be published in future held deductible); 
Primuth v. Commissioner, 54 T.C. 374 (1970) (fee in order to secure employment held 
deductible); Rev. Rul. 92-80, 1992-2 C.B. 57 (INDOPCO does not preclude deduction of 
advertising expenses having a future benefit); see Lee, "Doping out the Capitalization Rules 
after INDOPCO," 57 Tax Notes 669 (Nov. 2, 1992); Note, "Deductibility of Takeover and 
Non-Takeover Expenses in the Wake of lndopco," 45 Tax Law. 815 (1992). Indeed, the 
long-term benefits herein appear to be no different than those present in stock options given 
to employees which were held not to impair their compensatory character even before the 
enactment of the statutory framework that now exists. See Commissioner v. LoBue, supra; 
Union Chemical & Materials Corp. v. United States, 155 Ct. Cl. 540, 296 F.2d 221 (1961). 
Sun Microsystems, supra, 66 T.C.M.(CCH) at 1005. 
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Judge Tannenwald's Sun Microsystems list surely intentionally 
echoes his citing of educational and advertising costs as currently 
deductible despite future benefits over two decades earlier in his 
concurring opinion in Primuth v. Commissioner.61 Judge 
Tannenwald's concurrence was the genesis of Professor Lee's 
interest in doctrine permitting current deduction of expenses with 
some future benefit (or profit).62 When Professor Lee told this story 
to retired Tax Court Judges Samuel Sterrett and Lapsley Hamblen 
at the Virginia Tax Study Group [hereinafter VTSG] Spring 1997 
Symposium, Judge Sterrett proudly, and deservedly so, noted his 
authorship of Primuth, a sea change permitting deduction of 
employee job seeking fees (which at that time appeared to have 
more future benefit than they perhaps do today, with downsizing 
and job uncertainty in the air). Judge Sterrett also was the author 
of Wolfsen Land & Cattle treating a recurring maintenance cost 
itself as a freestanding intangible (much like a deferred charge) 
depreciable over the period of recurrence rather than associating it 
with some much longer lived tangible asset. Thus he joins 
distinguishedjurists, such as Judge Tannenwald, Seventh Circuit 
61 54 T.C. 374 (1970). 
I am in full agreement with the result reached by my colleagues in the majority and with 
much of the reasoning in Judge Sterrett's careful and lucid analysis and his apparent 
rejection of the subtle distinctions which seem to be developing in this area. To me, the 
drawing of distinctions based upon the difference between "seeking" and "securing" 
employment, upon whether the fee of the employment agency is contingent or payable 
in any event, or upon whether the agency's efforts are successful or unsuccessful simply 
adds unnecessary confusion and complexity to a tax law which already defies 
understanding even by sophisticated taxpayers. I would similarly reject any attempt 
to import a capitalization of expenditure concept into a situation such as is involved 
herein. That concept has generally been confined to cases of acquisition of tangible 
assets or intangible assets, such as a license or goodwill of a going business, or 
preparation for engaging in a new field of endeavor. Compare Morton Frank, 20 T.C. 
511 (1953) (prospective acquisition of newspaper businesses); with Manhattan Co. of 
Virginia, Inc., 50 T.C. 78 (1968) (goodwill); and Arthur E. Ryman, Jr., 51 T.C. 799 (19.69) 
(admission to the bar of a second State); and Nathania[ A Denman, 48 T.C. 439 (1967) 
(preparation for a new field of endeavor). By way of contrast, current deductibility has 
normally been permitted for advertising expenditures and for educational expenditures 
to improve one's skills utilized in existing employment, even though there were 
indications that some general benefit would in all probability last beyond the year of 
expenditure. E.g., Consolidated Apparel Co., 17 T.C. 1570, 1582 (1952), affirmed in part 
and reversed in part on other issues, 207 F.2d 580 (7th Cir. 1953) (advertising expenses); 
Cosimo A Carlucci, 37 T.C. 695, 701 (1962) (educational expenses). Compare Harold 
Haft, 40 T.C. 2 (1963). 
Primuth, supra, 54 T.C. at 381-82 (Tannenwald, J., concurring). 
62 See Bittker, supra note 55. 
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Judge Richard Posner, and Justice Harry Blackmun, who have 
shaped the capitalization/expensing doctrine. 
Glenn Carrington indicated at the VTSG Spring 1997 
Symposium that agents argue that Sun Microsystems is just a 
discount case: We believe that Judge Tannenwald, while indicating 
that such narrow analysis resolved the controversy in front of him, 
deliberately pointed to the precedent and surely the analysis 
(minimum distortion of income) that he at least would use to give 
meaning to "incidental" future benefit. In any event, the Service 
followed Sun Microsystems' incidental benefit reasoning in a T.A.M. 
extensively discussing deductibility of pre-opening costs incurred 
by a retailer opening new stores in the same field. 63 During the 
weeks prior to opening a store, this retailer incurred costs for 
employee hiring and training, inventory stocking, and initial 
functioning such as postage, supplies, repairs, utilities, 
communications, and security.64 These costs were typical of those 
incurred during the retailer's normal operations.65 The T.A.M. 
stated that not all expenditures that produce future benefits must 
be capitalized.66 Instead, the T.A.M. focused on whether the 
benefits were short-lived such that the future benefit was 
incidental.67 In this case, the Service concluded that the need to 
incur these costs again shortly, in the normal course ofbusiness, 
indicated that these pre-opening costs provided only short-term 
benefits.68 Expenditures with incidental future benefit, like these 
pre-opening costs, provide ample justification for an immediate 
deduction: when the benefits are realized in the current period, the 
expenditures should be immediately deductible to match the 
expense with the resulting revenue. 
63 See T.A.M. 96-45-002 (June 21, 1996). 
64 See id. 
65 See id. (noting that the recurring nature of these costs provides support for a current 
deduction because recurring costs resemble operating expenses whereas non-recurring costs 
resemble capital expenditures). · 
66 See id. ("Capitalization is not required for every expenditure that produces a future 
benefit."). 
67 See id. 
68 See id. 
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Rough Justice lauds this pre-opening T.A.M. and laments that 
the "published" version in Revenue Ruling 96-6269 is narrowly 
limited to job "training provided in the ordinary course of the 
taxpayer's business" with no other indication of rationale and not 
addressing the business expansion issue.70 Tax Executives 
Institute, Inc. [hereinafter TEl] which had been the prime private 
sector mover behind the Notice 96-771 request for comments finds 
the ruling more helpful than not.72 Glenn Carrington pointed out 
at the VTSG Spring 1997 Symposium, however, that the facts of the 
recent business expansion T.A.M. disclose an abnormally high 
annual employee turnover rate of 60% at many of taxpayer's 
stores.73 He indicated that revenue agents have sought to discount 
the business expansion T.A.M.'s reasoning due to such high 
tumover rates and even argue that because Revenue Ruling 96-62 
was derived from this T.A.M., it too was distinguishable from more 
usual business expansion with much lower tumover rates. Ken 
Kempson flatly stated that when a T.A.M. or other ruling is 
reviewed at a higher level and a ruling is then published by the 
Service, the underlying T.A.M. is dead and buried for purposes of 
analysis ofthe ruling. This is surely so for purposes of"substantial 
authority,"74 but we believe less so as to the reasoning itself. 
2. Balancing Benefits and Burdens 
The Fourth Circuit panel in NCNB Corp. v. United States 
[hereinafter NCNB I] described these exceptions as "situations 
involving considerations of pragmatism and uncertainty in which, 
with the blessing of the Commissioner, taxpayers may deduct 
currently certain expenditures, notwithstanding the presence of 
69 1996-53 I.R.B. 6. 
70 Rough Justice, supra note 16. 
71 1996-1 C.B. 359. 
72 Timothy J. McCormally, Rev. Rul. 96-62: A Lump of Coal or a Nicely Wrapped Present?, 
74 Tax Notes 797 (Feb.10, 1997). 
73 See T.A.M. 96-45-002 (June 21, 1996) (''Thus, the stores must continually hire and train 
new employees to replace those that have resigned or have been terminated or promoted, and 
train the employees that have been promoted or transferred for their new positions."). 
74 See Reg. § 1.6662-4(d)(3)(ii) (1996). 
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probable future benefit."75 The panel majority dubbed these "more-
trouble-than-it's-worth exceptions."76 Although the author of the 
NCNB I majority opinion probably intended a disparaging import 
to the "more trouble" description, the phrase hits the nail squarely 
on the head. It accurately captures the balancing process of 
weighing the burdens of capitalization/depreciation with the 
benefits of a more clear reflection of income resulting from that 
capitalization. The Court of Claims' landmark pre-INDOPCO 
decision Cincinnati, New Orleans & Texas Pacific Railway v. United 
States77 elucidates the proper role for such balancing test: 
Where the burden on both taxpayers and Service to account for 
each item of property separately is great, and the likelihood of 
distortion of income is nil or minimal, the Code is not so rigid and 
so impracticable that it demands that nevertheless all items be 
accounted for individually, no matter what the trouble or onus.78 
The Eighth Circuit implicitly endorsed such a balancing approach by 
ruling in a pre-INDOPCO opinion that "[w]here the prospective benefit is 
75 NCNB I, 651 F.2d at 961. The court further elaborated: 
The Commissioner allows current deductions for some repair and educational 
expenditures which will benefit a taxpayer during subsequent tax years .... Finally, 
there is a residuum of current expenditures which will have some future benefit but 
which "cannot, as a practical matter, be associated with any other period" and allocation 
of which "either on the basis of association with revenue or among several accounting· 
periods is considered to serve no useful purpose.["] These are also currently deductible. 
An example might be the salary of a high corporate officer whose time is not practically 
allocable between present operations and future projects. 
Id. at 961~62 (quoting Accounting Principles Board Statement No. 4, §§ 155, 160 (American 
Inst. of Certified Pub. Accountants 1970)) (footnotes omitted): 
76 NCNB I, 651 F.2d at 953. 
" 424 F.2d 563 (Ct. Cl. 1970). 
78 Id. at 572. The court found the distortion insignificant by comparing "both on a year-to-
year basis and on a 17 -year overall basis, the disallowed minimum rule expenses [i.e., current 
deduction of all items costing less than $500] are fairly similar to the amount of depreciation 
that would have been allowed under the defendant's [capitalization and depreciation] 
method." Id. at 571-72. (Moreover, the after tax revenue would be even closer if the 
additional administrative costs of capitalizing and depreciating were taken into account). 
Professor Gunn pointed to the immediate deduction available for tools, professional books and 
equipment, and work uniforms, concluding that 
(i]n none of these cases will a current deduction reflect income more clearly than would 
capitalization and depreciation, but the burden on the taxpayer of accounting for such 
costs through capitalization and depreciati~n would not justifY the small increase in the 
accuracy of determining taxable income that would result from capitalization. 
Gunn, supra note 53, at 456-57. 
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very slight, capitalization is not easily supported."79 Similarly, Judge 
Posner relied in the landmark, oft-cited Encyclopaedia Britannica on a 
balancing approach to rationalize the current deduction of steady-state 
recurring expenditures when "the benefits of capitalization are unlikely 
to exceed the accounting and other administrative costs entailed in 
capitalization."80 While we understand from Glenn Carrington that 
revenue agents may attempt to distinguish such ·authorities as decided 
prior to INDOPCO, such a tack should not succeed in the courts. These 
authorities all rest on the flexibility of the clear reflection of income 
standard. 
3. Administrative Convenience 
The Service has never explicitly adopted a balancing approach to 
resolving expensing versus capitalization issues.81 From time to 
time, however, the Chief Counsel's Office has recommended the 
adoption of one or another of the rough justice exceptions to 
capitalization under the rubric of "administrative convenience."82 
79 Iowa-Des Moines Nat'l Bank v. Commissioner, 592 F.2d 433, 436 (8th Cir. 1979). 
80 Encyclopaedia Britannica, 685 F.2d at 215. Congress has approved of a balancing 
approach for exceptions to the uniform capitalization rules. See S. Rep. No. 99-313, at 142 
(1986) ("The [section 263A] regUlations may adopt other simplifying methods and 
assumptions where, in the judgment of the Secretary of the Treasury, the costs and other 
burdens of literal compliance may outweigh the benefits."); id. at 140 (permitting 
"appropriate exceptions where application of the rules might be unduly burdensome"). This 
approval provided the basis for Notice 88-62, sec. 3.02, 1988-1 C.B. 548. 
81 Two recent rulings contain oblique indications that some in the Service may be starting 
to balance the benefits and burdens of capitalization/depreciation in assessing the desirability 
of a current deduction. See T.A.M. 96-38-002 (June 3, 1996) (citing Iowa-Des Moines for the 
proposition that expenditures to produce current income are deductible currently even though 
some incidental future benefit may result); T.A.M. 96-45-002 (June 21, 1996) (same 
proposition). 
82 See, e.g., Rev. Proc. 90-63, 1990-2 C.B. 664, 665 (providing safe harbor amortization 
procedures for package design costs explicitly for "administrative convenience" to "minimize 
disputes"); Rev. Proc. 89-17, 1989-1 C.B. 827 (same); cf G.C.M. 36,074 (Nov. 11, 1974) ("In 
view of the lack of any demonstrable legislative purpose or legal reason, we think it 
appropriate to consider questions of administrative convenience."); see also IRS 
Environmental Cleanup Guidance May be Out by July, Official Says, Daily Tax Rep. (BNA), 
May 11, 1993, at G-8 ("Asked whether IRS believes it has regulatory authority to 'arbitrarily' 
require capitalization over a fixed period, such as five or [ten] years, [Associate Chief Counsel 
Glenn] Carrington responded, 'It would be arbitrary, but we've done arbitrary-reasonably 
arbitrary-things in the past.'"). Commentators referred to Revenue Procedure 90-63 as 
"administrative grace." Hal Gann & Roy Strowd, INDOPCO-Time for the Second Shoe to 
Drop, 69 Tax Notes 1045, 1047 (Nov. 20, 1995). Hopefully, the atypical situation involved 
recommendations grounded in administrative considerations but urging the Service to avoid 
a published ruling. 'See, e.g., G.C.M. 35,044 (Sept. 20, 1972) (accepting a position based on 
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Unlike the balancing test, the administrative convenience rationale 
focuses only on the excessive accounting burden necessary to 
achieve conceptual purity.83 
For example, General Counsel Memorandum (G.C.M.) 33,968, 
dealing with writers' prepublication costs, extensively discussed the 
concept of administrative convenience.84 The G.C.M. pointed out 
that there was ample legal precedent for capitalizing prepublication 
costs because they yield future benefits in the form of a manuscript 
intended to produce royalties.85 Nevertheless, it concluded that a 
published ruling should permit a deduction for these costs based on 
administrative considerations. 86 
While there would thus appear to be a sound legal basis for 
requiring authors to capitalize all of their expenses, such a 
requirement gives rise to considerable practical difficulty .... 
Particularly where such an author works on several projects 
during a taxable year, ... it would be most difficult for him to 
capitalize and allocate to particular projects all of his recurring-
type costs, such as rent, supplies, and secretarial assistance. To 
make such an allocation with any degree of accuracy would in 
many cases require the use of a rather complex cost-accounting 
system, based on careful records of time spent on various 
projects. And in many cases the actual tax effect of recovering 
expenses through capitalization would be little different from 
administrative considerations that allowed a federal employee to include a payroll 
check-dated January 1, 1971-in the employee's 1971 taxable income even though the 
employee deposited the check in 1970 but suggesting that a published ruling be avoided to 
prevent problems in defending this position). 
83 Cf Encyclopaedia Britannica, 685 F .2d at 217 ("The administrative costs of conceptual 
rigor are too great."). 
84 See G.C.M. 33,968 (Nov. 18, 1968). 
85 See id. The G.C.M. noted that 
I d. 
[t]he principal published rulings ... indicate a Service position to the effect that an 
author may never currently deduct expenses incurred in writing books, but must 
capitalize all expenses by allocating them to his basis in particular manuscripts. This 
position would appear to have a sound legal basis in section 263(a), since it can be said 
that expenses incurred by an author in writing a book are costs of improving the value 
of property, i.e., the manuscript, within the meaning of section 263(a). 
88 See id. ("The ruling to be published should make clear that the decision to permit 
current deduction of overhead·type expenses is based on administrative, rather than legal 
considerations, so that the Service will not be prejudiced in litigating cases ... in which it is 
deemed appropriate to take a [legally based] position.~). 
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recovering them through current deductions, since a professional 
author may be expected to have continuing income from his 
writing over the years, as well as continuing expenses of an 
overhead nature . . . . In view of the foregoing considerations, 
we believe the Service should adopt an administrative policy of 
permitting professional writers to deduct currently their 
expenses of a continuing nature, and we recommend publication 
of a ruling to state such a policy.87 
The Service never issued such a ruling. Instead, the Government 
lost in a refund suit where a professional writer asserted a current 
deduction for prepublication costs.88 
In addition to practical considerations, the Chief Counsel 
expressed some concems about problems with litigation that might 
be avoided through administrative determinations. First, revenue 
rulings and procedures that permitted deductions based on 
administrative convenience could avoid the unpredictable results 
oflitigation.89 Courts were likely to reach inconsistent conclusions 
under the Cohan doctrine90 which would require a court to estimate 
87 Id. (citation omitted); cf. G.C.M. 38,410 (June 18, 1980) ("While we believe our position 
[requiring capitalization for costs with future benefit] has substantial merit, we accept your 
[immediate deduction under a separate asset] approach . . . in view of the practical 
considerations involved, including the lack of sympathetic appeal of our position due to the 
total denial of deductions and the continued losses in the circuit courts."). Note the emphasis 
on an increased burden to the taxpayer and minimal increase in revenue to the Treasury. 
88 See Stern v. United States, 71-1 U.S.T.C. 'II 9375 (C.D. Cal. 1971) (permitting a current 
deduction for a professional writer because the author is engaged in the trade or business of 
writing and is not attempting to create an asset). Revenue Ruling 73-395, 1973-2 C.B. 87, 
rejecting Stern, held that a publisher's prepublication costs incurred in creating, publishing 
and distributing textbooks and visual aids did not constitute research and developmental 
expenditures deductible under section 17 4 but instead should be capitalized under section 
263 because part of the publisher's cost of producing and copyrighting a manuscript of a 
literary composition thus resulting in the creation of an asset having a useful life extending 
substantially beyond the close of the taxable year. This ignited a firestorm of criticism 
ultimately resulting in section 2119 of the Tax Reform Act of 1976, which directed the Service 
to administer sections 162, 17 4 and 263 as to publishers' prepublication expenditures without 
regard to Revenue Ruling 73-395 and "in the same manner as they were consistently applied 
by the taxpayers prior to the issuance of [such ruling]." See H.R. Rep. No. 94-658, at 338 
(1975); Certain Committee Amendments to H.R. 10612: Hearings before the Sen. Comm. on 
Fin. (Part 2), 94th Cong., 475-76 (1976) (statement of Townsend Hoopes, President, 
Association of American Publishers, Inc., representing the Ad Hoc Committee for Equitable 
Tax Treatment of the Publishing Industry). 
89 See G.C.M. 34,262 (Jan. 30, .1970), considering Rev. Rul. 74-456, 1974-2 C.B. 65. 
90 Cohan v. Commissioner, 39 F.2d 540 (2d Cir. 1930) (George Cohan was a famous 
Broadway director who claimed astronomical entertainment expenses.). 
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the useful life of a depreciable asset if it believed that the asset 
declined in value or became obsolescent.91 By adopting one 
administrative determination of a class useful life or classes of such 
lives, the inconsistent estimations resulting from litigation could be 
avoided. Alternatively, a Cohan approximation of class lives for 
depreciation of self-created intangibles would avoid the 
unadministrability of varying depreciation periods for employee 
training according to what surrogate assets the IRS or the taxpayer 
can use to approximate the life of the business, e.g., nuclear 
regulatory license, natural gas pumping license, plant building in 
which the trained workforce works.92 When Lee recited these 
authorities at the VTSG Spring 1997 Symposium, Ken Kempson 
observed that such a case-by-case approach to depreciation of self-
created intangibles is unadministrable. Certainly the history of 
purchased intangibles in taxable corporate acquisitions prior to the 
enactment of section 197 so suggests.93 Moreover, the more 
conceptually accurate approach would treat the workforce itself as 
a freestanding depreciable intangible, which compounds the 
administrative problems. 
Second, the unpredictability oflitigation might lead to excessive 
litigation.94 Taxpayers believing that they might benefit from 
courts' short estimations of useful lives under Cohan may choose to 
91 See id. at 543-44 (noting that once a taxpayer shows that some amount was spent, a 
court should fashion an estimation of the amount, otherwise "to allow nothing at all appears 
to us inconsistent with saying that something was spent"). 
92 See Rough Justice, supra note 16. 
93 General Accounting Office, Report to the Joint Committee on Taxation: Tax Policy, Issues 
and Policy Proposals Regarding Tax Treatment of Intangible Assets (Aug. 9, 1991), reprinted 
in GAO Report on Tax Treatment of Intangible Assets is Available, 91 Tax Notes Today 169-1 
(Aug. 13, 1991) (LEXIS, FEDTAX lib., TNT file, elec. cit. 91 TNT 169-1); Tax Treatment of 
Intangible Assets: Hearings before the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 102d Cong., 48 
(1991) (prepared statement of Commissioner Fred Goldberg) ("From a tax administrator's 
perspective, the present situation [as to amortization of purchased intangibles] is untenable 
because it embroils the government in endless factual inquiries that are made more difficult 
by unsettled case law. Some courts are sympathetic to arguments that certain intangible 
assets can be distinguished from goodwill and therefore can be amortized. These decisions 
are dependent on the facts of the particular case, and results may differ from court to court 
depending on the legal principles considered controlling. What this means in practical terms 
is that both taxpayers and the system suffer intolerable inequities, costs, and other 
burdens."). . 
94 See G.C.M. 34,262 (Jan. 30, 1970), considering Rev. Rul. 74-456, 1974-2 C.B. 65. 
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litigate more often.95 Or even worse as a matter of tax 
administration and horizontal equity, their advisers may feel more 
comfortable in "preparing" the return claiming a current deduction 
of such self-created intangibles without fully di'sclosing the issue. 
Nevertheless, the contradistinction between administrative 
convenience and conceptual purity may have encouraged the 
Commissioner to frequently ignore the Chief Counsel's 
recommendations of simple solutions to the tax treatment of 
expenditures benefiting present and future tax years.96 Although 
administrative. considerations certainly lie at the heart of tax 
policy, future solutions to the expensing/capitalization puzzle 
should not be couched in terms of "administrative convenience" 
given the historical lack of acceptance by the Service, as evidenced 
in never-implemented G.C.M.'s. These solutions should be 
articulated as rough justice or equitable solutions: easier to 
administer and fairer on average in lieu of more theoretically 
correct rules.97 In particular when the theoretical standard is the 
clear reflection of income, rough justice rules implement a more 
practical and minimal distortion of income gloss. 
B. Rough Justice Rules 
For purposes of this article, the core idea of rough justice is the 
use of simple administrative rules that work well enough on 
average98 in lieu of either detailed rules pursuing theoretical purity 
or case law uncertainty. The principal virtue ofthese rules is the 
reduction of administrative costs to the taxpayer, to the Service,99 
95 See id. 
' 
96 See Rough Justice, supra note 16. 
97 Former Commissioner Fred Goldberg was a leading proponent of a rough justice 
approach over more theoretically correct but administratively difficult approaches. See 
Rough Justice, supra note 16. 
98 The core concept of rough justice is the use of rules that entail simple application, 
eliminate expensive factual inquiry, and achieve rational or just results in most cases. For 
an extensive discussion of rough justice, see generally id. The ideas in the accompanying 
paragraph in text are distilled from Rough Justice, supra note 16. 
99 As a proponent of rough justice, Commissioner Goldberg was particularly concerned 
about the transaction costs to the Service!I'reasury of establishing rules by litigation in the 
capitalization arena. See id. 
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or to both100 while avoiding a distortion of income. Aside from 
reducing compliance and enforcement costs, rough justice connotes 
an approximation of the just result. In some cases, rough justice is 
a "second best" surrogate or proxy tax; however, it generally seeks 
to effect better rather than unjust results-fair on average for a 
class of taxpayers but not necessarily just as to each affected 
taxpayer. Jurisprudentially, rough justice may be viewed as equity 
versus rule (equity versus law in the Anglo-American lexicon) or as 
substance versus form-an age-old battle between the spirit and the 
letter of the law. Under this view, rough justice envisions equity 
overcoming the rule of law. 
The Chief Counsel's analyses of rough justice expensing/ 
capitalization rules in several G.C.M.'s support the Commissioner's 
use of these rules with the broad enforcement authority granted by 
the clear reflection of income standard. The clear reflection of 
income standard, embodied in section 446,101 goes to the heart of 
capitalization.102 Basically stated, income is clearly reflected when 
expenses are matched with related revenue. Expensing/ 
capitalization rules that avoid a distortion of income, therefore, 
should come within the Commissioner's authority to adopt those 
rules. For example, in General Counsel Memorandum 34,959, the 
Chief Counsel's Office recommended a "minimum capitalization 
rule" as a practical guide to taxpayers with small items used in a 
trade or business.103 This rule automatically would have expensed 
purchases under $100 and permitted expensing oflarger amounts 
benefiting future years if that method of accounting "is generally 
accepted by the accounting profession for that industry and 
100 See Start-up Costs and Clear Reflection of Income, supra note 53, at 5-6, 6 n.S. 
101 I.R.C. § 446(b) ("[T]he computation of taxable income shall be made under such method 
as, in the opinion of the Secretary, does clearly reflect income."). 
102 See Fort Howard Paper Co. v. Commissioner, 49 T.C. 275, 283-84 (1967) ("[S)ections 263 
and 446 are inextricably intertwined. A contrary view would encase the general provisions 
of section 263 with an inflexibility and sterility neither mandated to carry out the intent of 
Congress nor required for the effective discharge of [the Service's) revenue-collecting 
responsibilities."); accord. Cincinnati, 424 F.2d at 569 ("This court agrees that the 
capitalization and depreciation provision[s) ... and the method of accounting provision ... 
are 'inextricably intertwined' and must be utilized in conjunction in deciding the ultimate 
success of the taxpayer's method in clearly reflecting income."). 
103 See G.C.M. 34,959 (July 25, 1972). 
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produces no distortion of income."104 The G.C.M. bottomed its 
recommendation of this rule on the clear reflection of income 
standard. 
The scheme of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 is to tax 
income in the year it should properly be taxed pursuant to 
appropriate accounting methods and standards. Thus, the 
accounting provisions (e.g., Code §§ 446 and 461) generally 
operate to override the more specific deduction or nondeduction 
provisions. A deductible item is to be deducted in the year paid 
or incurred unless a proper application of the accounting 
provisions requires or permits a different result. 
Code §§ 446 and 461 provide the general authority to prohibit 
deductions in the year the expense item is paid or incurred if to 
allow the deduction in that year would not clearly reflect income. 
However, Code§ 446 (b) and (c) provides the Commissioner with 
very broad authority to determine (1) whether a particular 
taxpayer's method clearly reflects income, and (2) whether 
particular methods of accounting generally may be used by 
various taxpayers even though such methods may deviate in 
certain respects from traditional tax accounting methods. Thus, 
while we believe those provisions provide authority for the 
Commissioner to prohibit deductions where· such is necessary to 
prevent a distortion of taxable income, we also believe they 
provide authority for the Commissioner to permit certain 
deductions where a deduction is seemingly proscribed by a 
particular provision of the Code. 
We recognize that by regulations and long-standing ruling 
practice the Service has definitely limited the Commissioner's 
discretion in this area. However, we are unaware of any such 
limits that would prevent the exercise of the discretion we now 
propose .... [W]e believe section 461 gives the Commissioner 
authority to direct the timing of deductions in a manner that will 
clearly reflect income. Although the exercise of this authority 
has generally been aimed at proscribing methods that fail to 
104 I d. This minimum capitalization rule resembled the minimum expensing rule approved 
in Cincinnati that enabled railroads to expense any expenditures under $500 in accordance 
with the accounting system imposed by the Interstate Commerce Commission. Cincinnati, 
424 F.2d at 572. Professor Gunn noted that the 1954 ALI Draft Code contained a $500 
minimum capitalization rule. See Gunn, supra note 53, at 457 n.61. 
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clearly reflect income, there is little doubt that it is broad enough 
to permit the recognition of additional methods that allow a clear 
reflection of income, even though such methods may appear to be 
a variance with a narrow interpretation of specific language of 
the Code.105 
The G.C.M. concluded that a "small item carve-out" was permitted 
under regulations that allowed expensing for both small items 
actually consumed and those not consumed but consistently 
expensed under the taxpayer's accounting method where the 
consistency avoided income distortion.106 The use of rough justice 
rules, therefore, is authorized by the Commissioner's broad 
authority to avoid a material distortion of income.107 
At the VTSG Spring 1997 Symposium Ken Kempson pointed out 
that a recurring cost exception with a two or three year interval 
could be readily abused by high income taxpayers just as a timing 
mismatch of three years was attempted in ACM Partnership v. 
Commissioner. 108 Lee responded that the rough justice expensing 
105 G.C.M. 34,959 (July 25, 1972) (citation omitted). 
106 See id. 
107 See id. ("[These) provisions are recognition that there is no absolute rule that capital 
expenditures, in the strict traditional sense, must in all cases be capitalized. Rather the rule 
is that such expenditures may be currently deducted if such treatment does not materially 
distort income."). 
108 73 T.C.M. (CCH) 2189 (1997). There the attempted transaction was as follows: 
Three parties form a partnership to acquire a liquid fixed-income security that is not 
publicly traded. It may even be a security created just for this purpose by the investment 
bank; the point is that it is liquid and readily valued. The partners have shares of 
income and loss of90 percent, 9 percent, and 1 percent, which match their initial capital 
contributions. The 90 percent partner is either not subject to U.S. tax liability, or may 
be a U.S. taxpayer that needs to replenish its net operating loss carryovers. The 9 
percent partner is the one in need of tax losses. The third partner is the investment 
bank, there to keep the partnership going when the 90 percent partner leaves. 
Shortly after its formation, the partnership sells the security in an installment sale; 
there may be no economic gain. The partnership receives most of the proceeds 
immediately, and the remainder, which is contingent, three years later. The contingent 
part of the price could be calculated according to a formula that factors in interest. In 
the second year, the 90 percent partner is redeemed out of the partnership for cash, 
presumably equal to the remainder of its capital account. 
The key to this arrangement is temporary reg. section 15A.453-1(c)(3)(i). If property has 
been sold for a fixed-term installment obligation with a contingent total price, the 
regulation requires that the seller recover basis ratably over the term of the obligation. 
Temporary reg. section 15A.453-1(c)(3)(i) states that in a year when no payment is 
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of expenditures with future benefits entails simplified accounting 
methods generally denied to large taxpayers and, above all, to 
shelters. Our Submission in response to Notice 96-7109 asserted 
that as a matter of tax policy rough justice rules based on 
considerations of simplicity from the taxpayer's perspective should 
be limited to small taxpayers.110 Under present law, examples of 
such limitations of simplified tax rules appear in the restriction of 
the cash method of accounting111 and the treatment of farm 
preparatory and livestock raising costs for small taxpayers.112 
However, retaining complexity for tax shelters is desirable. 
Assist_ant Secretary of Treasury (Tax Policy) Buck Chapoton 
articulated in a 1984 House Ways and Means Committee Hearing 
on proposed tax accounting changes that complexity in tax rules 
dealing with complicated tax shelters was acceptable. 113 There the 
received or the amount of the payment is less than the basis allocated to that year, no 
loss will be allowed unless that particular year is the final payment year. If no loss is 
permitted, then the unrecovered basis allocated to that year is carried forward to the 
next year. 
In the Merrill-designed partnerships, the literal application of temporary reg. section 
15A.453-l(c)(3)(i) allows the partners to recognize a large artificial gain in the first year, 
90 percent of which is allocated to the partner who will owe no tax on it. In the second 
and third years, the partnership recognizes large artificial losses, which will be allocated 
90:10, respectively, to the two remaining partners, the original 90 percent partner. 
having departed. 
Lee A. Sheppard, "Hero of the Day" is a Thankless Job, 7 4 Tax Notes 1382, 1382-83 (Mar. 17, 
1997). 
109 1996-1 C.B. 359 (seeking comments on the need for guidance on capitalization principles, 
the desired approaches of such guidance, and any safe harbor amortization periods for certain 
expenditures). The final version of our Submission is being published as Rough Justice, supra 
note 16. 
"
0 See Rough Justice, supra note 16. Professor Lee's work-in-progress, "Still Chewing on 
That Old Rag?": Writer's Prepublication Expenses Revisited After INDOPCO and New Section 
167(g), develops this thesis further. 
'" See I.R.C. § 448 (limiting the cash method of accounting to individuals and non-shelter 
entities with gross receipts averaged over a three-year period ofless than five million dollars). 
The scope of current section 448 allowing all individuals to use the cash method is somewhat 
questionable on the basis of simplicity. Furthermore, permitting all personal service 
corporations to use it clearly indicates political pressure and an origin oftradition rather than 
simplicity. 
"
2 See I.R.C. § 263A(d) (permitting the deduction of direct and indirect costs of producing 
livestock or plants in cash basis farming businesses). , 
"
3 Tax Shelters, Accounting Abuses, and Corporate and Securities Reforms: Hearings before 
the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 98th Cong., 32-33 (1984) (statement of John "Buck" 
Chapoton, Asst. Sec. (Tax Policy), Dep't of the Treasury) (stating that time value of money 
rules contain exceptions for "normal transactions and apply principally to large tax 
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complexity itself served as a transaction cost to retard tax shelter 
use. Additionally by limiting rough justice rules to small taxpayers, 
the retained complexity for large income individual and corporate 
taxpayers might be justified as increasing the progressivity of the 
effective tax rate on economic income, with regard to the high 
income individual taxpayers (directly or as shareholders), via 
higher compliance costs.114 This increased progressivity-in addition 
to achieving horizontal equity by treating airlines the same as 
other large corporate taxpayers with multi-period costs- is the best 
classic tax policy answer to House Ways and Means Chairman Bill 
Archer's rhetoric of a tax on airline safety. 
Descending from the grove at Academe to the rocky agora of 
practicable tax ideas, administrative convenience from the Service's 
perspective may militate in favor of extending rough justice rules 
to large corporations as well as small businesses. Certainly this is 
the Commissioner's judgment call. (But even in that event, high 
income taxpayers should not be permitted to use such simplified 
accounting methods to offset unrelated income, i.e., shelter other 
income, as was attempted in ACM Partnership. Such a schedular 
income rule would not be that different from the old Libson Shops 
doctrine.)115 The General Accounting Office reports that the biggest 
section 162 issue on audit is capitalization versus expensing and 
that this single Code section generates the largest dollar amount in 
controversy for business taxpayers.116 Rough justice rules might 
serve to reduce or eliminate much of this controversy. 
transactions, tax shelters, and otherwise, where very sophisticated planning is involved .. 
. . I do not think we need to apologize when we complicate the Tax Code for very complicated 
transactions, and that is the intent here.") 
"' This assumes that corporate earnings are allocated to shareholders in the short-run and 
owners of capital in general in the long-run, both of whom in the case of individuals are 
mostly high income. See John W. Lee, Entity Classification and Integration: Publicly Traded 
Partnerships, Personal Service Corporations, and the Tax Legislative Process, 8 Va. Tax Rev. 
57, 102 n.178 (1988). 
115 Libson Shops, Inc. v. Koehler, 353 U.S. 382 (1957) (restricting use of a net operating loss 
carryover after a statutory merger to the "same business" that generated the loss under a 
"continuity of business enterprise" test.) 
116 General Accounting Office, Tax Administration Recurring Issues in Tax Disputes Over 
Business Expense Deductions (Sept. 27, 1995) (reporting that of 117 IRS Office of Appeals 
cases filed by large corporations, capital expenditure issues comprise 42% ofthe total number 
and $~.1 billion of the $1.9 billion in proposed tax adjustments), reprinted in GAO Identifies 
Most Common Business Expense Deduction Issues Between IRS and Taxpayers, 95 Tax Notes 
Today 189-39 (Sept. 27, 1995) (LEXIS, FEDTAX lib., TNT file, elec. cit. 95 TNT 189-39). 
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Unlike many other big corporation capitalization issues, 
however, four-year cyclical expenses seem to raise minimal 
administrative problems for the Service or the taxpayer. An 
Industry Specialization Program [hereinafter ISP] coordinated 
issue paper (rather than merely listing as a "significant issue")117 
probably would pick up inost, if not all, of the cases in the airline 
industry and, assuming Congress permits the establishment of 
capitalization boundaries through audit and litigation to continue, 
direct litigation costs would probably be minimal.118 In general, 
however, the Service might well follow the lead of courts that have 
extended rough justice rules to large taxpayers. 119 
117 The first step identifies a significant issue as widespread and complex. If a significant 
issue remains significant and becomes more widespread, the industry specialist is involved 
in the development of the significant issue into a coordinated issue paper. If the issue is 
coordinated, an Industry Specialization Program [hereinafter ISP) coordinated issue paper 
is written thus becoming the method by which the IRS examines the cases, procedures, 
processes and techniques used to audit the particular issues. Deposition of IRS National 
Director of Corporate Examinations Addresses FSA and ISP Programs (Nov. 29, 1994) 95 Tax 
Notes Today 67-84 (Apr. 6, 1995) (LEXIS, FEDTAX lib., TNT file, elec. cit. 95 TNT 67-84). 
John J. Monaco, Executive Director Coordinated Examination Programs, stated that 
"significant issues" differ from ISP "coordinated issues" in that only the latter are governed 
by precise mandatory guidelines; the former might develop into coordinated issues, but they 
might not. John J. Monaco, Industry Specialization (ISP): Opportunities to Relieve Corporate 
Tax Burden (Dec. 22, 1992), 92 Tax Notes Today 256-17 (Dec. 24, 1992) (LEXIS, FEDTAX lib., 
TNT file, elec. cit. 92 TNT 256-17). 
118 Establishing tax rules through litigation is a risky and inefficient venture due to the 
·plethora of fora and the tendency to establish an endless cycle of conflicting precedents. See 
Start-up Costs and Clear Reflection of Income, supra note 53, at 5-6. Before the Service 
embarks on litigating the tax treatment of cyclical airline repairs, however, it should consider 
the special hazards of litigation here. House Ways and Means Chairman Bill Archer's 
reported advice that the airline industry "may not be the most appropriate area in which the 
Internal Revenue Service should be seeking to expand ... [INDOPCO]'s application," Sindhu 
G. Hirani,Archer Urges IRS to Continue Deductions for Mandated Aircraft Safety Inspections, 
Daily Tax Rep. (BNA), Sept. 26, 1996, at G-7 could well be sound even beyond the simple hint 
of a "limitation rider." Some court decisions reflect a tendency to distort doctrine to 
ameliorate the hardships of economically distressed taxpayers or, perhaps more narrowly in 
bankruptcy cases, to direct the few remaining assets to claims other than the Government's 
newly assessed tax claims. See, e.g., United States v. Kirby Lumber Co., 284 U.S. 1 (1931); 
Cottage Sav. Ass'n v. Commissioner, 499 U.S. 554 (1991). This tendency might be particularly 
relevant in challenging some fmancially distressed members of the airline industry. 
119 Courts fashioning simplifying rough justice rules have usually done so for larger 
corporations-who else can afford to litigate these issues, particularly in refund suits? Cf 
NCNB Corp. v. United States, 684 F.2d 285, 296 (4th Cir. 1982) (en bane) (Murnaghan, J., 
dissenting) (criticizing a rough justice deduction under the since discredited (no) separate 
asset doctrine for a large business' expansion costs because "[t)he taxpayer here, and others, 
preeminently. banks, who will benefit from the decision of the en bane majority, can by no 
means merit description as 'economically deprived.' The benefit heaped upon them further 
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The rough justice exceptions to future benefit capitalization 
provide immediate expensing for several categories: (1) costs with 
de minimis (insubstantial) or short-lived benefit, (2) costs recurring 
in a steady state, (3) costs with temporally limited benefit, but 
lacking a depreciation deduction if capitalized, and (4) costs when 
the burdens of capitalization/depreciation outweigh the benefit of 
a more clear reflection of income. Although the rationale of the last 
category underlies the other three, it supports an independent 
category for those costs that can not come under the other three 
categories, but where the capitalization of these costs is still more-
trouble-than-it's-worth. Each of these rules are explored briefly 
below and in greater detail in Rough Justice. 120 
1. De Minimis or Short-Lived Benefit 
Achieving rough justice under a minimum distortion of income 
standard requires an exception from strict capitalization 
requirements for items of relatively small cost and for items with 
short-lived benefits. Items of insubstantial cost present no realistic 
threat of a material distortion of income if they are expensed 
immediately despite the presence offuture benefit. The courts121 
and Chief Counsel's Office122 have approved the use of minimum 
capitalization rules that permit taxpayers to deduct any 
expenditures falling below a certain dollar threshold. 123 The 
problem with this de minimis exception is determining what 
amounts are insubstantial for a particular taxpayer for a particular 
tax year. 124 At the VTSG Spring 1997 Symposium Ken Kempson 
suggested that the section 179 election to expense a set annual 
amount ($17,500 to increase gradually to $25,000) could serve as a 
model for an annual maximum deductible amount. We agree and 
discuss the exceptions to future benefit capitalization as small 
business provisions in Rough Justice. 
contributes to the deserved description of our income tax system as a disgrace."). 
120 See generally Rough Justice, supra note 16. 
121 See Cincinnati, 424 F.2d 563. 
l 22 See G.C.M. 34,959 (July 25, 1972). 
123 See supra notes 103-07 and accompanying text. 
124 Compare Cincinnati, 424 F.2d at 563 (finding $500 insubstantial), with Cleveland Elec. 
Illuminating Co. v. United States, 7 Cl. Ct. 220, 234 (1985) (finding $15,545 insubstantial). 
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Expenditures with short-lived benefits require expensing in 
order to match the expenditure with the current income it produces. 
Generally, these expenditures are deducted immediately because 
any future benefit is considered insubstantial in relation to current 
income.125 As with de minimis expenditures, the burden of 
capitalizing and then amortizing items with short-lived benefit 
outweighs the benefit of less income distortion that might be 
possible under the capitalization method.126 
2. Steady State Recurring Costs 
Current deductions for steady state recurring costs tend to 
produce the same result on average that could be obtained by 
capitalizing and depreciating these costs over their useful lives. 
Steady state-fairly constant-costs that recur on a regular basis will 
produce technical mismatching with the income they generate 
when deducted currently; however, only minimal income distortion 
occurs. Viewing each expenditure individually, they should be 
deducted because a recurring expenditure typifies an ordinary 
business expense under section 162 whereas capital expenditures 
generally are extraordinary and non-recurring.127 Furthermore, 
125 See, e.g., Sun Microsystems, 66 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1005 (permitting a current deduction 
for stock warrants issued to a major customer to induce the purchase of workstations because 
the benefit from long-term customer relationship was incidental in comparison to the 
immediate benefit of the sale); Rev. Rul. 92-80, 1992-2 C.B. 57 (allowing immediate 
deductions for most advertising costs despite their potential to generate future sales); Reg. 
§ 1.162-6 (1958) ("Amounts currently paid or accrued for books, furniture, and professional 
instruments and equipment, the useful life of which is short, may be deducted."). 
126 See Sharon v. Commissioner, 66 T.C. 515, 527 (1976) (suggesting that a deduction of a 
$25 licensing fee might be deductible), affd, 591 F.2d 1273 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 442 
U.S. 941 (1979); Southland Royalty Co. v. U.S., 582 F.2d 604, 618 (Ct. Cl. 1978) (useful life 
of petroleum reserves survey subject to change at any time (due to effect of any nearby 
petroleum pumping), which has to be updated every few years to take account of subsequent 
developments. "In those circumstances, it is not compulsory to amortize such a rec111T4lg item 
over a fixed time-interval. Neither is it appropriate to require capitalization without 
amortization; such a requirement would clearly distort Southland's income."). 
127 See Encyclopaedia Britannica, 685 F.2d at 217 (using the recurring and non-recurring 
nature as "a very crude but perhaps serviceable demarcation between those capital 
expenditures that can feasibly be capitalized and those that cannot be"); Cabintaxi Corp. v. 
Commissioner, 63 F.3d 614, 619 (7th Cir. 1995) (noting that selling expenses occur 
continuously to justify an immediate deduction); Davee v. United States, 444 F.2d 557, 567 
(Ct. Cl. 1971) (distinguishing start-up costs by their non-recurring nature from ordinary 
expenses that recur regularly); T.A.M. 96-38-002 (June 3, 1996) (finding the recurring nature 
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considering the aggregate of the recurring expenditures, annual 
current deductions will approximate the total depreciation that 
otherwise would be taken in each benefited year.128 
The inherent difficulty with this approach is defining how often 
the expenditures must recur to qualify for an immediate deduction. 
On an individual basis, substantial authority supports expensing 
costs recurring every one to three years-the classic example is 
repainting a structure every three years.129 The Ninth Circuit 
reasoned in Moss v. Commissioner130 that since costs of repainting 
hotel rooms every three to five years would be currently deductible, 
doubling up maintenance to paint two-thirds of the rooms in one 
year to catch up on deferred maintenance was deductible as a 
"minor variation" in the pattern of annual maintenance. 
Conversely, costs recurring every_ five to ten years certainly seem 
an important factor to consider in assessing capitalization); P.L.R. 92-36-021 (June 8, 1992) 
(permitting current deductions for recurring short week benefits paid to laid-off employees). 
128 See Encyclopaedia Britannica, 685 F.2d at 217; T.A.M. 96-38-002 (June 3, 1996); 
Cincinnati, 424 F.2d at 571-72 ("compared with total operating expenses, total depreciation 
deductions claimed, or the total net income ... , the differences between depreciation the 
deductions computed ... [under an expensing of $500 dollars or less and under capitalizing 
and then depreciating such items] are so minute as to become unfathomable"); T.A.M. 96-45-
002 (June 21, 1996); Start-up Costs and Clear Reflection of Income, supra note 53, at 18-20. 
In addition to the costs remaining in a steady state, the income or benefit ofthese costs must 
also recur regularly. See Black Hills Corp. v. Commissioner, 73 F.3d 799-(8th Cir. 1996) 
(denying current deductions for steady state insurance premiums paid in anticipation of 
employees' black lung disease claims because the premiums were building up a reserve to 
meet a substantial future liability when the mine closed and the no longer employed miners 
then filed black lung claims). 
129 See, e.g., Estate of Wilbur v. Commissioner, 43 T.C. 322, 327 n.6 (1964) (distinguishing 
final coat of paint in construction from currently deductible.repainting, which usually recurs 
no more frequently than every three years). Although the Service has required capitalization 
of dredging costs incurred every three years in Revenue Rulilng 68-483, 1968-2 C.B. 91, some 
in Chief Counsel only lukewarmly concurred and seemed to prefer an immediate deduction. 
See G.C.M. 34,102 (Apr. 17, 1969). 
I d. 
[W]e fully realize that characterization of expenditures incurred in a silting removal 
operation as either "expense" or a "capital improvement" is not free from doubt. Of 
course we still feel that an expense characterization is the only proper classification 
where complete redredging is accomplished on an annual basis. However, classification 
becomes suspect where silt is removed every three years ... or one-third of the operation 
is accomplished every year .... In either case, whether the removal of silt accumulated 
during the prior three years benefits the current year or benefits the succeeding three 
years conjures visions in legalistic semantics and often as not the barnyard may wear 
an ·entirely different hue when interpretative chickens come home to roost. In either 
event both sides of the coin have merit. 
130 831 F.2d 833 (9th Cir. 1987). 
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under Wolfsen Land & Cattle to require capitalization.131 These 
generalities leave a gray area132 for cyclical costs incurred between 
three and five years, such as airline maintenance costs incurred 
every four years. The ultimate dividing line will take time to 
develop. Amortization safe harbors would be much more 
administrable. Notice 88-62133 providing safe harbor "amortization" 
of writer's prepublication costs at 50% I 25% I 25% over three years 
is a useful model in general for amortization or depreciation of 
irregularly recurring expenditures with substantial future benefits. 
Aggregating all of a taxpayer's related costs on a year-by-year 
basis may indicate that the costs recur annually. For example, 
even though a taxpayer may repaint individual structures every 
three years, when that taxpayer repaints a structure each year the 
aggregate repainting costs recur annually. In most cases, the 
annual costs will be roughly in a steady state and some variation 
in amount should not preclude a current deduction.134 Instead, the 
current deductions will properly reflect income on a basis 
commensurate with capitalization/depreciation135 without creating 
unnecessary burdens to account for each expenditure 
individually.136 . 
131 See Wolfsen Land & Cattle, 72 T.C. 1 (capitalizing the costs to repair drainage gates 
every five years and redredging costs incurred every ten years; depreciation as a freestanding 
intangible was then allowed over the recurrence interval). Beginning with the 1954 Code, a 
congressional pattern has developed for providing a sixty-month amortization period for self-
created intangible assets where case law did not readily provide a deduction or depreciation, 
such as formation costs, see I.R.C. §§ 248, 709, and start-up costs. See I.R.C. § 195. 
Purchased intangibles received a much longer amortization period of fifteen years due to pay-
go revenue neutrality constraints. See id. at§ 197. 
132 See Official Gives Update on Series of Guidance on Tax Accounting Issues, Daily Tax Rep. 
(BNA), Mar. 11, 1993, at G2-G3 ("As Wolfsen pointed out, if [done] ... every year, it would 
have been deductible. But if you've waited four or five years, it's not .. I gotta draw the line. 
I've got to say, 'If you do it every second year, you're fme. If you wait six years, it's not.'") 
(quoting Assistant Chief Counsel Glenn Carrington). 
133 1988-1 C.B. 548. 
134 See Moss, 831 F.2d at 842 (holding that minor variations in expenditure patterns should 
not drastically alter the tax consequences); T.A.M. 81-36-001 (Feb. 27, 1980) (finding 
recurring costs when there are no "disproportionate changes"). But see T.A.M. 74-01-31-140A 
(Jan. 31, 1974) (holding that sharp decreases indicate a non-recurring nature). 
135 See Encyclopaedia Britannica, 685 F.2d at 215 ("[E]xpenses and receipts will be 
systematically mismatched-but the same on average. Under these conditions the benefits 
of capitalization are unlikely to exceed the accounting and other administrative costs entailed 
in capitalization."). 
136 Cf Cincinnati, 424 F.2d at 572 (considering a current deduction when the burden from 
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3. Costs With Temporally Limited Benefit When Depreciation 
Remains Unavailable 
When a taxpayer's only options are a current deduction or 
capitalization without · amortization for expenditures with 
temporally limited benefits, a current deduction is preferable 
because it creates less income distortion than capitalization without 
depreciation. To assess the success of a method of accounting, the 
analysis must first recognize that capitalization, depreciation, and 
clear reflection of income are "inextricably intertwined."137 Income 
distortion, therefore, occurs when capitalized costs cannot be 
amortized to effectively match the expense with the associated 
income. Income distortion also occurs when the costs are deducted 
immediately but they provide benefits beyond the current period. 
Given the choice between these two methods, a current deduction 
is better because it produces less income distortion by at least 
matching some of the expense with the revenue produced in the 
current period-permanent capitalization never matches any 
expense with revenue.138 Both the courts139 and the Service140 have 
allowed current deductions for this reason when faced with this 
narrow choice. 
!!apitalization "to account for each item of property separately is great") (emphasis added). 
137 /d. at 569 (quoting Fort Howard Paper Co. v. Commissioner, 49 T.C. 275, 283-84 (1967)). 
138 See Gunn, supra note 53, at 492 ("In the absence of a feasible method of amortizing costs 
... a current deduction may be preferable to capitalization as a method of clearly reflecting 
income."). 
139 See, e.g., Southland Royalty Co., 582 F.2d at 618 ("In those ~ircumstances, it is not 
compulsory to amortize such a recurring item over a fixed time-interval. Neither is it 
appropriate to require capitalization without amortization; such a requirement would clearly 
distort Southland's income."). This rationale undoubtedly led courts to adopt the separate 
saleable asset rule that permitted an immediate deduction when no separate, transferable 
asset was created by an expenditure. See Start-up Costs and Clear Reflection of Income, 
supra note 53, at 51-57. By ad~pting this rule, courts could avoid the harsh result of 
capitalizing non-amortizable expansion costs by claiming that no identifiable asset was 
present. See supra note 53, at 51-57; see, e.g., Colorado Springs Nat'l Bank v. United States, 
505 F.2d 1185, 1192 (lOth Cir. 1974) ("The government suggests no way in which [the start-
up expenditures] could be amortized. The government's theoretical approach ... permits a 
distortion of [the] taxpayer's financial situation."). 
140 See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 94-38, 1994-1 C.B. 35 (reversing a T.A.M. requiring the capitalization 
of soil remediation costs, in part on the rationale that "since the land is not subject to an 
allowance for depreciation, amortization, or depletion, the amounts expended to restore the 
land to its original condition are not subject to capitalization"). 
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Unfortunately, this ali-or-nothing dichotomy ignores the more 
desirable option of capitalizing the costs as a freestanding asset and 
amortizing that asset over its usefullife.141 Instead of settling for 
one of the two options that distort income, several courts have 
pursued this alternative concept that once again attempts to match 
expenses with related income.142 For example, in Wolfsen Land & 
Cattle,143 Judge Sterrett capitalized the costs incurred to maintain 
a drainage system as a freestanding asset depreciable over the ten-
year period until the next anticipated maintenance operation 
(where the repair cycle was five years, the court adopted a five-year 
amortization period).144 This approach relieved the pressure to 
currently deduct a substantial expenditure or to capitalize the costs 
to the land, a non-depreciable asset. The focus, therefore, should 
remain on how the costs can be treated to avoid income distortion 
without placing undue· emphasis on capitalizing the costs to a 
particular asset. 145 
4. More-Trouble-Than-It's- Worth 
The final rough justice rule encompasses any situation where the 
burdens of pursuing capitalization outweigh any potential benefit 
obtained from this method's more clear reflection of income. 
Although intertwined throughout the previous three rough justice 
rules, this notion justifies a current deduction for any expenditures 
that do not fall within the specific limits outlined above, but where 
141 See Start-up Costs and Clear Reflection of Income, supra note 53, at 32-38; Gunn, supra 
note 53, at 445-46. 
142 See, e.g., NCNB I, 651 F.2d at 954-55, 962-63. 
143 72 T.C. 1. 
144 See id. at 13. 
145 For example, in reconsidering a T.A.M. that required the capitalization of soil 
remediation costs, see T.A.M. 93-15-004 (Dec. 17, 1992), the Service concluded that a current 
deduction was preferable to capitalizing the costs to the non-depreciable land. See Rev. Rul. 
94-38, 1994-1 C.B. 35. Unfortunately, this approach focused too heavily on the land without 
considering the costs as a freestanding depreciable asset. See Juliann Avakian-Martin & 
Mar lis Carson, Environmental Cleanup Issue: A Repeating Theme at ABA Meeting, 60 Tax 
Notes 925, 927 (Aug. 16, 1993) ("[I)fthe costs ... in that T.A.M. should be capitalized, they 
should be capitalized to the land. The IRS was trying to be 'nice' in reaching the conclusion 
that costs were not capitalized ... yet the IRS still was criticized.") (quoting Treasury official 
Robert Kilinskis). 
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"the benefits of capitalization are unlikely to exceed the accounting 
and other administrative costs entailed in capitalization."146 
The benefits of capitalization may be analyzed on several levels~ 
First, by its ability to match _expenses with related revenue, 
capitalization may obtain a more accurate reflection of income than 
other accounting methods. Second, by treating alike all costs 
benefiting several tax years, capitalization satisfies the goal of 
horizontal equity. This effectively assures that the tax system 
remains neutral and encourages economic efficiency by avoiding a 
taxpayer preference for immediately deductible items over similar 
items that require capitalization-Judge Richard Posner's good 
point in Fishman v. Commissioner. 147 Third, capitalization might 
yield more revenue to the Treasury than expensing. Following the 
tax policy of adequacy of revenues, capitalization must be a 
preferred method of accounting if expensing threatens to 
significantly decrease tax revenues.148 For a given expenditure, the 
dollar amount of tax deductions would remain the same under both 
capitalization with depreciation and expensing. The immediate 
deduction from expensing, however, would decrease tax revenues 
in present value terms in comparison to the spreading of the 
deductions over a period of years. 
Similarly, the burdens of capitalization can be analyzed on 
several levels. First, considering only the taxpayers, 
administrative burdens· are at their greatest for small taxpayers for 
whom record keeping is difficult. Many small taxpayers lack the 
ability to track their expenditures and accurately depreciate the 
capitalized amounts over their useful lives. Second, considering 
both the Service and the taxpayers, the administrative burdens 
increase when frequent disputes arise during audits and litigation. 
For example, if litigation typically is required to resolve disputes 
over useful life estimations, then the costs of capitalization 
146 Encyclopaedia Britannica, 685 F.2d at 215. 
147 837 F.2d 309, 312 (7th Cir. 1988). 
148 See Joseph T. Sneed, The Criteria of Federal Income Tax Policy, 17 Stan. L. Rev. 567, 
569-72 (1965); Edward Yorio, The President's Tax Proposals: A Major Step in the Right· 
Direction, 53 Fordham L. Rev. 1255, 1263 (1985) ("In its narrower sense, the adequacy 
criterion refers to the aggregate revenue effect .... If a proposed change in the Internal 
Revenue Code will result in a significant loss in revenues, the criterion is badly served. If the 
proposal will generate additional revenues, the criterion is satisfied.") (footnotes omitted). 
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increase. Minimizing these administrative burdens would help to 
satisfy the tax policy of simplicity in the tax system.149 In the 
ultimate assessment of whether capitalization is more-trouble-
than-it's-worth, the revenue benefits must exceed th.e increase in 
administrative burdens. 
Together, these four rough justice rules provide effective means 
for discerning the exceptions to the otherwise harsh rule of future 
benefit requires capitalization. Their application avoids a material 
distortion ofincome and supplies a degree offairness to the· system 
with simple rules that produce the "right" result on average. In 
sacrificing theoretical purity, these rules allow taxpayers-
particularly small taxpayers-to clearly reflect income without 
incurring any undue burdens. 
C. Structured Discretionary Justice Regulations 
As developed more thoroughly in Rough Justice, 150 these rough 
justice rules should be incorporated into structured discretionary 
justice regulations. Administrative guidance normally consists of 
general standards, detailed rules, examples and conclusions, or 
some combination of these features. General standards set forth 
the principle or policy of the substantive law-such as the clear 
reflection of income standard in taxation-that enables a 
decisionmaker to assess whether the facts of a particular situation 
merit the desired treatment, i.e., discretionary justice.151 
Conversely, rules are definitional and can generate precise and 
predictable answers. 152 These two approaches are not mutually 
exclusive; often "safe harbor" rules are combined with a facts-and-
circumstances test subjected to the underlying standard. This 
combination format provides certainty in the safe harbor for anyone 
149 See Sneed, supra note 148, at 572-7 4 (describing this goal as "practicality"); Yorio, supra 
note 148, at 1256-57 ("Like the [taxpayers') costs of compliance and planning, the 
govemment's expense in administering the law produces no efficiency gains: What the 
govemment gains from a successful audit or lawsuit, the taxpayer loses."). 
150 See generally Rough Justice, supra note 16 (exploring this notion more thoroughly in 
response to the IRS request for comments on the need and nature of guidance for 
capitalization issues). 
151 See Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 Harv. L. 
Rev. 1685, 1688 (1976). 
152 See id. at 1687-88. 
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who can read the Code and "an area for those who want to venture 
into it where, if you really understand the cases, you can advise 
your client intelligently."153 Such a combination of safe harbor and 
fact-and-circumstances permits too much abuse by generally high 
income taxpayers, however, and is now disfavored.154 The better 
combination is to provide rules for implementing the standard and 
directions for applying such rules. Expanding on Professor Daniel 
Shaviro's illustration of rules and standards with speed limits, 155 (1) 
a rule would be, "do not exceed 65 miles per hour"; (2) a standard 
would be, "do not exceed a safe speed under the circumstances"; and 
(3) structured discretionary justice would additionally provide 
factors to use in determining safe speed, e.g., (a) time of day or 
night or dusk; (b) weather conditions; (c) condition of highway; (d) 
condition of car; (d) skill/training of driver; (e) distractions-radio, 
eating, cellular phone; and (D prior accident or speeding records, 
and how to weigh and apply combinations of these factors. 
Ideally, the evolution of regulations incorporating structured 
discretionary justice progresses from: first, considering one fact 
pattern at a time without announcing generalized principles; 
second, fashioning the generalized principle or standard based on 
this prior experience; and third, formulating regulations that 
incorporate the generalized standard and implementing balancing 
rules, consistent with that standard, for achieving some certainty 
and structured discretionary justice.156 
In the capitalization area, the doctrine is sufficiently evolved to 
promulgate structured discretionary justice regulations. These 
regulations should set forth the general principle of a minimum 
distortion of income through the timing of deductions. In addition, 
they should contain a presumption of capitalization when the 
expenditure provides future benefit along with the rough justice 
153 Income Tax Revisions: Panel Discussions Before the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 
86th Cong., 883 (1959) (colloquy between Chairman Wilbur Mills, D-Ark., and Hugh Calkins, 
Esq.). 
154 Cf Business Plan 1992, reprinted in Treasury-IRS Business Plan, 92 Tax Notes Today 
104-50 (May 18, 1992) (LEXIS, FEDTAX lib., TNT file, elec. cit. 92 TNT 104-50). 
155 Daniel N. Shaviro, Compliance and Enforcement under the Passive Loss Regulations, 4 
Tax Mgmt. Real Est. J. 107 (May 1988); accord, Lee A. Sheppard, Kohl Discusses Forthcoming 
Guidance, Anti-Abuse Rules, 73 Tax Notes 399 (Oct. 28, 1996) (Kohl uses similar speed limit 
metaphor). 
156 See Davis, supra note 35, at 60. 
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exceptions for de minimis or short-lived benefits and recurring 
expenditures. Furthermore, a safe harbor amortization period 
should be provided for taxpayers with expenditures of temporally 
limited benefit when amortization otherwise is unavailable. 
Reasonable approximations ofthe expenditures' useful lives would 
provide necessary relief from the otherwise harsh treatment of 
permanent capitalization. Thus, the regulations would provide safe 
harbors based on prior ruling and case law experience. In addition, 
they would supply the general principle behind capitalization for 
discretionary determinations of facts that fall outside the safe 
harbor provisions. 
III. CYCLICAL AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE COSTS 
A. Conclusions ofthe Aircraft Maintenance T.A.M. 
The airline in the T.A.M. currently deducted the costs of major 
engine inspections and complete overhauls performed 
approximately every four years on its aircraft fleet used in its 
passenger and freight transport business.157 Each major inspection 
cost between $90,000 and $122,000, equivalent to 1/10 the cost of 
a new engine and 1/100 the cost of a new aircraft.158 A properly 
serviced engine had an estimated service life in excess of twenty-
two years. 159 
The T.A.M. required the airline to capitalize these inspection 
costs and depreciate them as seven-year recovery property.16° Chief 
Counsel commenced its analysis with the conceptually sound notion 
of using capitalization to achieve a more accurate calculation of net 
income by matching expenses with related income.161 
Acknowledging that the demarcations between current expenses 
and capital expenditures are those of degree and not kind, the 
. T.A.M. rested on the INDOPCO precept that the duration and 
extent of any future benefits are important considerations in 
157 See T.A.M. 96-18-004 (Jan. 23, 1996). 
158 See id. 
159 See id. 
160 See id. 
161 See id. 
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determining the appropriateness of expense or capitalization 
treatment. 162 The T.A.M. concluded that the costs of major engine 
inspections were capital expenditures because they 
result in substantial improvements to the overall condition of the 
engine that are not merely incidental and ... have the effect of 
adding materially to the then value of the engine while at the 
same time prolonging the engine's useful life. Furthermore, 
these expenditures generate significant future benefits to [the 
airline], not the least of which is the fact that without them, the 
FAA would not permit [the airline] to continue to operate its 
aircraft. Finally, in the case of engines owned by [the airline], 
the major inspection costs restore exhaustion for which an 
allowance has been made. 163 
Once capitalized, the costs were recoverable through depreciation 
over the recovery period of the aircraft.164 
Ken Kempson, former aide to Chief Counsel Brown, explained at 
the VTSG Spring 1997 Symposium that in fact T.A.M.'s are quite 
taxpayer specific due (a) to the facts of the particular taxpayer's 
case, and (b), often more importantly, to the presentation to the 
Service of those facts. Ken first illustrated this concept with the 
example of the well-publicized Danaher Corp./Just-in-Time 
T.A.M.165 That T.A.M. tumed on the taxpayer's internal 
communications lauding the retraining and restructuring as a new 
162 See id. Unfortunately, this precept seems to lead agents to presume capitalization 
whenever an expenditure is expected to produce future benefits, whether "substantial" or 
"incidental." In part this is because, as yet, "incidental" is more of a conclusion than a test. 
163 Id. The taxpayer argued that the expenditures "merely restored the aircraft to the 
operating condition that was required by the FAA," id., to come within the before-the-need 
vs. after-the-repair test of Plainfield-Union Water Co. u. Commissioner. 39 T.C. 333 (1962). 
That case used a before-the-condition and after-the-repair comparison of property values to 
determine if the expenditure constituted an incidental repair. See id. at 338 (''The proper test 
is whether the expenditure materially enhances the value, use, life expectancy, strength, or 
capacity as compared with the status of the asset prior to the condition necessitating the 
expenditure."). The T.A.M. rejected this contention for a number of reasons, the most 
significant being the ability to distinguish the aircraft maintenance from the sudden 
casualty-like occurrence of the condition necessitating a repair in Plainfield-Union. See 
T.A.M. 96-18-004 (Jan. 23, 1996). 
164 See T.A.M. 96-18-004 (Jan. 23, 1996). 
165 T .A.M. 95-44-001 (July 21, 1995). See Matthew A. Melone, The Information Revolution: 
Organizational Knowledge and the Capital Expenditure Question, 50 Tax Law. 73, 87-88 
(1996). 
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way of doing business. The taxpayer's counsel initially thought that 
current deductibility of such costs was self-evident and easily 
defensible. Only after the adverse T.A.M. did the taxpayer more 
carefully marshal its facts. Then it reportedly settled the case quite 
favorably. 166 Expressly based upon communications with taxpayer 
counsel and other non-governmental sources and not upon any 
knowledge from his stint with Chief Counsel, Ken suggested that 
such might be the case as well with the cyclical aircraft engine 
safety inspections. He pointed out that in many cases the actual 
replacement of parts is a minor part of the inspection costs. Most 
of the costs could involve taking the engine out of the aircraft, 
replacing it with a rotable engine, and then taking apart and 
putting back together the engine first taken out. Thus on the 
specific facts presented by another taxpayer, the T.A.M.'s 
conclusion of material increase in value through replacement of 
parts might not be readily replicated. 
Ken offered at the VTSG meeting the above analysis as a 
possible explanation of Chief Counsel Brown's written statement to 
Chairman Archer that the cyclical aircraft engine safety inspection 
T .A.M. was taxpayer specific and not a precedent. Whether 
revenue agents rely upon the safety inspection T.A.M. itself is a red 
herring. More importantly such inspections are included on the 
"significant issues list," thus advising agents to question their tax 
treatment. 167 Unlike an Industry Specialization Paper, however, 
the agent's resolution of the issue is not dictated by the National 
166 Business Expenses, NAM Asks IRS to Reconsider Ruling on Just-In-Time Manufacturing 
Techniques, Daily Tax Report (BNA), Jan. 25, 1996, at G-6; McCormally, supra note 72, at 
798 ("following the issuance of the T.A.M. a settlement was negotiated in the case that was 
almost wholly satisfactory to the taxpayer: not only were the just-in-time manufacturing 
training expenditures involved in the case determined to be currently deductible (or 
amortizable over a relatively short time frame), but it was agreed that the taxpayer's ongoing 
expenditures for training could be currently deducted as ordinary and necessary business 
expenses"); Laura Saunders, How to fight the IRS, Forbes, Jan. 22, 1996, at 64 (compromise 
was to amortize $9 million training costs over five years instead of eight); Albert B. 
Crenshaw, IRS Rules Against Danaher On One-Time Tax Write-Off; Conversion Decision 
Could Affect Other Firms, Wash. Post, Aug. 19, 1995, at D1 ("The company sought to deduct 
four kinds of expenses associated with just-in-time manufacturing: reconfiguring the plant 
physically, buying materials and supplies used in the process, training workers and hiring 
consultants. Drawing on Danaher's assessment that just-in-time manufacturing is a 'radical 
redesign, a fundamental change in the business processes' at factories and that it provides 
long-term benefits to Danaher, the agency concluded that all the costs must be capitalized."). 
167 See supra note 19. 
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Office.168 This article advises that if the Service concludes that 
four-year amortization as a freestanding intangible is the proper 
tax treatment, such conclusion be stated in an ISP or better-
published ruling pending consideration in a negotiated regulation 
process. 
B. Public Choice Theory and Interpretation: Congressionally 
Sanctioned Subsidy? 
Chairman Archer's criticism of the cyclical aircraft maintenance 
costs T.A.M. based on the increase in the effective rate of taxation 
for airlines apparently flows from his opposition to any tax 
increase.169 His opposition follows the tax policy factor of economic 
growthP0 "The criterion of economic growth insists ... that rates 
of marginal taxation not be confiscatory. Otherwise, significant 
numbers of taxpayers may lose their incentive to work and to take 
entrepreneurial risks."171 For airlines, the case has not been made 
that a decrease in their net after-tax income would decrease their 
growth. The growth potential depends primarily on the intended 
use of this income: plant and equipment investment, rank-and-file 
compensation, debt reduction, dividend payment or top executive 
incentives.172 In particular, any effective increase in taxation will 
not discourage compliance with FAA safety standards; similarly, 
tax favored treatment would not encourage compliance. For the 
airline industry will meet FAA requirements regardless of the tax 
laws. Any tax preference for airlines-providing a deduction even 
168 See supra note 117. 
169 See generally supra note 23. 
170 See Sneed, supra note 148, at 586-90; see supra note 12. 
171 Yorio, supra note 148, at 1262. 
172 It seems likely that income is more likely to be spent on executive compensation than 
increased safety measures. Consider the record of corporate downsizing coupled with soaring 
executive pay and increasing income disparity. See, e.g., Steven Pearlstein, Reshaped 
Economy Exacts Tough Toll; Competition, Efficiency Grow-as Does Americans' Income 
Disparity, Wash. Post, Nov. 12, 1995, at A1; Judith H. Dobrzynski, New Road to Riches is 
Paved with Options, N.Y. Times, Mar. 30, 1997, at 3-1 (noting that while average worker got 
a "meager 3.3 percent raise in 1996," top executives again enjoyed double-digit raises often 
approaching 20 percent due to stock options although corporate profits increased only 11 
percent); Roger Lowenstein, On the Difficulty of Hiring Good Help, Wall St. J., Mar. 27, 1997, 
at C1; Michael J. McCarthy, Thanks a Lot: CEO Gets $102 Million Bonus, Wall St. J., Mar. 
27, 1997, at B-1. 
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when general expense/capitalization rules require capitalization-
would provide a subsidy to do what they would do anyway rather 
than an incentive to do what they otherwise would not do. If an 
intended subsidy exists, it must be derived from the general tax 
laws because the statutes do not provide an explicit subsidy. 
Classic public choice theory views some legislation as a private 
contract between legislators bent on reelection and private interest 
or pressure groups. 173 "Public choice [is] the economic study of 
173 See Frederick R. Anderson, Revisiting the Constitutional Status of the Administrative 
Agencies, 36 Am. U. L. Rev. 277, 284 (1987) (explaining that the "democratic process ideal 
presumes the value of interest group competition and representation in the political process"); 
Neil Duxbury, Faith in Reason: The Process Tradition in American Jurisprudence, 15 Cardozo 
L. Rev. 601, 645-48 (1993) (discussing the interaction of interest groups and govemment); 
Emest Gellhom, Public Participation in Administrative Proceedings, 81 Yale L.J. 359, 377 
(1972) (explaining how public interest groups have "drawn agency attention to new 
techniques for fulfilling their mandate"); Mark R. Killenbeck, A Matter of Mere Approval? The 
Role of the President in the Creation of Legislative History, 48 Ark. L. Rev. 239, 248 (1995) 
(discussing the impact of a lawyer-lobbyist on legislative history); Jonathan R. Macey, 
Promoting Public-Regarding Legislation Through Statutory Interpretation: An Interest Group 
Model, 86 Colum. L. Rev. 223, 224 (1986) (explaining the "so-called interest group ... theory 
oflegislation" which contends that "market forces provide strong incentives for politicians to 
enact laws that serve private rather than public interests, and hence statutes are supplied 
by lawmakers to the political groups or coalitions that outbid competing groups"); Richard A. 
Posner, Legal Formalism, Legal Realism, and the Interpretation of Statutes and the 
Constitution, 37 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 179, 193 (1986) (stressing the impact of special interest 
groups in shaping legislation); Daniel B. Rodriguez, The Substance of the New Legal Process, 
77 Cal. L. Rev. 919, 921-22 (1989) (book review) (discussing the view of the "legislative 
process as a continuous series of bargains among competing interest groups"); Jeffrey A. 
Schoenblum, Tax Fairness or Unfairness? A Consideration of the Philosophical Bases for 
Unequal Taxation of Individuals, 12 Am. J. Tax Pol'y 221, 248-49 (1995) (pointing to the 
impact of special interest groups on the distribution of wealth); David A. Strauss, Presidential 
Interpretation of the Constitution, 15 Cardozo L. Rev. 113, 126 n.24 (1993) (describing the 
"pluralist model of democracy" as a system "under which optimal outcomes are thought to be 
produced by the competition among interest groups"); John Vitha, Comment, Allegheny 
Pittsburgh Coal Co. v. County Commission of Webster County, West Virginia: The Supreme 
Court Gives "Welcome Stranger" Tax Assessments a Cold Reception, 56 Brook. L. Rev. 1383, 
1407 (1991) (discussing judicial review of laws enacted by constitutional referendum or 
supported by grassroots organizations); Edward A. Zelinsky, James Madison and Public 
Choice at Gucci Gulch: A Procedural Defense of Tax Expenditures and Tax Institutions, 102 
Yale L.J. 1165, 1171-84 (1993) ("Public choice analysis ... reinforces Madison's preference 
for competitive political processes that pit diverse and conflicting groups against one 
another."). 
Commentators have criticized interest group competition as leading to economic waste. 
See Lynn A. Baker, Direct Democracy and Discrimination: A Public Choice Perspective, 67 
Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 707, 737 (1991) (criticizing the notion that "legislation enacted by a 
representative body is ... more likely to realize 'the common good"'); Douglas M. Branson, A 
Corporate Paleontologist's Look at Law and Economics in the Seventh Circuit, 65 Chi.-Kent 
L. Rev. 745, 753 (1989); Dennis Honabach & Roger J. Dennis, TheSeventh Circuit and the 
Market for Corporate Control, 65 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 681, 725-28 (1989) (explaining how the 
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nonmarket decision making, or simply the application of economics 
to political science."174 Without debating the accuracy of this 
theory's tenets as to the origin oflegislation, 175 the following rules 
of statutory construction derived from public choice scholarship are 
supported by various judicial and administrative tax rulings. First, 
when the special interest groups and Congress act against a 
backdrop of reserved judicial or agency power, that power should be 
applied broadly. 176 In the tax arena, the clear reflection of income 
is such a power reserved to the judiciary and the Service. Second, 
when the fact finder can determine that a particular provision is 
the product of private compromise that produces asymmetrical 
benefits between taxpayer groups, the terms of the statutory 
"contract" or "devil's bargain" should not be extended to other 
taxpayers or tax provisions. 177 Taxpayers are entitled to the 
preferences Congress awards by relying on form even when little or 
'"interest group' approach . . . views legislation as the product of compromise among 
competing interest groups" and arguing that the court's role should be to enforce the bargain 
struck between the interest groups as reflected in the legislation); Jerry L. Mashaw, The 
Economics of Politics and the Understanding of Public Law, 65 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 123, 132 
(1989) (discussing the history of interest group involvement in agency and noting that critics 
have seen interest groups as "pursuing their own ends"). 
Other commentators criticize such competition as preserving the status quo. See Ethan 
Fishman, Loper, Begging and Civic Virtue, 46 Ala. L. Rev. 783, 794-95 (1995) ("When civic 
virtue is defined by competing interest groups, it becomes possible for cohesive minority 
interests to have a disproportionate influence on public policy."). 
174 Dennis C. Mueller, Public choice Ill (1989 rev.). 
175 In studying this issue, Professors Daniel Farber and Philip Frickey reached several 
conclusions about public choice theory. See Daniel A. Farber & Philip P. Frickey, The 
Jurisprudence of Public Choice, 65 Tex. L. Rev. 873 (1987). First, "[a]lthough it is true that 
legislators are influenced by special interests, and that legislatures are faced with the 
possibility of incoherence, legislatures need not be mere pawns of special interest, nor are 
they doomed to chaos." I d. at 883. Second, "the behavior of members of Congress is dictated 
by three basic goals: achieving reelection, gaining influence within the House, and making 
good public policy." ld. at 889. Third, "[t)he economic theory of legislation ... does not 
perform well empirically." I d. at 895. Fourth, "[o)ur best view of the political process ... is 
a mixed model in which constituent interest, special interest groups, and ideology all 
influence legislative conduct." ld. at 900. "In addition, ... political parties and chief 
executives, among other forces, also influence outcomes." ld. at 900 n.165. These other forces 
influencing legislation include the popular press, in particular investigative tax reporting. 
176 Cf Frank H. Easterbrook, Fore ward: The Court and the Economic System, 98 Harv. L. 
Rev. 4, 50-51 (1984). 
177 See Easterbrook, supra note 176, at 46, 50. Judge Easterbrook posits that the "more 
detailed the law, the more evidence of interest-group compromise and therefore the less 
liberty judges possess." See supra note 176, at 16. See also Honabach & Dennis, supra note 
173. 
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no economic substance exists apart from the tax preferenceP8 The 
taxpayers, however, can expect no more. 179 Third, when the fact 
finder determines that a provision does not originate from special 
interest but rather public interest, a classic Holmesian fill-in-the-
gaps-by-analogy analysis should be used when Congress failed to 
address an item.180 Well-known disparate tax doctrines appear 
implicitly bottomed on this common sense construct. 181 
The subsidy intended by Congress in the expensing/ 
capitalization area is the cost recovery deductions through 
depreciation under section 168. Although theoretically enacted to 
represent the exhaustion or decline in value, depreciation-in 
particular accelerated depreciation-serves as an investment 
incentive in addition to its representation of wear and tear.182 
Thus, taxpayers that meet the congressional objective of making an 
investment can receive this subsidy regardless of any actual 
exhaustion or decrease in value; taxpayers that meet the terms of 
the statutory contract are entitled to a depreciation deduction 
despite the lack of economic substance. For example, in Liddle v. 
178 Ironically, essentially this approach to statutory construction was followed by the Board 
of Tax Appeals in Gregory u. Commissioner, 27 B.T.A. 223 (1932), reu'd, 69 F.2d 809 (2d Cir. 
1934), affd, 293 U.S. 465 (1935). The trial court upheld a transaction meeting the letter of 
the newly revamped reorganization statute. 27 B.T.A. at 225. The appellate courts 
adumbrated that the transaction still failed to meet the spirit of the law. See Rough Justice, 
supra note 16. 
179 See Easterbrook, supra note 176, at 54 ("[Courts should) look for and enforce the 
bargain, but do not elaborate."). 
180 Cf. Easterbrook, supra note 176, at 50. 
181 These notio118, albeit unarticulated, underlie the Tax Co.urt's "statutory tax shelter" as 
contrasted with "generic tax shelter" doctrine (articulated in Rose u. Commissioner, 88 T.C. 
386 (1987), affd on other grounds, 868 F.2d 851 (6th Cir. 1989)). For an excellent discussion 
ofthe "generic tax shelter" test, see Note, The Tax Court's Rose Test: More Thorns in the Sides 
of Taxpayers, 8 Va. Tax Rev. 905 (1989). Similarly the ability of a taxpayer to form a tax 
entity just to obtain the tax benefits Congress intended that such entity could provide, such 
as Subchapter S status or Western Hemisphere Trade Corporation status or corporate 
qualified retirement benefits prior to 1982 rests on these ideas. A similar policy of enforcing 
congressionally intended special interest subsidy underlies certain administrative practices. 
E.g., Rev. Rul. 79-300, 1979-2 C.B. 112, considered in G.C.M. 38,117 (Sept. 28, 1979), 
discussed at infra notes 282-88 and accompanying text. 
182 This discrepancy with the theoretical basis is apparent in the statutory recovery periods 
of section 168 that are often much shorter than the actual useful life. For example, as 
personal property, a newly acquired aircraft engine is classified as seven-year property even 
though with proper maintenance its useful life approximates twenty-two years. I.R.C. § 168. 
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Commissioner, 183 the Third Circuit permitted a musician to 
depreciate an antique musical instrument as theoretically subject 
to wear and tear even though the antique possessed an 
indeterminate useful life and non-diminishing value. 184 Under the 
public choice doctrine, taxpayers that make the investment are 
entitled to the subsidy regardless of the economic results.185 
Congressional modifications of this basic depreciation provision 
were fairly restricted and left expenditures for aircraft engine 
overhauls to case law doctrines. Over the past fifteen years, 
Congress carved out, wherever possible, self-created intangible 
assets from the basic depreciation provisions via sections 195, 197, 
and 263A. These exceptions are quite specific and cannot be 
judicially expanded to cover other expenditures not enumerated in 
the statutes. Therefore, Congress presumably left the treatment of 
overhaul costs to the case law doctrine of achieving a clear 
reflection of income. Nothing in the statutes indicates that 
Congress intended to provide the airline industry with preferential 
treatment beyond the accelerated depreciation allowed under 
section 168. This conclusion seems reasonable given that most 
likely neither Congress nor the FAA took account of any tax policies 
when establishing the safety rules. The result might have differed 
if Congress or the FAA established a policy assuming certain tax 
consequences. But here the tax and safety policies appear 
183 65 F.3d 329 (3d Cir. 1995). 
184 See id. at 335; cf Simon v. Commissioner, 68 F.3d 41 (2d Cir. 1995); A.O.D. CC-1996-009 
(July 15, 1996); Joseph M. Dodge & Deborah A. Geier, Simon Says: A Liddle Night Music 
With Those Depreciation Deductions, Please, 69 Tax Notes 617 (Oct. 30, 1995); Lee Sheppard, 
Violins, Ferraris, and the Music of Class Lives, 69 Tax Notes 669 (Nov. 6, 1995); Note, Which 
Concept of Depreciation Should Guide Us? Trying to Develop a Consistent Framework for the 
Federal Income Tax System, 14 Va. Tax Rev. 753 (1995). 
185 Several references in the T.A.M. hint that capitalization might be required under some 
sort of tax benefiUrecapture notion to restore the depreciation deductions previously taken. 
See T.A.M. 96-18-004 (Jan. 23, 1996) ("[The) major engine inspections have the effect of 
replacing the engine that was previously wasted during [the airline's] previous operations."); 
cf G.C.M. 34,959 (July 25, 1972); G.C.M. 39,162 (Mar. 2, 1984). After Hillsboro Nat'l Bank 
v. Commissioner, 460 U.S. 370 (1983), however, the "fundamentally inconsistent event" test 
is not triggered in a subsequent year when the initial deduction effectuated the purpose 
Congress intended. See generally John W. Lee & Mark S. Bader, Contingent Income Items 
and Cost Basis Corporate Acquisitions: Correlative Adjustments and Clearer Reflection of 
Income, 12 J. Corp. L. 137, 199-206 (1987); see also Rev. Rul. 85-186, 198.5-2 C.B. 84; T.A.M. 
92-06-004 (Oct. 16, 1991). Thus, the airline was entitled to the depreciation subsidy initially 
by satisfying the congressional purpose of making an investment, and the character of 
subsequent expenditures for overhauls should not represent a recapture of that subsidy. 
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independent. With the lack of a subsidy entitlement, the airlines 
must satisfy one of the rough justice rules to obtain an immediate 
deduction. 
C. Application of the Rough Justice Rules to Cyclical 
Aircraft Maintenance Costs 
Assuming arguendo that the rough justice rules apply to large 
taxpayers, 186 the conclusion that future benefit automatically leads 
to capitalization must be reconsidered. One of the exceptions 
outlined above might provide a justification for reversing the 
T.A.M.'s conclusions. 
1. De Minimis or Short-Lived Benefit 
Although the approximately $90,000 to $120,000 cost of an 
overhaul may not seem de minimis, a current deduction might be 
justified by a minimal distortion of income standard. 187 Judge 
Sterrett suggested in Wolfsen Land & Cattle that the absolute 
amount of an expenditure may require capitalization.188 As a 
comparative standard, Congress carefully limited the statutory 
equivalent of de minimis deductions to $17,500 (to gradually 
increase to $25,000)189 in section 179.190 Thus, the relatively large 
186 See supra notes 110-14 and accompanying text (discussing the appropriate scope of the 
rough justice rules in the context of amount of taxpayer's income). 
187 This article does not consider the repair doctrine that permits a current deduction for 
incidental repairs because repair cases should be decided on the preferred distortion of 
income basis-it's not a question of classifying an expenditure as a repair, the question is: 
Does it distort income to currently deduct the expenditure? See Gunn, supra note 53, at 457-
61. . 
188 See Wolfsen Land & Cattle, 72 T.C. at 13. The Service appears to waiver on this point. 
Compare T.A.M. 94-24-002 (Feb. 9, 1994) (denying a repair deduction due to the 
substantiality of nearly $1 billion spent for temporary work performed to raise oil rig 
platforms and to construct a barrier wall around a storage tank), with Rev. Rul. 94-38, 1994-1 
C.B. 35 (permitting a deduction of presumably substantial soil remediation expenditures). 
The aircraft maintenance costs, however, seem to greatly exceed the de minimis standard 
when compared with Chief Counsel's prior recommendation of a $100 de minimis safe harbor. 
See G.C.M. 34,959 (July 25, 1972). 
189 See Pub. L. No. 104-188, § 1111(a), 110 Stat. 1755, 1758 (1996). 
190 See I.R.C. § 179(b)(l). In more recent years, Congress has found itself "paying" for any 
extensions of tax expenditures, see supra note 25, suggesting that any de minimis-flavored 
exception in the $90,000 to $120,000 range is probably not viable in today's economic and 
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amount of these expenditures tends not to suggest a de minimis 
characterization. Ken Kempson, at the VTSG Spring 1997 
Symposium, flatly rejected any notion that the magnitude of an 
expenditure militated towards capitalization, although recognizing 
that a case could be made for a minimum expensing rule. 
The inspection costs, however, might not distort income if 
deducted as incidental repairs under a generally applicable repair 
ratio. The T.A.M. reveals that these costs amount to about 1/10 the 
cost of a new engine and 11100 the cost of a new airplane. 191 
Restated as ratios, these costs seem much less substantial. 
Although never formally adopted, the Chief Counsel's Office once 
· proposed a safe harbor deduction for cyclical repair expenditures 
that fell below 50% of the original cost of an asset.192 Providing 
taxpayers with a generalized repair ratio would satisfy the goal of 
minimal distortion of income through rough justice rules-the ratio 
achieves simplification and horizontal equity by providing one 
straightforward rule for all taxpayers. Accordingly, further 
consideration of a ~afe harbor repair ratio seems warranted.193 
Nevertheless, the fairly small ratio of aircraft maintenance costs to 
initial investment makes the absolute cost more credible as a de 
minimis amount. Given the ambiguous conclusions from the 
absolute amount and the repair ratio, the proper tax treatment of 
the cyclical maintenance costs may be too close to call on this one 
factor alone. 
2. Steady State Recurring Costs 
The fact that these maintenance costs recur in approximately 
four-year cycles places them right on the line between deductible 
and capitalizable expenditures. As noted above, precedent 
indicates that three-year-or-less cycles often provide deductions 
whereas five-year-or-longer cycles require capitalization and 
political climate. 
191 See T.A.M. 96-18-004 (Jan. 23, 1996). 
192 See G.C.M. 34,921 (June 26, 1972) (denying a deduction for railroad car rehabilitations 
that often exceeded 50% of the original cost). · 
193 See Notice 96-7, 1996-1 C.B. 359 (requesting comments on guidance needed for 
capitalization issues). 
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depreciation. 194 Individually, each engine is inspected every four 
years. A four-year period might just push the envelope enough that 
it begins to tear. Although somewhat inconclusive, viewing the 
inspection performed on each engine on an individual basis may 
suggest capitalization. Aggregating the costs on a year-by-year 
basis, however, indicates that the costs recur annually, which 
supports a deduction. In particular, the airline probably overhauls 
25% ofits fleet on a rotating basis each year. 195 With these steady 
state recurring costs, there would appear to be little difference in 
the measurement of income between expensing and 
capitalizing/depreciating these expenditures.196 Once again, under 
the rough justice rules, it is a close call in deciding whether to 
consider the individual or aggregate bases. 
3. Costs With Temporally Limited Benefit When Depreciation 
Remains Unavailable 
An extensive analysis under the third rough justice rule should 
be unnecessary. The need to perform the inspections every four 
years in accordance with the FAA's safety requirements 
demonstrates that these expenditures provide temporally limited 
benefits. In addition, the T.A.M. itself states that these costs are 
194 See supra notes 129-32 and accompanying text. 
195 To minimize the downtime of serviced aircraft, airlines often simply replace the 
inspected engine with one of their "rotable engines" kept on hand in a pool. For a discussion 
of the use of rotable parts, see generally Dennis J. Gaffney, Ratable Spare Parts: How Did a 
"Terrible" Accounting Method Become So Bad?, 70 Tax Notes 1009 (Feb. 19, 1996); Calvin H. 
Johnson, Federal Circuit Plays Dirty Pool with Inventory Accounting, 70 Tax Notes 111 (Jan. 
1, 1996): W. Eugene Seago, Ratable Parts: IRS Discretion Under the Clear Reflection of Income 
Standard, 67 Tax Notes 117 (Apr. 3, 1995). The removed engine is overhauled and placed 
into the rotable parts pool and depreciated under Revenue Rulling 69-200, 1969-1 C.B. 60. 
Smaller airlines might purchase or lease reconditioned engines from a reconditioning center 
and send the inspected engine back to that center. The T.A.M. hints at a mixture of both 
patterns. It states that the airline, "[i]n performing a major inspection, ... is required to 
remove a large portion of engine component parts and replace these parts with new or 
reconditioned parts." T.A.M. 96-18-004 (Jan. 23, 1996). In addition, "a newly inspected 
engine ... is of an interchangeable nature, and is treated by [the airline] as a substitute or 
standby component." Id. 
196 Cf Encylopaedia Britannica, 685 F.2d at 217 (considering recurring payments by a 
publisher to authors developing books). With the current industry practice of immediately 
expensing the costs, any.distortion normally created by the transition period to a steady state 
will be absent in this situation. 
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recoverable through depreciation.197 Therefore, minimal distortion 
of income should occur because the expenditures will be allocated 
through depreciation to future benefited periods to achieve 
matching. This is not a situation where this rough justice exception 
is intended to apply (i.e., for expenditures capitalized, but non-
recoverable through depreciation despite the temporally limited 
usefulness ofthe expenditures). 
This rough justice rule may apply, however, due to the long 
depreciation period suggested by the T.A.M. The T.A.M. capitalized 
the costs of the overhauls to the engines that will generate 
depreciation deductions over the next eight years. 198 Common 
sense says that depreciating a cost that recurs every four years, 
over eight tax years, is wrong. Particularly in the capitalization · 
area, unreasonable approaches tend to backfire by provoking courts 
to apply roughjustice solutions.199 Iflitigated, a court may perceive 
the eight-year recovery period as "overreaching" by the Service,200 
and the court simply may allow a current deduction for the 
expenditure.201 The key to avoiding this result is achieving a.clear 
reflection of income by capitalizing the costs to the right "asset."202 
197 See T.A.M. 96-18-004 (Jan. 23, 1996). 
198 See id.; W ald, supra note 7. 
198 See Start-up Costs and Clear Reflection of Income, supra note 53, at 52,-56 (discussing 
courts' willingness to adopt the separate, saleable asset doctrine to alleviate the harshness 
of capitalization in response to perceived overreaching by the Service). 
200 NCNB I, 651 F.2d at 959 ("It was, in short, an attempted overreaching by the tax 
collector. If he failed, he had less basis for protest than if he had confined his demands to 
those which were properly Caesar's."). 
201 See Capitalization Rules, supra note 16, at 677. For instance, the Ninth Circuit in Moss, 
831 F.2d 833, allowed a taxpayer operating a hotel a current deduction for the recurring costs 
of interior painting andre-papering of hotel rooms customarily redone on a three-year cycle. 
Id. at 841-42. Using the general plan of rehabilitation doctrine, see infra note 200, the 
Service sought to add the costs to the depreciable basis of the hotel building that had a 
remaining useful life of thirty years. Moss, 831 F.2d at 835. Ironically, the Service permitted 
the taxpayer to depreciate over seven years the costs of remodeling, beds, and drapes, see id., 
that probably had longer useful lives than the repainting. The court permitted an immediate 
deduction for the repainting costs to minimize the harshness of the Service's suggested 
excessive capitalization period. I d. at 841-42. Such sweeping of a shorter-lived, recurring 
expenditure into the greater longer-lived structure offends a court's sense of justice. 
202 See Gunn, supra note 53, at 492; see also Start-up Costs and Clear Reflection of Income, 
supra note 53, at 4 n.3 (listing the various assets that courts use to capitalize start-up costs). 
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With a comparatively sparse discussion of depreciation,203 the 
cyclical aircraft engine maintenance T.A.M. buttressed its 
conclusion on Revenue Ruling 88-57, which capitalized the cyclical 
repair costs of freight-train cars and treated the reconditioned cars 
as new assets under the general plan of rehabilitation doctrine. 204 
The reconditioning of the railroad cars occurred every eight to ten 
years, 205 and new cars were depreciated over eleven years under the 
203 See Sheryl Stratton, IRS Draws Flak for Aircraft Overhaul Capitalization TAM, 73 Tax 
Notes 119, 122 (Oct. 14, 1996) (crediting this observation to Professor Annette Nellen). 
204 See Rev. Rul. 88-57, 1988-2 C.B. 36. Under a judicial gloss of section 162 or perhaps 263, 
the otherwise deductible cost of a repair is capitalized if the repair was part of an overall 
pattern of rehabilitation. See United States v. Wehrli, 400 F.2d 686, 689-90 (lOth Cir. 1968) 
("[C]ourts have superimposed ... an overriding precept that an expenditure made for an item 
which is part of a 'general plan' of rehabilitation, modernization, and improvement of the 
property, must be capitalized, even though, standing alone, the item may appropriately be 
classified as one of repair."). The most sound rationale for this doctrine is that the execution 
of a plan of rehabilitation constitutes the acquisition of a new capital asset so that all the 
related expenses must be capitalized. See Start-up Costs and Clear Reflection of Income, 
supra note 53, at 34; see, e.g., California Casket Co. v. Commissioner, 19 T.C. 32, 37-38 (1952) 
(requiring the capitalization of all renovation costs when the building was acquired with the 
express intention of completely renovating it to conform with specific business requirements). 
So viewed, the plan of rehabilitation rule is analogous to the rule that an expenditure which· 
is part of the acquisition cost of a capital asset must be capitalized even though standing 
alone, or incurred after the completion of the process of acquisition, would be deductible. See 
Estate of Wilbur, 43 T.C. at 327 n.6 (1964) (capitalizing the last coat of paint applied during 
construction), acq. 1965-2 C.B. 7; Mt. Morris Drive-In Theater Co. v. Commissioner, 25 T.C. 
272, 274-75 (1955) (capitalizing the cost of a drainage system installed after the completion 
of the theater because it would have been capitalized as part of the original construction and 
it was obvious that the drainage system was needed), affd, 238 F.2d 85 (6th Cir. 1956); Start-
up Costs and Clear Reflection of Income, supra note 53, at 32-38. The Ninth Circuit correctly 
limited the "rehabilitation doctrine" to substantial capital improvements and repairs to the 
same specific asset, usually a structure in a state of disrepair. See Moss, 831 F.2d at 841. 
205 See Rev. Rul. 88-57, 1988-2 C.B. 36. TEI has recently pointed out in a supplement to its 
Submission of comments pursuant to Notice 96-7 that the railroad car reconditioning 
occurred near the end of the useful life of the car and following a long period of continuous use 
without repairs. Letter form James R. Murray of Tax Executive Institute, Inc., dated March 
25, 1997, to Commissioner Margaret M. Richardson re: Capitalization Issues Under Notice 
96-7 and Follow-up on IRS-TEI Liaison Meeting, reprinted in Additional Guidance Needed 
Regarding Capitalization Issues, 97 Tax Notes Today 64-46 (Apr. 3, 1997) (LEXIS, FEDTAX 
lib., TNT file, elec. cit. 97 TNT 64-46) ("The economic life of any asset, and the corresponding 
asset guideline class and applicable MACRS class life in which the asset falls [twelve years 
under Rev. Proc. 87-56, 1987-2 C.B. 674], is premised on the taxpayer undertaking periodic 
repairs in order to keep the asset in an ordinarily efficient operating condition. Indeed, 
following the T.A.M.'s reasoning to its logical extreme, periodic oil changes for automobiles 
or delivery trucks would be subject to capitalization. Estab~hing a prudent policy of periodic 
repairs and incurring expenses under that policy do not, in our view, transmogrifY periodic 
repairs into a capital asset with a useful life beyond the year incurred."). 
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then-applicable depreciation system.206 By fortuity, the new asset 
depreciation period was close to the right period for cyclical railroad 
car repairs. This similarity may have misled the drafters of the 
aircraft maintenance T.A.M. into believing that treating the 
capitalized costs as new assets depreciable over eight years would 
produce the proper result. In fact, the eight-year recovery period is 
too long; it should approximate four years. 
In support of its new asset treatment, the T.A.M. was on far 
· sounder ground in concluding that "major engine inspection costs 
had the effect of replacing the engine with a newly inspected and 
reconditioned engine. "207 The airline normally would recover the 
cost of a new engine over an eight-year period; therefore, the 
Service could justify its eight-year recovery period for the 
maintenance costs by characterizing the reconditioned engine as 
new. . In this regard, section 168's prohibition of component 
depreciation and requirement of composite depreciation208 probably 
motivated the Service's characterization.209 Following Revenue 
Procedure 87-57, any additions or improvements to property are 
treated as separate properties with the same recovery period, 
convention, and depreciation method as applicable to the 
underlying property.210 Instead of depreciating the maintenance 
costs over their own period, the Service considered them to 
constitute part of the engine and used the engine's recovery period. 
Rough justice suggests, as an alternative to current deduction, 
sidestepping these section 168 rules by treating the recurring 
maintenance costs as creating a freestanding intangible asset or 
deferred charge, apart from the engine, depreciable under section 
167.211 Treating the cost as a freestanding asset depreciable over 
206 See G.C.M. 39,743 (July 14, 1988); see also G.C.M. 34,921 (June 26, 1972). 
207 T.A.M. 96-18-004 (Jan. 23, 1996). 
""' See I.R.C. § 168(i)(6). The component method depreciates a structure component-by-
component according to the useful life of each component whereas composite depreciation 
treats the structure as a whole and depreciates the entire structure as one unit. 
209 The T.A.M. referred to the use of composite depreciation twice. See T.A.M. 96-18-004 
(Jan. 23, 1996) ("[The airline) depreciates the aircraft and engines as one unit under the 
composite method of depreciation."). 
210 See Rev. Proc. 87-57, 1987-2 C.B. 687, 689. 
211 See I.R.C. § 167(a) (permitting depreciation deductions for assets not covered by MACRS 
in section 168). 
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four years on a straight-line basis212 under section 167 minimizes 
the income distortion that occurs by depreciating the maintenance 
as a reconditioned engine purchase under section 168 over eight 
years. Once again, this is an attempt to settle on the middle 
ground.213 Moreover, to the extent that the cyclical safety 
inspection costs largely consist of removing the engines, taking 
them apart, and inspecting and reassembling rather than replacing 
parts, those costs do not resemble permanent improvements. 
The proposed freestanding depreciable intangible approach 
mirrors that taken by the Tax Court in Wolfsen Land & Cattle. The 
taxpayer in Wolfsen Land & Cattle incurred substantial costs in 
dredging irrigation ditches every ten years in lieu of performing 
annual maintenance.214 The parties presented the court with two 
income distorting options: either allow a current deduction of the 
substantial costs or capitalize the costs to the non-depreciable basis 
of the land with an indefinitely useful life.215 Judge Sterrett 
unraveled this Gordian knot216 by treating the maintenance cost 
itself as a deferred charge depreciable over ten years:217 
212 The ideal rule for capital recovery would include indexing the asset's basis for inflation 
and using the economic life with straight-line depreciation. See 2 U.S. Dep't Treasury, supra 
note 48, at 151-211 (1984). Failure of such rules to account for greater use in particular years 
may prevent those rules from being perfect. See Douglas A. Kahn, Accelerated 
Depreciation-Tax Expenditure or Proper Allowance for Measuring Net Income?, 78 Mich. L. 
Rev. 1, 42 (1979). Certainly straight-line depreciation over the period benefited without other 
adjustments is not the ideal rule, but it is probably close enough for tax expenditure analysis. 
Contra id. Other academics have suggested a wide variety of ideal rules to account for multi-
period costs. See, e.g., Thomas L. Evans, The Taxation of Multi-Period Projects: An Analysis 
of Competing Models, 69 Tex. L. Rev. 1109 (1991); Mary Louise Fellows, A Comprehensive 
Attack on Tax Deferral, 88 Mich. L. Rev. 722 (1990); Larry D. Ward, Tax Postponement and 
the Cash Method Farmer: An Analysis of Revenue Ruling 75-152, 53 Tex. L. Rev. 1119 (1975). 
213 See NCNB Corp. v. Commissioner, 684 F.2d at 295 (Murnaghan, J., dissenting) (finding 
"an opportunity to resort to the golden mean"); cf supra notes 141-45 and accompanying text. 
214 Wolfsen Land & Cattle, 72 T.C. at 8. 
215 ld. at 13. In an uncharacteristic reversal of roles, the Service argued for an immediate 
deduction and the taxpayer sought capitalization. Id. at 10. Perhaps the Service's position 
was principled; an immediate deduction produces less distortion than capitalization without 
amortization. See supra notes 138-40 and accompanying text. A more likely explanation, 
however, is that the Service attempted to put the dredging costs into an earlier tax year so 
that the benefit of the deduction would be barred by the statute of limitations. 
216 Alexander the Great, of course, cut through the Gordian knot with his sword. Courts 
may believe that such option is open only to Congress; they must unravel the problem. See 
Board of Trade of Chicago v. SEC, 677 F.2d 1137, 1168 (7th Cir. 1982) (Campbell, J., 
concurring). 
217 Wolfsen Land & Cattle, 72 T.C. at 13; accord Rev. Rul. 68-483, 1968-2 C.B. 91 
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Thus, we are faced with something of a conundrum, how do we 
treat a maintenance-type expense substantial in amount, which 
only restores its subject to its original operating condition, yet 
need be repeated only on the average of every 10 years and is 
performed on a subject of indefinite life. 
To permit a current deduction of such a large expenditure with 
a beneficial effect lasting on the average of 10 years would surely 
distort that [year's] income. Yet to deny even an amortization 
deduction for an expenditure with a specific demonstrable 
beneficial life on the grounds that its deductibility is 
contaminated by its relationship to an asset of indefinite life, i.e., 
the land, would similarly require an uneven reporting of income. 
Since a basic premise of the income tax laws is to relate expenses 
to the income which they helped earn, a reasonable solution to 
our conundrum is to hold that the expenses in issue should be 
written off over their useful life. In short we would subscribe 
independent status to those expenditures on the basis that they 
create a free-standing intangible asset with an amortizable 10-
year life.218 
(depreciating recurring redredging costs as a freestanding asset over the period until the next 
required redredging); cf Gunn, supra note 53, at 446 ("The distinction between asset as cost 
and asset as property may be helpful in determining the proper period for recovery of 
capitalized costs through depreciation or amortization."). 
218 Wolfsen Land & Cattle, 72 T.C. at 13 (footnote omitted). 
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This common sense solution219 is equally applicable to cyclical 
aircraft maintenance costs. Given the ambiguous results under the 
de minimis and recurring prongs, the airline probably should 
depreciate the costs separately as freestanding intangible assets 
over each four-year period of benefit to assure that no distortion of 
income occurs. 
Ironically, the factors weighing against the use of a four-year 
recovery period are the horizontal equity and economic efficiency 
goals of taxation. Horizontal equity seeks to treat similarly 
situated taxpayers similarly.220 Economic efficiency attempts to 
avert any influence that a tax might have on taxpayers' decisions 
about the use of economic resources.221 These two goals appear 
219 Unfortunately, the Service has refused to adopt generally the depreciation of a 
freestanding intangible asset approach to recurring costs. But see T.A.M. 94-24-002 (Feb. 9, 
1994) (using the period of recurrence as the useful life to depreciate the costs incurred to raise 
a sinking seawall). Consequently, it often strains to find an appropriate depreciable asset 
that could have the recurring costs tied to it. For example, in the case of employee training 
costs, the Service initially permitted depreciation of capitalized new nuclear power plant 
employee training costs over the life of the building in which the workforce was employed. 
See T.A.M. 75-09-099-440A (Sept. 9, 1975). Contemporaneously, the Service capitalized 
training costs as start-up costs of a new plant in an existing lumber business as a depreciable 
intangible asset-"an operational fiberboard plant." See T.A.M. 75-04-281-070A (Apr. 28, 
1975); cf G.C.M. 37,500 (Apr. 5, 1978) (suggesting, but not ruling, that pre-opening costs like 
training should be capitalized and amortized over the life of the facility). Subsequently, 
during the period the Service followed the separate asset doctrine, it allowed a current 
deduction for the costs of training a work force in connection with the establishment of a new 
manufacturing facility by a taxpayer with similar existing operational plants in other 
locations. See T.A.M. 83-03-012 (Oct. 7, 1982), modifying T.A.M. 82-04-061 (Oct. 28, 1981). 
Later, the Service amortized employee training costs over the life of a plant's forty-year 
Nuclear Regulatory Commission license. See T.A.M. 94-30-003 (Apr. 22, 1994). This 
awkward progression strongly suggests that the Service should recognize generally the 
approach of capitalizing costs as freestanding assets depreciated over their own useful lives. 
220 See Sneed, supra note 148, at 579; 2 U.S. Dep't Treasury, supra note 48, at 151-211; see, 
e.g., Idaho Power Co., 418 U.S. at 14 (requiring the capitalization of depreciation from 
vehicles used during self-construction projects to maintain tax parity with taxpayers that hire 
independent contractors because the contractors would include the depreciation in their 
charge that the taxpayer would capitalize as paid); cf. Iowa-Des Moines, 592 F.2d at 436 
{permitting a taxpayer to deduct credit screening costs paid to outsiders in part because the 
costs of performing the screening in-house would have been currently deductible). 
221 See Sneed, supra note 148, at 586-90. Judge Posner provides a good explanation of this 
policy: 
Because ofthe time value of money-real riskless interest rates are positive-a deduction 
taken today is worth more than one taken a year from now. Hence if an expense 
incurred to produce future income can be deducted from current income rather than 
postponed until it has borne its fruits, taxpayers will have an incentive to incur such 
expenses earlier than they would if there were no income tax; and tax law seeks, to the 
extent compatible with revenue and distributive objectives, to interfere as little as 
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violated by the contrary treatment of airlines that maintain 
engines in a rotable parts pool and airlines that purchase 
replacement engines.222 Self-repairing airlines that draw upon a 
rotable part pool, to replace the engines in aircraft while 
performing the inspection on the removed engines, could justifY 
using a four-year recovery period. They would treat the overhaul 
costs as a freestanding asset. Conversely, airlines that purchase 
replacement engines and perform inspections on the removed 
engines before returning them to the seller would capitalize the 
inspection costs as part of the acquisition price. As demonstrated 
above, a newly reconditioned and inspected engine is depreciable 
over an eight-year period.223 Thus, different treatment is afforded 
two similarly situated taxpayers, with self-repairing airlines 
receiving a preference of a shorter recovery period.224 
Conceptually, the true parity problem may be that an eight-year 
recovery period fails to account for extraordinary obsolescence. The 
need for major inspections and overhauls of engines every four 
years suggests that aircraft engines simply fall within the wrong 
recovery property class. In that case, the answer to the lack of 
parity between airlines that self-repair and those that purchase 
reconditioned engines is not to lengthen the period, from four to 
eight years, for recovering costs capitalized as freestanding 
intangible assets. Instead, the better answer provides for this 
extraordinary obsolescence legislatively through MACRS or 
perhaps administratively or judicially under the clear reflection of 
income standard. 
possible with the pattern of expenditures that would exist in the absence of taxation. 
Fishman u. Commissioner, 837 F.2d 309, 312 (7th Cir. 1988) (Posner, J.); accord Cabintaxi 
Corp., 63 F.3d at 619 (7th Cir. 1995) (Posner, J.) ("The purpose of these [start-up cost) rules 
(the second, the requirement of capitalization, more clearly than the first [of not yet carrying 
on a trade or business)) is to require the matching of expenses to income temporally, a major 
objective of efficient tax policy.") (citation omitted). 
222 See supra note 194 (discussing the industry practice of using either a parts pool or 
acquiring replacement engines to minimize the downtime while servicing aircraft). 
223 See supra notes 207-10 and accompanying text. 
224 Airlines that lease engines presumably pay fairly level annual rental payments. Thus, 
the airlines obtain much the same annual dollar deduction result by annually deducting the 
rent for four years as by depreciating the capitalized costs of repairs as a freestanding asset 
over four years. 
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4. More-Trouble-Than-It's- Worth 
Based on tax considerations alone, the T.A.M.'s facts do not 
indicate that the burdens of capitalization/depreciation outweigh 
the benefit of a more clear reflection of income. For a large 
taxpayer, the administrative costs of compliance are minor. In 
particular, the clearly identifiable period of recurrence-four 
0 
years-provides the ideal depreciation period. This period assures 
against income distortion and avoids the burden of attempting to 
estimate a proper recovery period. This method also avoids any 
perceived horizontal inequity in the transportation industry by 
treating the airline as all other taxpayers that must capitalize their 
repair costs. These tax considerations alone make 
capitalization/depreciation over four years worthwhile. 
Political factors, however, raise the Service's administrative costs 
and make it more-trouble-than-it's-worth. The threat of 
congressional intervention into the administration of the tax laws 
might derail the Service's post-/NDOPCO strategy of 
incrementalism and regulation by litigation rather than by 
regulations. These political factors will concentrate on non-tax 
policies without regard to the tax standard of achieving a clear 
reflection of income. Deviations from the ideal tax policy will 
establish contrary precedent that make the already difficult area of 
capitalization more confusing. 
The non-tax policy arguments raised against the airline 
maintenance T.A.M. may call to mind the fate of the soil 
remediation T.A.M. previously issued by the Service.225 The soil 
remediation T.A.M. capitalized substantial and fairly non-recurring 
costs to treat soil "contaminated" by PCPs, which were dumped 
after they had lubricated machines that pumped natural gas. 226 As 
it tums out, that T.A.M. allowed depreciation of such capitalized 
costs over the life of the pipeline used by the natural gas pumping 
company.227 This laudable result 228 was reversed by a published 
225 T.A.M. 93-15-004 (Dec. 17, 1992); see also Stratton, supra note 203, at 122 (indicating 
that Professor Annette Nellen noted this similarity). 
226 T.A.M. 93-15-004 (Dec. 17, 1992). 
227 These facts were gleaned from tax journals and a subsequent article by Glenn 
Carrington. See Glenn R. Carrington, Capitalization After Indopco, 53 Inst. on Fed. Tax'n § 
25.01, § 25.03[5)[c], at 25-29 to 25-30 (1995); see also Avakian-Martin & Carson, supra note 
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ruling that allowed a current deduction of the remediation costs.229 
A current deduction was not allowed on the basis of sound tax 
policy, instead it resulted from intense political opposition. 
Sacrificing tax policy for the sake oflargely political arguments 
of critics cannot provide the right answer to this problem. A hasty 
exception granted to one interest group only encourages others to 
badger the Service for similar exceptions. Conversely, ignoring 
non-tax policies invites congressional intervention to correct the 
frustration of certain social goals. These alternatives threaten the 
consistency of the tax laws. This threat certainly suggests that 
requiring the capitalization of the airline maintenance ·costs is 
simply more-trouble-than-it's-worth. 
The apparent disapproval of the Service's position with respect 
to the cost of cyclical aircraft engine overhauls portends that 
Congress will step in and attempt to protect what it sees as a threat 
to a governmental airline safety policy. The apparent orchestration 
of events culminating in the House Conference Committee Report 
verbally chastising the Service's position on these costs230 seems an 
omen of Chairman Archer's plan to bypass· the pay-go rules231 
should the Service continue ignoring his requests to consider FAA 
safety policies in determining how to treat these costs. Congress 
has assumed the role of guardian in the past. In several instances 
during the second half of the 1970's, Congress prohibited the 
Service from executing particular aspects of the tax law.232 
Congress has instituted similar prohibitions on other government 
agencies in a host of other areas as well.233 
145, at 925·26. 
228 See Juliann Avakian-Martin, Does the IRS Need to Clean Up its Ruling on Cleanup 
Costs?, 59 Tax Notes 728, 729 (May 10, 1993) (quoting Professor John Lee's approval of the 
soil remediation T.A.M.). 
229 See Rev. Rul. 94-38, 1994-1 C.B. 35 (permitting a current deduction for soil remediation 
costs but requiring the capitalization of the cost of a permanent ground water cleaning 
facility). 
230 See supra notes 9, 13, 24, 28 and accompanying text. It is probably no coincidence that 
the date of Chairman Archer's news release of his Jetter to Commissioner Richardson 
corresponds with when the Budget Committee was deciding on the IRS budget for the next 
fiscal year. 
231 See supra note (discussing the "pay-go" procedures). 
232 See Pamell, supra note 26, at 1370-75. 
233 See Neal E. Devins, Regulation of Government Agencies Through Limitation Riders, 1987 
Duke L. J. 456, 461-63 (1987). 
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One technique, seen in the Tax Reform Act of 1976,234 suspended 
the application of a revenue ruling mandating the capitalization of 
prepublication costs235 by "substitut[ing] earlier IRS rules for IRS. 
execution in place of subsequent Service rules."236 This suspension 
was to last until prospective regulations dealing with 
prepublication expenditures were issued.237 The generic term in the 
literature for such legislative strategies is "limitation riders." The 
classic limitation rider is a floor amendment or "rider" to an 
appropriations bill that prohibits the agency from using any funds 
generally appropriated to the agency for a specific purpose 
identified by Congress during the next fiscal year. In the tax arena, 
limitation riders commonly are enacted by revenue, rather than 
appropriation, acts without amending the Internal Revenue 
Code.238 
The use of limitation riders, to suspend application of the 
reasoning in the aircraft maintenance T.A.M. until promulgating 
regulations, would be the least intrusive potential Congressional 
interference with IRS and Treasury administration of the 
234 Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, § 2119, 90 Stat. 1520, 1912 (1976). 
235 See Rev. Rul. 73-395, 1973 C.B. 87 (requiring capitalization but "allowing" depreciation 
under the income forecast method). · 
236 See Parnell, supra note 26, at 1370. See id. 1370-71, 1371 n. 77. Section 2119 of the Tax 
Reform Act of 1976 stated that the 
application of sections 61 (as it relates to cost of goods sold), 162, 174, 263, and 471 of 
the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 to any prepublication expenditure shall be 
administered-(!) without regard to Revenue Ruling 73-395, and (2) in the manner in 
which such sections were applied consistently by the taxpayer to such expenditures 
before the date of the issuance of such revenue ruling. 
Pub. L. No. 94-455, § 2119, 90 Stat. 1520, 1912 (1976). Chairman Archer's complaint that 
Chief Counsel Brown failed to even acknowledge that the Service's treatment of the cyclical 
aircraft engine safety inspections was a new interpretation takes on a new light against this 
backdrop. See Archer Reply, supra note 19. 
237 See Tax Reform Act of 1976 § 2119. Such regulations were never issued. Instead, 
Treasury believes that the Tax Reform Act of 1986 superseded this provision. See Temp. Reg. 
§ 263A, 52 Fed. Reg. 10,052, 10,054 (1987) ("If, and to the extent, that section 2119 of the 
1976 Act would otherwise contravene the clear Congressional intent underlying section 263A 
of the Tax Reform Act of 1986 regarding the production of books, then section 263A, the more 
recent expression of Congressional intent, is properly viewed as the legally determinative 
provision and section 2119 is viewed as modified, accordingly."). As long as noted author 
Senator Patrick Daniel Moynihan, D-N.Y., serves on the Senate Finance Committee, the 
Treasury's belief might not be very sound. . 
238 See Parnell, supra note 26, at 1370-71; discussion infra part IV. 
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capitalization standards.239 Ideally these regulations would be 
issued after a public hearing in which FAA representatives 
participated.24° Congress could also express its concern with the 
Service's disregard for airline safety policy by prohibiting 
consideration of the cyclical aircraft engine inspection T.A.M. or, 
even more broadly, by cutting off funding for selected activities,241 
including audits or development of industry guidelines dealing with 
capitalization. If Chairman Archer's long-term goal is "to tear out 
the income tax by its roots,"242 he would certainly be willing to 
prune a capitalization limb or two now. However, such 
congressional guidance is not without its risks, in that it could very 
239 If the Service continues to ignore FAA airline safety policy, the House acting in this 
manner is a virtual certainty. 
240 A thesis of this article is that the new formulations of capitalization rules should be1 
through public rule making and ideally through negotiated rulemaking resulting in 
structured discretionary justice regulations. 
241 In the 1970's Congress repeatedly substituted prior IRS rules for proposed regulations 
or revenue rulings. Examples were rules as to salary reduction plans, employer reporting of 
tips paid to employees by charge cards, deductibility of travel expenses, and nonqualified 
deferred compensation plans. Parnell, supra note 26, at 1370-72. Commentators were even 
more critical of congressional prohibitions at this time of IRS providing nationwide guidance 
without any substitution of a prior IRS rule thereby creating a total administrative ruling 
void as was the case with fringe benefits. Parnell, supra note 26, at 1372-74. On occasion 
without amending the taxing statute, Congress prohibited IRS guidance but provided 
guidelines for rulings as in the case of classification of taxpayers as employees or independent 
contractors. Parnell, supra note 26, at 1373-7 4. Still another tack during this era was to limit 
IRS use of appropriated funds to implement nationwide guidance as in the case of denial of 
tax-exempt status to schools on account of racial discrimination. Devins, supra note 233, at 
1374. See Devins, supra note 233, for additional non-tax examples. Professor Devins points 
out that House rules now restrict the last approach of appropriation limitations. Parnell, 
supra note 26, at 462. 
242 142 Cong. Rec. H3408 (daily ed. Apr. 16, 1996) (Remarks of House Ways and Means 
Chairman Bill Archer, R-Tex.); Transcript of W&M Hearing on Impact of Tax Reform on 
Manufacturing, Energy, Natural Resources (July 31, 1996), 96 Tax Notes Today 154-27 (Aug. 
7, 1996) (LEXIS, FEDTAX lib., TNT file, elec. cit. 96 TNT 154-27) (Remarks of Chairman Bill 
Archer, R-Tex.) ("[I]t is my goal in the years that I will continue to serve in the Congress to 
tear the income tax out by its roots and to get the IRS completely and totally out of the lives 
of every individual American."); Archer Announces Hearing on ~eplacing the Federal Income 
Tax and Its Impact on Small Business (Apr. 1, 1996), reprinted in W&M Schedules Hearing 
on Effect of Tax Reform on Small Business, 96 Tax Notes Today 65-19 (Apr. 2, 1996) (LEXIS, 
FEDTAX lib., TNT file, elec. cit. 96 TNT 95-19) ("In announcing the hearings, Chairman 
Archer stated, 'This hearing is a continuation of our effort to replace the Federal income tax. 
My goal is to tear out the income tax by its roots so that it can never grow back. I believe that 
small businesses will be significant beneficiaries of a new, simpler tax system."'); Rosenbaum, 
supra note 12; Editorial, Income Tax or Sales Tax, Wash. Post, June 6, 1995, at A18; Peter 
Passel, The Tax Code Heads into the Operating Room, N.Y. Times, Sept. 3, 1995, at 3-1, col. 
2. 
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well subject the Service's interpretation of applicable tax law to 
congressional micromanagement. 243 Regardless, these early 
indications suggest that the Service should consider the role of non-
tax policies when interpreting the tax laws. 
IV. CONSIDERATION OFF AA SAFETY POLICY IN FASHIONING TAX 
POLICY: THE PuBLIC POLICY DOCTRINE 
The obvious public safety issues that pervade the subject of 
aircraft maintenance costs raise the question of whether the 
Service should consider non-tax public policy in fashioning tax 
policy with regard to the treatment of these costs. This article sets 
forth the thesis that a two-step analysis should apply in 
determining whether public policy expressed in a non-tax statute 
or rule sh~uld be taken into account in the formulation of a given 
tax policy. According to this analysis, in order for non-tax policy to 
be considered in the modeling of tax policy, Congress or the courts 
must first have clearly identified an overlap of this recognized non-
tax policy with the tax policy in question. The second step of the 
analysis would then require that the application of this general tax 
policy severely frustrate the non-tax policy with which it overlaps. 
The classic public policy tax doctrine required legislative 
identification ofthe non-tax public policy. Historically, the Service · 
has taken the public policy underlying judicial decisions and 
federal, state, and local legislation into account in the formulation 
of tax policy in certain areas. The following discussion examines 
how the Service has historically applied non-tax policy in some of 
these areas. 
243 Tax Executives Institute-Department of the Treasury Liaison Meeting (Nov. 19, 1996), 
reprinted in Agenda for TEl-Treasury Liaison Meeting, 96 Tax Notes Today 228-32 (Nov. 22, 
1996) (LEXIS, FEDTAX lib., TNT file, elec. cit. 96 TNT 228-32) (waming Treasury that "the 
dearth of generally applicable guidance places taxpayers in the position of having to seek 
clarification of any challenged expense deduction, and may well open the door to Congress's 
micromanaging the IRS's interpretation of the tax law"). 
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A. Previous Applications of Non- Tax Public Policy 
1. Public Policy Doctrine: Ab Initio 
As early as 1919, Treasury took broad non-tax policy into account 
in fashioning remedial rules as to involuntary conversions due to 
World War I. Without a statutory basis, the Revenue Act of 1918 
Regulations provided that the amount received by a taxpayer (a) for 
property lost or destroyed in whole or in part through fire, storm, 
shipwreck, or other casualty, or (b) in requisition or eminent 
domain proceedings resulting in a loss of title to property (or 
voluntary conveyance induced by reason of an imminent proceeding 
for such a purpose) was taxable only to the extent gain exceeded the 
amount actually and reasonably expended to "replace or restore the 
property substantially in kind, exclusive of any expenditures for 
additions or betterments."244 
Treasury's Notes on the Revenue Act of 1918 recommended a 
statutory amendment providing for a "replacement fund for the 
replacement in kind of lost or damaged property."245 These Notes 
clearly rested their involuntary conversion proposal on a general 
hardship policy.246 This public policy consideration, spawned by the 
flurry of involuntary conversions from the war, can be seen in the 
Revenue Act of 1921, retroactively applicable in this instance to 
''' Treasury Department, Regulations 45 Relating to the Income Tax and War Profits and 
Excess Profits Tax Under the Revenue Act of 1918, H.R. Doc. No. 1826, 65th Cong., 3d Sess., 
Art. 47, 26-27 (1919). 
245 Secretary of Treasury, Notes on the Revenue Act of 1918, § 213(e) (1919). 
246 See id. Section 213(e) provides: 
I d. 
During the war, in the case of property requisitioned for war purposes by the 
Government and property lost or destroyed in whole or in part through war hazards, 
especially in the case of ships, it happened that at the time of requisition or loss the 
market value of such ships was considerably increased over the cost or market value as 
of March 1, 1913, in cases in which the property was acquired prior to that date, and 
that in practically no case would the taxpayer have been willing to sell the property for 
its appraised value at the time of requisition or loss. 
To require the taxpayer to pay income and war profits and excess profits taxes upon the 
difference between the cost or market price on March 1, 1913, and the compensation 
received at the time of requisition or loss would have been to take such a large 
proportion of the amount received for the vessel that, although the owner desired to 
replace the same, the taking of the tax by the Government would have made it 
impossible in practically every instance. 
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1918.247 This Act provided relief to taxpayers whose property was 
converted for government use, by allowing a deduction for amounts 
the taxpayer expended from the proceeds of "compulsorily or 
involuntarily" converted property or its equivalent "in the 
acquisition of other property of a character similar or related in 
service or use to the property so converted."248 Thus the Act clearly 
showed an early congressional recognition of the utility of using 
non-tax public policy to help shape tax policies that would best 
serve the public interests. 
2. Public Policy Doctrine: Deduction Disallowance of Penalty 
Payments 
The most widely known tax rule that takes non-tax policies into 
account is the common law frustration of public policy doctrine that 
limits the allowance of certain deductions otherwise allowable 
based upon the literal language of the Code. In one instance, the 
public policy at stake was the deductibility of illegal payments and 
penalties. This doctrine's limitation was initially a judicial gloss on 
the section 162249 term "necessary,"250 which the Service later 
adopted,251 based upon the Chief Counsel's Office acknowledgment 
that the ensuing flood of lower court decisions were difficult to 
247 See Pelican Bay Lumber Co. v. Blair, 31 F.2d 15, 16 (9th Cir. 1929), cert. denied, 279 U.S. 
870 (1929). 
248 Revenue Act of 1921, ch. 136, § 214(a)(12), 42 Stat. 227, 241 (1921). Altematively, a 
deduction was provided for the acquisition of 80% or more of the stock or shares of a 
corporation owning such other property or in the establishment of Commissioner approved 
replacement fund. See id. 
249 I.R.C. § 162(a) ("There shall be allowed as a deduction all the ordinary and necessary 
expenses paid or incurred during the taxable year in carrying on any trade or business .... "). 
250 See Tank Truck Rentals v. Commissioner, 356 U.S. 30, 33-34 (1958) (holding that an 
expenditure otherwise qualifying as a business expense under section 162 could not qualify 
as necessary "if allowance of the deduction would frustrate sharply defined national or state 
policies proscribing particular types of conduct, evidenced by some govemmental declaration 
thereof'). 
251 See Rev. Rul. 54-27, 1954-1 C.B. 44; see also G.C.M. 38,611 (Jan. 16, 1981), considering 
Rev. Rul. 82-127, 1982-1 C.B. 215, declaring obsolete Rev. Rul. 54-27, 1954-1 C.B. 44. 
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reconcile252 and that subsequent Supreme Court cases only 
confused matters further. 253 
In the Tax Reform Act of 1969,254 Congress's intent to codify a 
limitation of the public policy doctrine as to ordinary and necessary 
business expenses came to fruition in the amendment of section 
162(c)255 and the addition of sections 162(£) and (g).256 These 
sections operated to deny deductions for certain illegal bribes, 
kickbacks, and other payments;257 deductions for "any fine or 
similar penalty paid to a government for the violation of any 
law;"258 and deductions of certain treble damage payments under 
the antitrust laws.259 The 1969 Senate Finance Committee Report 
explained the Committee's rationale for the changes and additions 
under sections 162(c), (f), and (g) as provisions, designed "for the 
denial of the deduction for payments in these [section 162(c), (f), 
and (g)] situations ... deemed to violate public policy [which are] 
intended to be all inclusive. Public policy, in other circumstances, 
generally is not sufficiently clearly defined to justify the 
disallowance of d~ductions."260 
252 See G.C.M. 36,671 (Mar. 30, 1976) (citing "Dwight, The Doctrine of Public Policy, 46 
Taxes 377 (1968); Gordon, The Public Policy Limitation on Deductions from Gross Income: 
A Conceptual Analysis, 43 Indiana L.J. 406 (1968); ~·ler, Disallowance of Deductions on 
Public Policy Grounds, 20 Tax L. Rev. 665 (1965); Lamont, Controversial Aspects of Ordinary 
and Necessary Business Expenses, 42 Taxes 808 (1964); Lindsay, Tax Deductions and Public 
Policy, 41 Taxes 711 (1963); and Note, Business Expenses, Disallowance and Public Policy: 
Some Problems of Sanctioning With the Internal Revenue Code, 72 Yale L.J. 108 (1962)"); see 
also O.M. 18,744 (Dec. 22, 1976), Illegal Bribes, Kickbacks and Other Payments; John Y. 
Taggart, Fines, Penalties, Bribes and Damage Payments and Recoveries, 25 Tax L. Rev. 611 
(1970). 
253 See James J. Freeland et al., Fundamentals of Federal Income Taxation, 539-44 (9th ed. 
1996), and Paul R. McDaniel et al., Federal Income Taxation, 374-89, 484-85 (Foundation 
Press 3d ed. 1994), for an excellent summary of the modern rules. 
254 Pub. L. No. 91-172, 83 Stat. 487 (1969). 
255 I.R.C. § 162(c). The Revenue Act of 1971 further amended section 162(c). See Pub. L. 
No. 92-178,85 Stat. 497 (1971). 
256 I.R.C. §§ 162(f), (g). Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-66, § 
13222, 107 Stat. 312, 477 (1993); in a similar vein disallows any deduction for lobbying 
expenses in amended section 162(e). 
257 I.R.C. § 162(c). 
258 I.R.C. § 162(f). 
259 I.R.C. § 162(g). 
260 S. Rep. No. 91-552, at 274 (1969) .. 
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One of the problems inherent in Congress's implementation of 
public policy in the formulation of tax policy, however, is the 
Service's propensity not to follow these limitations when applying 
that public policy. For example, despite the Committee's limitation 
on public policy as a reason to disallow deductions in situations 
beyond those addressed in sections 162(c), (f), and (g), the Service 
readily ruled that its disallowance of a section 165 loss, based on a 
violation of public policy, remained unchanged by the Tax Reform 
Act amendments and stated congressional policy.261 Moreover, the 
Service extended the same arguments it traditionally used to 
support its public policy gloss on "necessary" even further by 
finding that expenses resulting from behavior which violated public 
policy were not "ordinary'' business expenses in that they were not 
normal, common, usual, or customary.262 Ultimately this tack 
resulted in holdings such as that in Raymond Bertolini Trucking 
Co. v. Commissioner,263 where the Tax Court disallowed a deduction 
for regular kickback payments which violated a (decidedly 
unenforced) Chicago anti-kickback statute because these costs were 
not "ordinary" in the public policy sense.264 This holding produced 
precisely the same result as application of a common law public 
policy doctrine that Congress had sought to bar in 1969, which 
probably underlies the Sixth Circuit's reversal of the Tax Court.265 
261 See G.C.M. 36,965 (Dec. 22, 1976), considering Rev. Rul. 77-442, 1977-2 C.B. 264 ("Our 
position is that the amendments to Code § 162 do not limit public policy considerations 
applicable to other sections of the Code ... . ");see also Rev. Rul. 77-126, 1977-1 C.B. 48, 
considered in G.C.M. 36,665 (Mar. 26, 1976); accord, Rev. Rul. 81-151, 1981-1 C.B. 74, 
considered in G.C.M. 38,547 (Oct. 24, 1980); Rev. Rul. 81-24, 1981-1 C.B. 175 and Rev. Rul. 
82-74, 1982-1 C.B. 110, considered in G.C.M. 37,985 (June 19, 1979); G.C.M. 36,962 (Dec. 22, 
1976) and attached O.M. 18,744 (Dec. 22, 1976), Illegal Bribes, Kickbacks and Other 
Payments. 
262 See O.M. 18,744 (Dec. 22, 1976), Illegal Bribes, Kickbacks and Other Payments, supra 
note 255. Perhaps the better position is set forth in Judge Sterrett's dissent in Mazzei u. 
Commissioner, 61 T.C. 497, 506 (1974) (Sterrett, J., dissenting) ("(W]hen a deduction should 
be denied should remain under the control of Congress.") (emphasis omitted). Judge 
Tannenwald's concurring opinion illustrates the attraction of the public policy doctrine to the 
fact finder. See id. at 504 (Tannenwald, J., concurring) ("The obvious reply to the contention 
that my approach may involve 'the task of grading criminal activity' is that, ... the courts will 
simply be dealing with another instance of line-drawing which is part of the daily grist of 
judicial life."); see also McDaniel eta!., supra note 253, at 484-85. 
263 45 T.C.M. (CCH) 44 (1982), reu'd, 736 F.2d 1120 (6th Cir. 1984). 
264 45 T.C.M. (CCH) at 50. 
265 See Raymond Bertolini Trucking Co. v. Commissioner, 736 F.2d 1120 (6th Cir. 1984). 
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3. Public Policy Doctrine: Charitable Exemptions and Illegal 
Purpose 
A second area of taxation in which public policy has played a 
major role is qualification as a charitable organization under 
section 501(c)(3).266 This area actually provided the most natural 
niche of all for public policy, given the fact that the Code does not 
define "charitable ... purposes."267 Instead, the regulations use the 
"broad outlines of'charity' as developed by judicial decisions" as the 
benchmark for the tax-exempt purposes set forth in section 
501(c)(3).268 The Service interpreted these common-law decisions 
as establishing the notion that neither the purposes nor 
operations269 of an exempt charity could be illegal or contrary to 
public policy. 
The Service also has relied upon the general trust law 
prohibition of purposes and activities that are illegal or contrary to 
public policy as an interpretive tool in justifying the denial of tax-
exempt status to organizations.270 In Revenue Ruling 71-447, the 
Service utilized the general common law of charitable trusts to 
determine that racially discriminatory private schools were not 
described in section 501(c)(3) because they violated a clear federal 
public policy against racial discrimination in education.271 The 
Supreme Court in effect confirmed this determination in Bob Jones 
266 I.R.C. § 501(c)(3). 
2s1 Id. 
268 Reg.§ 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(2) (1996). 
269 General Counsel Memorandum 37,858 describes the operational test for determining 
tax-exempt status: 
[I]fthe overall consequences of carrying on such activities would be contrary to public 
policy, the organization carrying on the activities will not qualify for exemption under 
section 501(c)(3) regardless of the legality of the activities. For instance, although the 
granting of scholarships is, in and of itself, legal and not contrary to public policy, such 
activity will be considered contrary to public policy if the scholarships are limited in 
such a way that the overall effect of the activity is to promote racial discrimination in 
education. 
G.C.M. 37,858 (Feb. 16, 1979). 
270 See Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 377 cmt. c ( 1959) (noting that a charitable trust 
cannot be created for a purpose which is illegal or contrary to public policy); Iva A. Scott, The 
Law of Trusts § 377 (4th ed. 1989) (stating that where a policy is articulated in a statute 
making certain conduct a criminal offense, a trust is illegal if its performance involves such 
criminal conduct or tends to encourage such conduct). 
271 Rev. Rul. 71-447, 1971-2 C.B. 230. 
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University v. United States,272 which revoked the tax-exempt status 
of the university due to the school's prohibition of interracial 
relationships.273 
The Service has also indicated that it will focus upon whether the 
activities of purportedly exempt organizations are contrary to a 
fundamental public policy. In outlining its analysis of the public 
policy doctrine, the Service relied upon the Supreme Court's 
opinion in Bob Jones University for guidance, stating: 
We believe that in Bob Jones the Court set a standard that the 
public policy involved must be fundamental and there must be no 
doubt that the activity involved is contrary to that fundamental 
public policy. 
In beginning our analysis of whether the activities of the 
Association violate a fundamental public policy we must first 
determine whether the public policy involved is clear and 
fundamental. Then consideration must be given to whether the 
specific activities of the Association violate that fundamental 
public policy.274 
The Service, however, has yet to clearly set forth a consistent 
definition and scope of what constitutes a fundamental public 
policy. The Service has stated that it only rarely denies section 
501(c)(3) status "based on illegal acts or violations of clear federal 
public policy outside the area of racial discrimination in 
education."275 While the frequency of such an application of public 
policy may not be great, the scope of public policies considered in 
General Counsel Memoranda (and more rarely published rulings 
272 461 U.S. 574 (1983). 
273 See id. at 605; see also Miriam Galston, Public Policy Constraints on Charitable 
Organizations, 3 Va. Tax Rev. 291 (1983) (criticizing the Court's reading of the trust law 
doctrine in Bob Jones while supporting the Court's conclusion to deny the school's section 
501(c)(3) exemption under a broader theory of public policy). 
274 G.C.M. 39,800 (Oct. 25, 1989); see also G.C.M. 36,797 (July 23, 1976) ("Formal legislative 
action on the national level is commonly regarded as a controlling determinant of Federal 
public policy with regard to the subject of such legislation."); see, e.g., Building Serv. 
Employees lnt'l Union v. Gazzam, 339 U.S. 532, 537-38 (1950) (affirming its earlier 
pronouncement in Twin City Pipe Line Co. v. Harding Glass Co., 283 U.S. 353, 357 (1931) 
(stating that it is primarily "for the lawmakers to determine the public policy of the State.")). 
275 G.C.M. 39,800 (Oct. 25, 1989). 
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and cases) in fact is broad.276 Even though a strict definition of 
"fundamental" is lacking, an argument can be made that the 
legislative and judicial recognition prong of the suggested analysis 
is tantamount to the requirement that only fundamental public 
policy should be considered. 
4. Public Policy Doctrine: Preserving Statutory Subsidies 
The public policy doctrinal area that is conceptually closest to the 
cyclical aircraft overhaul tax issue arose from tax shelter 
preferences used by individuals to offset income from other 
activities and investments. Repeatedly during the 1970's, the 
Service modified certain doctrines that were a part of its tax policy 
in order to avoid thwarting Congress's clear intent of providing a 
particular subsidy or tax preference. From the perspective of this 
article, the determinative factor was Congress's awareness of the 
overlap of public policy and tax policy as evidenced by these 
subsidies. 
One example of the Service's reversal oftax policy in recognition 
of congressional public policy occurred in the waning days of the 
Ford Administration. In 1977, Commissioner Don Alexander 
proposed anti-tax-shelter revisions to the "association" (an entity 
tax classification) regulations which would have taxed many pass-
through277limited partnerships as corporations.278 These revisions 
276 See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 75-384, 1975-2 C.B. 204 (holding that an anti-war protest 
organization could not be exempt because its primary activity was sponsoring protest 
demonstrations in which participants were urged to commit violations oflocal ordinances and 
breaches of public order); G.C.M. 39,862 (Nov. 22, 1991) ("(E]ngaging in conduct or 
arrangements that violate the anti-kickback statute is inconsistent with continued exemption 
as a charitable hospital."); G.C.M. 39,800 (Oct. 25, 1989) (determining that insufficient 
evidence existed to find a violation of fundamental public policy of the First Amendment of 
the United States Constitution from a tax-exempt organization paying the salary of a public 
high school teacher who taught three courses on the Bible as literature and history); G.C.M. 
37, 858 (Feb. 16, 1979) (holding that rent strikes, economic boycotts, picketing, and mass 
demonstrations, although legal, must be closely analyzed to determine whether they are 
contrary to public policy); G.C.M. 36,797 (July 23, 1976) (finding that an apprentice training 
school that gave a preference to Native Americans was exempt since it carried out national 
public policy as provided for by federal legislation). 
277 In this context the essence of a pass-through entity is the ability of the owner to deduct 
currently the owner's "share" of the entity's tax losses, which are "passed through" to the 
owner. I.R.C. §§ 702(a), 704(a), and 704(d). 
278 See Prop. Reg.§ 301.7701-l(b), (c), 42 Fed. Reg. 1038-44 (1977); see generally Lee, supra 
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would have ended the use of tax losses from limited partnerships' 
real estate activities as passive offsets to partners' income from 
services and investments.279 However, the regulations were 
''hastily withdrawn" upon the Department of Housing and Urban 
Development's (HUD) protest that such a revision would hinder its 
attempts to encourage investments in low-income housing.280 In 
essence, Treasury subordinated its application of the tax policy of 
"corporate resemblance"281 to HUD's policy of encouraging private 
investment in low-income housing. 
The Service revealed its rationale behind this subordination of 
tax policy to HUD's non-tax policy in Revenue Ruling 79-300.282 In 
this ruling, the Service explained that the application of the section 
183283 profit motive requirement to low-income housing projects, . 
qualifying under section 236 of the National Housing Act 
[hereinafter NHA section 236], would frustrate the congressional 
intent of encouraging the construction of low-income housing.284 
Most significantly, the ruling noted that Congress had Been aware 
note 114, at 61 n.9. 
279 See Prop. Reg.§ 301.7701-l{b), (c). This revision would have had the same immediate 
practical effect as the Passive Activities Loss [hereinafter PAL) rules eventually enacted in 
1986 (and much more adverse long-term effect since PAL only suspends the passed-through 
losses, whereas association treatment traps the losses inside the entity which is taxed as a 
C corporation). See I.R.C. § 469. 
280 See Withdrawal of Notice of Proposed Rule Making, 42 Fed. Reg. 1489 (1977); Note, Tax 
Classification of Limited Partnerships: The IRS Bombards the Tax Shelters, 52 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 
408, 410 (1977); Alan S. Oser, Battle is Joined on I.R.S. Partnership-Corporation Ruling, N.Y. 
Times, Jan. 7,1977, atA11. 
291 See Larson v. Commissioner, 66 T.C. 159, 185 (1976) (holding that a tax shelter limited 
partnership "failed" the mechanical test of corporate resemblance under the regulations 
because it lacked continuity of life and limited liability and hence was not an association 
taxable as a corporation as the IRS asserted). 
282 1979-2 C.B. 112, considered in G.C.M. 38,117 (Sept. 28, 1979). 
283 I.R.C. § 183 (setting forth the "hobby loss" rules requiring that an activity be engaged 
in for profit for the deductibility of losses under sections 162, 167, and 212); see generally 
Start-up Costs and Clear Reflection of Income, supra note 53. 
294 Rev. Rul. 79-300, 1979-2 C.B. 112, 113. In this ruling, the Service stated: 
The above legislative history indicates that in limiting rental charges, Congress 
assumed deductions oftax losses would be allowed to encourage investment in projects 
providing decent housing for low or moderate income families under the Act. 
Consequently, application of section 183 of the Code to the present case would frustrate 
congressional intent in enacting the housing legislation. Therefore, section 183 will not 
be applied to disallow losses incurred in activities to provide low and moderate income 
housing under section 236 of the National Housing Act. 
Rev. Rul. 79-300, 1979-2 C.B. 112, 113. 
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when enacting the enabling legislation for the NHA section 236 
program that: (a) section 236 project partnerships likely would not 
realize any economic profit due to limitations on the amounts 
chargeable as rent and distributable in cash to partners and (b) a 
partner's investment return in such partnerships would compare 
adequately with returns on other investments only if tax losses 
could be taken into account.285 The General Counsel Memorandum 
accompanying the ruling explained that "[c]onsequently, the 
Commissioner has made a policy decision that Section 183 will not 
be applied to disallow losses incurred by partners engaged in the 
construction and operation of low and moderate income housing 
under Section 236 of the National Housing Act."286 This 
explanation sounds more like "administrative convenience,"287 but 
the ruling clearly adopted a public policy rationale that the Service 
later extended to other low and moderate income housing 
partnerships where the expectations of economic profits were 
doubtful.288 
285 Id. 
286 G.C.M. 38,117 (Sept. 28, 1979). In the litigation context of Blitzer v. United States, 684 
F.2d 874 (Ct. Cl. 1982), the offices of the Commissioner and the Chief Counsel as well as the 
representatives of Treasury decided that the Service would not rely on an "economic reality" 
to disallow losses from such activities. G.C.M. 38,117 (Sept. 28, 1979). The Department of 
Justice agreed. Id. 
The section 236 program is designed to provide decent housing for many low and 
moderate income families who otherwise could not afford it. As the above legislative 
history indicates, the program relies on certain tax benefits to encourage private 
investors to construct and manage low and moderate income housing projects. ·If section 
183 were applied to deny these tax benefits to the section 236 projects, few, if any, would 
invest in these projects. As a result, the goal of building more low and moderate income 
housing would not be fulfilled. 
When Congress enacted section 183, it recognized that this section was a broad provision 
that might technically encompass certain situations to which it was not intended to 
apply. The Committee on Finance expressed its desire that section 183 be reasonably 
administered and stated that the Service should limit the disallowance of the deduction 
of losses under this provision to cases in which "it is generally recognized that this is 
appropriate." S. Rep. No. 91-552, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., 103-104 (1969), 1969-3 C.B. 423, 
490. 
G.C.M. 38,117 (Sept. 28, 1979). 
287 See supra notes 81-96 and accompanying text. 
288 See, e.g., P.L.R. 85-31-065 (May 9, 1985). The letter ruling sets forth the Service's 
conclusion that: 
[T]he fact that individual dwelling units may be sold under options to low-income 
tenants at a price which limits the Partnership's profit will not cause the Project to be 
treated as "an activity not engaged in for profit" under section 183(a) of the Code, and 
' 
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B. Application of the Public Policy Doctrine to Cyclical 
Aircraft Maintenance Costs 
In order for the FAA safety policy to be considered in the tax 
treatment of cyclical aircraft maintenance costs, the model analysis 
set forth earlier in this article requires that two tests be met. First, 
Congress or the courts must have clearly identified an overlap of 
the FAA safety policy with the tax policy applicable to the 
treatment ofthese costs. Next, the application ofthe Service's tax 
policy, with respect to the capitalization of these maintenance costs, 
must severely frustrate the FAA's safety policy underlying the 
required cyclical overhauls of aircraft engines. As the subsequent 
discussion indicates, the airline industry's case is much stronger as 
to the former requirement than the latter. 
1. Clear Identification of Overlap of IRS and FAA Policies as to 
Maintenance Costs 
History suggests that expressions not subject to a formal vote of 
Congress or Committee are not sufficient to trigger the public policy 
doctrine.289 Based on this, Chairman Archer's letter to 
!d. 
the Service will not use the "not for profit" argument to deny related deductions under 
sections 162, 165, 167 and 212. 
289 For instance, the Service apparently ignored an October 7, 1987 letter to House Ways 
and Means Chairman Rostenkowski, D-Ill., signed by all of the other members of the 
Committee. See Letter from Thomas Downey et al., Representative, U.S. House of 
Representatives, to Dan Rostenkowski, Chairman, House Ways and Means Committee (Oct. 
7, 1987), reprinted in Ways and Means Members as for Technical Correction to Relieve Free-
Lance Writers from the New Uniform Capitalization Rules, 87 Tax Notes Today 197-10 (Oct. 
9, 1987) (LEXIS, FEDTAX lib., TNT file, elec. cit. 87 TNT 197-10). The letter requested the 
Chairman's "assistance in reconsidering the application of the uniform capitalization rules 
of section 263A, added by the Tax Reform Act of 1986, to the expenses of professional 
free-lance creators, such as writers and photographers." !d. The letter described the 
administrative issues arising from the application of income forecasting in depreciation to 
writer prepublication expenses: 
As noted in our report accompanying H.R. 3838, it was not intended that the uniform 
capitalization rules would apply "where application of the rules might be unduly 
burdensome". (H.R. Rep. No. 99-426, p. 625). In fact very substantial administrative 
and accounting burdens, including allocation and income forecasting requirements that 
are unlikely to be manageable by either taxpayers or the Internal Revenue Service 
would be imposed on professional creators such as writers and photographers by the 
uniform capitalization requirements. In the case of free-lance writers, for instance, each 
of a writer's legitimate professional expenses must be "allocated" among all pending 
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Commissioner Richardson290 and the bipartisan Ways and Means 
Committee Members' letter to Treasury Secretary Robert Rubin,291 
both ofwhich criticized the Service's failure to consider FAA safety 
policy in its treatment of aircraft maintenance costs, would not 
satisfy the suggested prerequisite of clear congressional 
identification of the overlapping policies. 
The discussion in the 1996 Conference Committee Report, 
however, probably would meet the clear identification requirement 
of the analysis.292 The major question with respect to the 
committee discussion is whether congressional recognition of the 
overlap of tax and non-tax policy was established too late. Under 
classic rules of statutory construction, the views of a later Congress 
cannot affect the meaning of a term enacted by an earlier Congress 
unless the act of the earlier Congress is being statutorily amended 
works and then recovered based on the projected profitability of the novel, article or 
poem. The task of allocating the expense of each telephone call and expenditure for 
supplies among each pending project is nearly impossible. In addition, the requirement 
of estimating the likely profitability of a project that has only begun is equally difficult. 
In each case little more than guesswork is involved. . . . In sum, we think there is little 
question that any theoretical benefit of applying capitalization requirements to the 
expense of professional free·lance creators such as authors or photographers is 
far-outweighed by the countervailing considerations of the significant burden imposed 
on these taxpayers, the introduction of material uncertainty in the computation of tax 
liability by these individuals, and the unfairness of singling out this group of individuals 
who earn income from their personal efforts. 
!d. Action by the Service came only after Congress began to act in 1988. See infra notes 292-
93 and accompanying text. 
290 See Archer Letter, supra note 9. 
291 See Letter from Mac Collins et al., supra note 13. The Committee members urged 
reversal of the T.A.M. stating: 
This Congress and the Administration, through the Federal Aviation Administration, 
is working hard to enhance the safety of the traveling public. The United States 
airline industry has the best safety record in the world. We do not believe the 
Administration intends to increase the cost of ensuring the public safety by making it 
more expensive to perform routine maintenance and repair of aircraft. Clearly the 
IRS is overstepping its authority in attempting to impose this tax penalty on air 
safety. 
We are troubled by the IRS's change of policy without the benefit of legislation or 
rulemaking. If the IRS intends to implement a change in policy of this magnitude, 
we believe the change should be the subject of hearings before the Committees of 
appropriate jurisdiction in the Congress. 
Letter from Mac Collins et al., supra note 13. 
292 See H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 104-863, at 1149 (1996), 142 Cong. Rec. Hll644, H12009 (daily 
ed. Sept. 28, 1996). See supra notes 24 and 28. 
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by the later Congress.293 This rule of statutory construction should 
probably not apply here because the issue is not the intended 
meaning of a tax term, but rather identification of an overlap of tax 
and non-tax policies. The Service's actions in 1988 as to writers' 
prepublication costs indicate that this form of congressional 
identification of non-tax and tax policy overlap may be sufficient.294 
Notice 88-62 authorized writers to elect to capitalize 
prepublication costs and then depreciate 50% ofthese costs in the 
tax year in which they were paid and 25% in each tax year 
thereafter.295 The Notice was based. on a standard expressed in the 
1986legislative history to section 263A that sought to reduce the 
administrative complexities of complying with the Uniform 
Capitalization Rules.296 The Service reasoned that the three-year 
depreciation safe harbor substantially reduced the administrative 
difficulties associated with compliance by eliminating the necessity 
to amortize the capitalized costs under the income forecast 
method.297 The Service's application of this standard in Notice 88-
62 is germane to the Service's treatment of cyclical aircraft 
maintenance costs in two ways. First, the Service's recognition of 
the policy enunciated in the 1986 legislative history shows its 
reliance on congressional identification of the overlap of policies. 
Second, it is also indirect support for the exercise of a broad 
mandate in allowing a current deduction, under section 446(b)'s 
clear reflection of income standard, at a point sooner than such 
deduction would otherwise be allowed-essentially the standard this 
article advocates for capitalization under section 263. 
293 See Rough Justice, supra note 16. 
294 See Notice 88-62, 1988-1 C.B. 548. 
295 Id. 
296 SeeS. Rep. No. 99-313, at 142 (1986). 
297 Notice 88-62, 1988-1 C.B. 548. The Service noted: 
I d. 
The legislative history of section 263A indicates that Congress was aware of the possible 
administrative complexities resulting from the application of the uniform capitalization 
rules to businesses. In response to this concern, Congress granted the Treasury 
Department authority under section 263A to "adopt other simplifying methods and 
assumptions where, in the judgment of the Secretary of the Treasury, the costs and 
other burdens of literal compliance may outweigh the benefits." S. Rep. 99-313, 99th 
Cong. 2d Sess. 141-42 (1986). 
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2. Severe Frustration of the FAA Safety Policy 
The argument that the current tax policy with respect to the 
treatment of cyclical aircraft maintenance costs would severely 
frustrate the FAA's airline safety policy is weaker than the 
argument supporting the congressional identification of policy 
overlaps. Allowing a current deduction for these cyclical 
maintenance costs will not free up revenues to spend on airline 
safety as Chairman Archer has implied because the airline industry 
is currently deducting these costs anyway.298 The airlines 
economically must perform the required FAA safety inspections and 
overhauls regardless of the tax consequences. Therefore, revoking 
the Service's capitalization rule as set forth in the T.A.M. still 
would not allow the airlines to reduce safety costs below FAA 
standards, nor would it increase revenues likely allocable to 
increased airline safety since the airlines are unlikely to take safety 
measures above those required by the FAA. 
The argument that allowing a current deduction for cyclical 
maintenance costs would be a revenue loser for the federal 
government is also an anomaly. Assume (as the Ways and Means 
Committee does) that all airline industry taxpayers have been 
expensing the cost of FAA-mandated aircraft engine overhauls in 
the year these costs were incurred. Thus the costs relating to the 
overhaul of any one engine are incurred and deducted once every 
four years. Under the pay-go rules,299 the ideal rule of capitalizing 
and depreciating the overhaul costs would be included in the base 
line so that a statute allowing a current deduction would be 
counted as a revenue loser. Assuming that the correct depreciation 
period is four years and that one quarter of the engines are 
overhauled each year, the deduction in the fourth year would be the 
same under both approaches. Thus, in three to four years the 
current airlines would have the same amount of deductions for 
depreciation as they would if they had currently expensed the costs 
ofthe overhauls. Such a result seems to only bolster the idea that 
the Service's approach is indeed more-trouble-than-it's-worth, even 
without considering the possible frustration of non-tax policy. 
298 See supra text accompanying note 12; supra notes 169-71 and accompanying text. 
299 See supra note 25. 
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Despite the weakened severe-frustration prong of the public 
policy doctrine analysis in this case, reading the public policy 
doctrine together with a handful of rulings, in which the Service did 
not apply a general tax rule because it would frustrate a non-tax 
congressional policy,300 could support the Service's adoption of a 
position that would take FAA safety policies into account and 
reverse the T.A.M. Further consideration of non-tax public policy 
in light of rough justice current deduction rules would tend to allow 
·factors, such as the fact that the interval of recurrence is only one 
year longer than a three-year cycle which often has been found to 
support current deduction301 and the fact that the amount of the 
costs involved is relatively de minimis,302 to tip the scales in favor 
of a current deduction. Whether the Service's tax policy severely 
frustrates FAA airline safety policy is an area that requires more 
attention; however, any consideration of non-tax policy in this area 
should be explicit. 
Based upon comments at the VTSG Spring 1997 Symposium, it 
is unlikely that any frustration of public policy argument here 
would carry the day in litigation in the Tax Court. Nor is it likely 
to be very appealing to Chief Counsel. 
C. Negotiated Rulemaking: Evolution from Notice 96-7 
Negotiated rulemaking constitutes an open process in which 
representatives ofthe administrative agency and various pressure 
groups work together to find a compromise solution to the problem 
facing the administrative agency.303 Congress has on occasion 
300 See supra discussion, part IV.A. 
301 See supra discussion, part II.B.2. 
302 See supra discussion, part II.B.l. 
303 See Philip J. Harter, Negotiating Regulations: A Cure for Malaise, 71 Geo. L.J. 1 (1982); 
Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Administrative Alternative Dispute Resolution: The Development of 
Negotiated Rulemaking and Other D14 Pepp. L. Rev. 863 (1987); Lawrence Susskind & 
Gerard McMahon, The Theory and Practice of Negotiated Rulemaking, 3 Yale J. on Reg. 133 
(1985); Susan Rose-Ackerman, Consensus Versus Incentives: A Skeptical Look at Regulatory 
Negotiation, 43 Duke L.J. 1206 (1994); Daniel J. Fiorino, Dimensions of Negotiated 
Rulemaking: Practical Constraints and Theoretical Implications, in Conflict Resolution and 
Public Policy 141 (Miriam K. Mills ed., 1990); Administrative Conference of the United 
States, Negotiated Rulemaking Source Book 1 (1990). 
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mandated such endeavors.304 In the tax arena negotiated 
rulemaking has been much more informal. Probably the most 
significant. examples of informal negotiated regulation or its 
functional equivalent are the "collegial" tax reforms of the late 
1970's and early 1980's. Staff from Treasury and the tax writing 
committees at times met with representatives from the tax 
professional groups (e.g., ABA and AICPA) to agree upon tax 
reform rules to be presented to the committees against a backdrop 
of public hearings in which the more traditional, or at least overt, 
pressure groups could voice their view on the reforms.305 · 
In mid-1979 the Chairs of the House Ways and Means and 
Senate Finance Committees introduced a bill to clarify and simplify 
section 453, intended as the first of a number of discrete 
simplification bills to be introduced over the next several years.306 
Treasury's Deputy Tax Legislative Counsel, Hank Gutman, saw 
this bill as an "important barometer of the fortunes of the 
simplification effort."307 The 1979 installment reporting bill, largely 
drafted by Treasury,308 ran into much opposition from pressure 
groups in the 1979 Hearings.309 House Ways and Means Chairman 
304 The Environmental Protection Agency was one of the first agencies to institutionalize 
this process and provide problem selection criteria. 48 Fed. Reg. 7494 (1983); see also 5 
U.S.C. §§ 561-570 (Supp. V 1994). 
305 See Howard J. Hoffman, The Role of the Bar in the Tax Legislative Process, 37 Tax L. 
Rev. 411 (1982) (Examples: Installment Sales Revision Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-4 71, 94 
stat. 2247 (1980); Bankruptcy Tax Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-589, 94 Stat. 3389 (1980); 
Subchapter S Revision Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97·354, 96 Stat. 1669 (1982); and Limitation 
on Net Operating Loss Carry Forwards enacted in Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-
514, § 621, 100 Stat. 2085, 2254 (1986), where no consensus was reached, but the tax writing 
committees struck their own balance). The more recent section 197, Treatment of 
Intangibles, enacted in Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-66, § 
13261, 107 Stat. 312, 532 (1993), had more extensive public hearings and more hard data on 
actual practice than prior reform efforts, but again apparently less negotiated-regulation, 
with the tax writing committees simply dictating the result. 
306 H.R. 3899, 96th Cong. (1979); see Hoffman, supra note 305, at 495-96. 
307 Installment Sales, Subtitle F Simplification, and Miscellaneous Tax Measures: Hearings 
on H.R. 2536, H.R. 2770, H.R. 3660, H.R. 3899, H.R. 3900, H.R. 42001, and H.R. 4726 Before 
the Subcomm. on Select Revenue Measures of the House Ways and Means Comm., 96th Cong. 
33 (1979) (prepared statement of Deputy Tax Legislative Counsel Harry L. Gutman) 
[hereinafter 1979 House Hearings]. 
308 Hoffman, supra note 305, at 507. 
308 Tax Simplifications: Hearings on S. 1062 and S. 1063 before the Subcomm. on Taxation 
and Debt Management Generally of the Sen. Finance Comm., 96th Cong. 50 (1979) (statement 
of Senator Harry Byrd, D-Va.); 1979 House Hearings, supra note 307, at 81 (statement of 
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Dan Rostenkowski, D-Ill., then directed Treasury to work with 
representatives from the Bar Associations and the AICPA to come 
up with a mutually acceptable reform provision. They did, in a 
consensual process310 ably spearheaded by Professor Martin 
Ginsburg.3u 
More recently, the development of market segment 
understandings312 and some Industry Specialization Program 
("ISP") coordinated issue papers constitute further examples of 
informal negotiated regulation.313 Lee understands, from an 
Eastern Virginia CPNattorney involved on a national level with 
tax administration in a professional society, that at least one 
Market Segment Specialization Program ("MSSP") guide was also 
developed in this manner. 
Professor Martin Ginsburg) ("only truly controversial provision" is the barring of installment 
reporting to sales to a related party); 1979 House Hearings, supra note 307, at 71, 74-75, 78-
79 (statement and prepared statement of Herbert J. Lemer, Chairman Tax Accounting 
Subcommittee, Federal Tax Division, American Institute of Certified Public Accountants). 
Professor Ginsburg had advocated that ratable basis recovery and not cost recovery should 
obtain wherever the total purchase price is fixed. Martin D. Ginsburg, Taxing the Sale for 
Future Payment, 30 Tax L. Rev. 469, 493-94 (1975). 
310 Staff of the Joint Comm. on Taxation, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., Description of H.R. 6883 
Relating to Revision of Installment Sale Reporting Rules 1 (Comm. Print 1980) [hereinafter 
1980 Staff Description)); Miscellaneous Tax Bills IX· Hearings before the Subcomm. on 
Taxation and Debt Management Generally of the Senate Fin. Comm., 96th Cong. 97 (1980) 
(Prepared Statement of Deputy Assistant Secretary (Tax Legislation) Daniel Halperin) ("The 
objective was to produce a revised bill incorporating the proposals made and resolving 
adequately the issues raised in the testimony and comments received by the Subcommittee. 
Treasury, along with those groups whose representatives were willing to donate the requisite 
time and effort to engage in constructive dialogue were, thereafter, intimately involved with 
the staff in the development of the revised installment sale bill."). 
311 Hoffman, supra note 305, at 499-500 ("Professor Martin D. Ginsburg, who represented 
the two New York tax groups and was vice chairman of the Special Committee on 
Simplification was the most active participant, initiating the informal contacts and 
subsequently serving as the focal point for the discussion, as well as liaison among the tax 
groups and the govemment."); Installment Sales Revision Act of 1980 and Minor Tax Bills: 
Hearings on H.R. 6883, H.R. 5616, H.R. 5729, H.R. 6039, H.R. 6140, H.R. 6247, H.R. 6824, 
and H.R. 7009 before the Subcomm. on Select Revenue Measures of the House Ways and Means 
Comm., 96th Cong., 3, 23, 26, 29 (statements of Chairman Dan Rostenkowski, D-Ill.; Harry 
Gutman); id. at 36-37 (statement of Charles Walker, Chairman Section of Taxation of 
American Bar Association); id. at 46 (statement of Chairman Dan Rostenkowski, D-Ill.) ("We 
are aware of the amount of time and effort you [Professor Ginsburg] have devoted to this 
legislation. We know that you were truly one of the principal architects of this legislation 
... ."). 
312 See, e.g., Ann. 96-105, 1996-42 I.R.B. 19; IR-95-49, 1995 IRB Lexis 261 (Aug. 3, 1995). 
313 See Phil Brand, IRS Alternative Dispute Resolution Techniques, 71 Tax Notes 529, 531 
(Apr. 22, 1996). 
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We do not view, as some academics do, garden~variety hearings 
on proposed regulations and ensuing modifications in response to 
pressure group complaints as rising to the level of negotiated 
rulemaking or "neg-reg," but do agree with Professor Carole C. 
Berry314 that Treasury regulations would often benefit from this 
process. Indeed, we see Treasury regulation of capitalization tax 
issues as crying out for this approach.315 We believe that the ideal 
solution for cyclical airplane engine overhauls is the promulgation 
of legislative regulations pursuant to a statutory authorization, 
enumerating factors that in rough form had been the subject of 
public hearings and then were refined by a negotiating group of 
Treasury and IRS officials (and former officials concemed with 
capitalization issues), FAA and Department of Transportation 
folks, the accounting and legal professions, pressure groups, and 
academic representatives directed by the Chairman/Commissioner 
to come up with a solution. This article offers such negotiated 
rulemaking as a defusing technique that would address all of the 
problems raised herein, including above all, the political one. Were 
Technical Advice Memorandum 96-18-004 simply reversed with a 
tersely worded published ruling, as was the case with the soil 
remediation T.A.M., every other industry faced with a new post-
INDOPCO ruling or ISP, MSU or significant issue will seek to 
challenge it politically.316 Conversely if the Service does not 
consider FAA policy and/or hold a public hearing or equivalent, 
considering at least in part the tax treatment of cyclical safety 
aircraft engine overhauls, Congress in the near future might 
suspend, through limitation riders or the like, application of the 
reasoning of Technical Advice Memorandum 96-18-004 until the 
Service acts. Either way the Service may well find its whole post-
INDOPCO strategy much more trouble than it ever could have been 
worth. We recommend that the apparent IRS strategy be shifted 
from establishing rules through audit, litigation and occasional 
314 Carole C. Berry, Sub S One Class of Stock Requirement: Rulemaking Gone Wrong, 44 
Cath. U. L. Rev. 11, 20-24, 54-58 (1994). 
315 We are very grateful to Ms. Berry's work for acquainting us with this useful concept. · 
Professor Lee's colleague Charles Koch, a recognized administrative law expert, helped as 
well. 
316 Cf Art Pine, Congress Stirs Up IRS Enforcement, Wash. Post, Dec. 22, 1978, at El. That 
is just what happened the first time. 
242 Virginia Tax Review [Vol. 17:161 
· rulings to utilizing the medium of "structured discretionary justice" 
regulations. Such regulations, ideally modeled after the revised 
section 355 corporate separations regulations or perhaps the 
partnership anti-abuse regulations, should cover capitalization and 
depreciation in general. Ideally these structured discretionary 
justice regulations, containing detailed balancing tests, should 
themselves be formulated through negotiated rulemaking in which 
FAA representatives, etc., are invited to participate on appropriate 
topics. A marriage of the Installment Sales Revision Act of 1980 
and the "collegial tax reform" experiences of the amortization of 
purchased intangibles provision offers a handy analogue for 
negotiated rulemaking for capitalization/depredation versus 
expensing regulations. Major steps towards simplification and 
towards the Service being less intrusive in business decisions could 
result from implementation of all (or perhaps even any) of these 
proposals. 
V. CONCLUSIONS: A STREAM CAN RISE NO HIGHER THAN 
ITS SOURCE 
IRS-bashing by Congress here seems hypocritical. In the area of 
capitalization versus expensing, the tax writing committees 
repeatedly have chosen to leave the question of deductibility, 
particularly as to self-created intangibles like long-term recurring 
repairs, to the case law. Time after time in the aftermath of such 
deliberate congressional inaction, however, the mercies of the case 
law proved to be not as tender as the pressure groups had 
anticipated.317 Moreover in light of this inaction, transaction costs 
have mounted as capitalization doctrines have ebbed and flowed 
between the Supreme Court's puzzling pronouncements in 
Commissioner v. Lincoln Savings & Loan Ass'n318 and INDOPCO, 
Inc. v. Commissioner. 319 
317 See, e.g., supra notes 225-29 and accompanying text (discussing the fate of the soil 
remediation T.A.M.). 
318 403 U.S. 345 (generating the supposedly determinative separate and distinct asset 
analysis). 
319 503 U.S. 79 (resurrecting the future benefit analysis). 
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Yet the Service does not come forward with clean hands either. 
Officials from Treasury and the Service have repeatedly claimed 
that INDOPCO did not change the law as to capitalization. 
Nevertheless, the Field is currently interpreting the future benefit 
presumption of capitalization much more broadly than in the past320 
and in litigation the Service has argued that INDOPCO created a 
!'new look."321 An examination of rulings over the past two decades 
shows that the Chief Counsel's Office in fact followed the judicial 
trend of the moment as the separate asset doctrine rose and then 
fell, but it never stopped auditing and litigating for a future benefit 
capitalization rule. In the meantime, Chief Counsel's Office, 
recognizing the hazards oflitigation and administrative concerns, 
from time to time recommended rough justice current deduction 
rules that the Commissioner almost never followed. Thus, Chief 
Counsel Stuart Brown's claim that the cyclical aircraft engine 
overhaul T.A.M. does not reflect a change in the Service's position 
is ingenuous. 
The advancement of general capitalization ·regulations is 
overdue. For almost twenty years, the Field has been desperate for 
guidance by the National Office as to the standards-actually it 
prefers rules-for capitalization. Despite protestations of denial, the 
Chief Counsel's Office position as to the capitalization rules did 
change as the tide of cases shifted from the taxpayer "separate 
asset doctrine" victories to the government victories under other 
tests culminating finally in INDOPCO. Regulations should be 
introduced that follow the discretionary justice approach outlined 
earlier, including the various safe harbor deductions that avoid 
income distortion. Furthermore, an open dialogue must take place 
to determine whether and, if so, under what conditions other 
agency policies should be taken into account in fashioning tax rules. 
Ideally, this dialogue would culminate in the suggested negotiated 
rulemaking strategy. Given the numerous inconsistenCies and 
frustration of public policy, a limitation rider mandating such a 
process and regulations might not be such a bad thing. 
320 See Rough Justice, supra note 16. 
321 See Sun Microsystems, 66 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1002. 
